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Abstract

In 1883, Otto von Bismark had a “change of heart” regarding colonialism.
Through shrewd diplomacy and secrecy, the German Chancellor was able to
spring the reality of German colonies on the world, particularly in the last
available or unclaimed regions in Africa and Oceania where the Germans
subsequently encroached upon British territory. One of Germany’s first colonies
was Southwest Africa, or present-day Namibia, where a German businessman
secured the purchase of a large tract of the Skeleton Coast from indigenous
rulers and then requested the protection of the German Reich, which Berlin
granted to him. The result was a vicious dispute of private claims between
German and British citizens and an entangled diplomacy between the two
empires.
In Britain, both Tory and Liberal governments tried to prevent the
Germans from establishing themselves so close to their precious Cape Colony
and both later attempted to confine the German territory so that the Afrikaners in
the Transvaal could not link up with the Germans. Eventually, London and
Cape Town would only succeed in the latter. Both Britain and the Cape failed to
produce any evidence of prior official claims to the Skeleton Coast. In fact, any
official British presence there had been previously withdrawn, leaving a
vacuum, because of the bloody wars between the indigenous tribes. They had
“left the door wide open” for the Germans to walk into southern Africa, and when
they tried to close this door, the British found Bismark’s foot firmly established in
it. Humiliatingly, Bismark forced both London and Cape Town to support
Germany’s control of Southwest Africa by turning down offers of annexation

from indigenous tribes or from British traders (with one such trader even trying
to establish an independent republic) who wanted a British presence there. In
the end, Britain admitted to the world that this was German soil.
Although Southwest Africa was not a prosperous German colony at first,
requiring many subsidies from the Reich, it became the most popular desti
nation for German colonists far exceeding the other German colonies in Africa
and Oceania due to the relatively small native population and large tracts of
seemingly vacant land. Yet as the 20th century came, Southwest African
mining began to profit and the discovery of diamonds created an economic
boom which finally made Southwest Africa a valuable asset to the German
Reich.
The German colonists did have, and created, some problems with the
indigenous population or particularly with the Herero and Nama tribes.
Although the German colonial government was able to gain control over them in
the 1890’s, they had an explosive rebellion in the early years of this century
which pushed German policy to a horrifying extreme, rivaling even the later
Third Reich in its brutality. Yet just as the German colonial government had
gained total control over Southwest Africa and just as the colony had become
profitable with a hopeful future, World War I gave Britain and the Union of South
Africa the pretext to invade the German colony. Despite the South African rule
over the territory until just recently when Namibia became independent, the
German impact on the region is as fundamental as the genetic makeup of a
living creature.
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P re fa c e

Southwest Africa, or modern-day Namibia, extends from Angola to the
Union of South Africa on the Atlantic coast and inland to the Zambezi River and
the Kalahari Desert. Namibia’s Skeleton Coast was named for the skeletons of
ships which wrecked along the thousand miles of quicksand-infested shore
where the great battle between the cold, rough Atlantic and the fierce Namib
Desert took place. The latter is the oldest desert in the world where dunes can
reach nearly a thousand feet high and at times create an impenetrable barrier.
The average temperature in this southern hemispheric country is around sixty
degrees fahrenheit in July and the mid- to upper seventies in January. Only
between the Namib and the Kalahari is there land of any agricultural value. In
the southern region, called Namaland, the karakul sheep thrive in the semidesert where over seventy acres of land are needed to support one animal. In
the central region between the great deserts lies Hereroland where the capital
of Windhoek was eventually established by the Germans. Here, with somewhat
more rainfall, the indigenous population and European settlers were able to
raise larger livestock such as cattle (though some cattle can be raised in
northern Namaland as well). In seasons with enough rain great grasslands
form, but in years of drought thousands of livestock die and the earth becomes
parched. Ovamboland is the last great region lying in the extreme north where
there is enough rainfall for cultivation and settled agriculture. Nearly half the
population of Southwest Africa or Namibia, both in its history and even now,
lives in Ovamboland. In addition, Giraffes, wildebeest, lions, oryx, elephants,
and many other great African animals still roam the countryside in and between
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Hereroland and Ovamboland. 1
The ethnic make-up of Southwest Africa is rather varied. The tribes
consist of two major linguistic groups: the Khoisan and the Bantu. The Khoisan
peoples, who originally inhabited all of southern Africa were increasingly
pushed south and west by the Bantu migration towards the more arid regions of
the Kalahari and Namib. One group of these Khoisan retained their stone-age
culture of nomadic life and were called “bushmen” for their miraculous survival
in such harsh conditions. The Bushmen have been hunted down or used as
slaves by nearly every other tribe in Southwest Africa. Another group called the
Nama, labeled “Hottentots” by outsiders, represent a mixture of the Bantu and
Khoisan blood with some indigenous to the region and others later pushed into
Southwest Africa from South Africa by Dutch colonists between 1800 and 1830.
/»

Another group, the Herero, represent the Bantu invasion from the north into
Southwest Africa directly and became the most powerful tribe in the central
region probably due to their more centralized tribal system whereas the others
remained divided and scattered. Another Bantu tribe, though much weaker,
called the Berg Damara was pushed into the mountainous fringe of the Namib
by both the Herero and Nama. Not until the German colonists had almost wiped
out the Damara’s enemies were they to flourish and gain a significant
population. Another small group, called the Basters (or “Bastards”), a mixture of
Bantu, Malay (from Madagascar), and Dutch blood, was pushed out of South
Africa and allowed by the Herero in the 1870’s to move north slipping past the
Nama to form a buffer for the Herero from their southern Nama enemies. The
last major ethnic group, other than various tribes which inhabited the Caprivi
Strip or panhandle of the country, were the Ovambo. These people,
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like the Herero, were Bantu who had invaded from the north and settled in the
region north of the Herero. The Ovambo make up almost half the population of
Southwest Africa or Namibia and are able to raise corn in their land that
receives on average 22 inches of rain per year (compared with the only 5
inches of rain per year in the southern region of Namaland ) . 2
The first Europeans to visit Southwest Africa were the Portuguese in
1484. They named a natural harbor on the Skeleton Coast, on their way
towards the Cape of Good Hope, “Angra Pequena” which would later have
some significance in the region’s history. The Dutch, who created their colony
south on the Cape, were the next to make expeditions along the coast, visiting
Southwest Africa as early as 1670. Yet neither the Portuguese nor the Dutch
ever annexed or settled there with the Portuguese confining themselves to
Angola and the Dutch remaining on the Cape. One reason was the lack of
readily apparent resources, including drinking water. One exception was a
1791 Dutch expedition which discovered gold, but it was dismissed by the Cape
with skepticism. Most expeditions for gold actually ended up being mere
hunting excursions for exotic animals. In 1796, a year after the British took over
the Cape Colony, one English ship sailed up the coast to take temporary
possession of six places along it, though the Napoleonic wars drew London’s
attention away from the Skeleton Coast where nothing permanent or official
was ever done. The only valuable resource found by Europeans and exploited
prior to Germany’s entry, were the islands off the coast near Angra Pequena.
These islands had guano (bird dung) deposits as much as seventy feet thick,
which entrepreneurs excavated and later sold as rich fertilizer to Europe. They
removed hundreds of thousands of tons between 1843 and 1848, when at one

point three hundred ships anchored off one island alone. However, by 1847
one company gained a monopoly over the guano, De Pass, Spence &
Company, which represented nearly the only permanent European presence in
Southwest Africa beyond the missionaries which crossed the Orange River
boundary of the Cape into the region as early as 1802.3
I would like to note to the reader that many regions are identified by
different names, but I have attempted to standardize most of them. For Walvis
Bay, as an example, which was also known as Walfisch or Whale Fish Bay, I
have strictly used the contemporary identity. Also, regions like Hereroland or
Namaland which have been at times identified as Damaraland or Namaqualand respectively I have tried to standardize in their use to hopefully ease any
confusion. Furthermore, I have tried to refer to Britain’s bureaucratic branches
involved in this affair as the Foreign and Colonial Offices whereas for the
German government I have referred to the applicable entities as the Foreign
Ministry and the Colonial Department For the most part these are the accepted
names anyway, though some individuals involved and some historians writing
their accounts mix the terms in the whole affair. Hopefully this will make my
account clearer than some.
The bulk of my primary material comes from British government docu
ments, therefore one should expect a somewhat more thorough British view.
However I have supplemented this with documents from the German Foreign
Ministry and the records of a particular official there who was in office for nearly
the entire lifespan of the German colonies. I chose him for his tendency to avoid
political circles, in which he seemed to play the more neutral and objective role
in that office. I hope the balance which I sought was achieved.
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Chapter 1
Open Doors Entered
In the middle of 1915, as the weather became increasingly colder in the
southern hemisphere, the bulk of the German forces defending Southwest
Africa from the South African invasion surrendered near Tsumeb in the northern
part of the colony. The Germans had been hopelessly outnumbered and were
only able to fight a delaying war which lasted into July, well after the fall of the
capital of Windhoek. The retreating German forces bad had only one hope for
escape: to reach the Caprivi Strip and fight their way across the British transZambezi region to reach other German forces on Lake Tanganyika in East
Africa. Unfortunately for them, they were out-flanked and cut off by the South
Africans. Thus with Germany losing this and eventually all of her colonies, and
with South Africa gaining control over Southwest Africa, a door which had been
misfeasantly left open long ago by Great Britain and the Cape Colony (South
Africa), now had been closed once and for alU
In 1883 Prince Otto von Bismark, Chancellor of the new German Reich,
was fully engaged on two fronts: to maintain the European balance of power
and pax that he had orchestrated with Germany on top, and to keep his
Conservative imperial government in power. Germany was one of the most
vulnerable nations in Europe. Prior to unification it had two conflicts with Austria
and Denmark, followed by a successful war with France to defend German
unity. The result was the birth of the German Reich with Prussian aristocrats
and other Conservatives leading the government under the former Prussian
king, now German emperor, Wilhelm I. Following unification, Chancellor
Bismark embarked on a dream policy of balancing friends and foes in a way
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that would prevent a war against Germany. He allied the three emperors of
Germany, Austria, and Russia and made authorized rapprochement efforts with
defeated France .2 Bismark vacillated between conflicting policies playing off
each nation’s fears and distrust of one another in an effort to segregate and
diffuse any threat from growing against Germany. Although the Chancellor had
a distaste for Britain, he used England to play off French and Russian fears and
vice versa. However, with new powers emerging like the United States, Italy,
and Japan, with new technologies making European war increasingly dynamic,
volatile, and out of control, and with new international rivalry on the rise,
Bismark's system of juggling began breaking down in the final decades of the
nineteenth century. Furthermore, despite Bismark’s distaste for democracy, he
had to deal with the new Reichstag and the public opinion of the new German
electorate. Although control was fairly centralized within the imperial
government on most matters, the Reichstag possessed “the power of the purse”
when it came to two particular matters that were fairly new to Germans: naval
priorities and colonies. Nor did Bismark’s Conservatives rule by themselves;
there were liberal, moderate, and socialist parties and factions represented in
the Reichstag and in the government as well. Only through alliances between
Conservatives and the National Liberal and Center parties could the imperial
agenda be assured. That meant at times giving in to more industrial and liberal
planks, such as colonies, which Bismark and his Prussian agrarians would
have otherwise liked to forego.3
Just as enthusiasts, industrialists, and public opinion divided and pushed
many German Conservatives into colonialism, British Liberals in control of
London were also divided and prodded. Traditionally British Liberals had been
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against new colonial expansion or any rejuvenated imperialism which had
waned since mid-century. The Liberal Cabinet in Britain from 1880 to 1885
refused to accept any increase in cost or responsibility which new colonies or
expanded colonies would incur. William E. Gladstone, as Prime Minister, stated
this well in March of 1882: “Throughout the whole of my political life . . . I cannot
recollect an occasion on which I gave a vote or took a step . . . except on the
side which was opposed to [further] annexation.” Gladstone further believed
that the goal of British colonization was to eventually create independent,
anglophile nations--“so many happy Englands”--in which London would be the
model, and yet not necessarily the leader responsible for them. The Prime
Minister even demanded that no further annexations be considered unless the
expressed and authenticated “wish of the people to be annexed” was

g iv e n .4

However the Prime Minister’s anti-imperial influence began to lose its effect,
especially with those who disagreed with his 1872 opposition to the annexation
of Fiji, his 1881 offer of autonomy to the Transvaal (in which Gladstone had
British public opinion against him), and his 1883 prevention of Australian efforts
to annex New Guinea. Gladstone’s own Cabinet had varying degrees of
concurrence and even dissension. The Lord Chancellor and Home Secretary
were both well known for their hostility against new or larger colonies, while
Gladstone’s Colonial Secretary, Lord Derby (Edward Stanley), though likewise
evasive of increased cost and responsibility, gave into pressure from the British
colonies themselves in the issues of expansion. Others in the Cabinet went
much further, calling for the English race to rule the world. Yet even these
radicals underestimated any rumors of possible German colonization and the
effects it would have, and even believed that this remote possibility would be
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preferable to any further French gains. 5
Such diversity of opinion was just as apparent in Bismark’s government,
though initial German interest and involvement in southern Africa came without
any official sanction or control. German missionaries were the pioneers in this.
They had been active under the London Missionary Society (LMS), which had
access to Southwest Africa ever since the first missionaries began crossing the
Orange River into Namaland in 1802. After the LMS and the later Wesleyan
Missionary Society (WMS) had failed among these indigenous peoples who
seemed to vigorously oppose the cross, the Rhenish Missionary Society (RMS)
based out of Germany was given exclusive rights over Southwest Africa by the
LMS in 1840. This embarked them on a course of cultural imperialism that
increasingly drew more German involvement into Southwest Africa. However,
the evangelical field remained very wide in this land where natives resisted the
Christian faith. The RMS therefore helped and encouraged the Finnish
Missionary Society (FMS), which was also Evangelical Lutheran, to set up
amongst the Ovambo in 1870 well to the

n o r th . 6

The sociopolitical climate of Southwest Africa was as severe as its
physical climate, which did not help evangelical or mercantile enterprise. The
Nama and Herero had been at odds over cattle and land in the region’s
heartland ever since the Nama entered the land from the south colliding with
the Herero who had entered from the north during the Bantu migration.
However, the 1864 Herero-Nama war exploded with particular vigor and
complexity when Western weapons and personalities, mostly traders, entered
the picture. English traders and the Swede merchant Charles Andersson (who
was given the Herero title “regent and military commander for the period of his
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natural life or as long as he desired”) assisted the Herero. After several defeats
by the aided Herero, the Nama made a raid in 1868 on Andersson’s shop and a
RMS mission. The RMS later requested protection from Prussia, but the
Franco-Prussian war and German unification diverted any attention. A tentative
i

peace in 1870 between the Nama and Herero also dropped the matter for a
while.7
The British Cape Colony became involved when it sent William Palgrave
to the scene as “special commissioner in Southwest Africa” on a four year
mission to gain tribal allegiance to Cape authorities. However, by 1876 only the
Basters (who the Herero allowed to move past the Nama northward to become
a buffer around Rehoboth between their own tribe and the Nama) agreed to
Cape overseers. The Herero wanted complete protection from any Nama
revenge, but the Cape was not willing to offer it entirely. Palgrave tried likewise
to bring the Nama under the Cape’s sphere, but the Nama wanted nothing to do
with the British. Palgrave reported to the Cape that eventually the British colony
needed to invade the Nama

te r r ito r y .8

However for now, the imperial powers

simply did not want to go to any great effort or expense in the colonies, which
such protection in Southwest Africa for the missionaries, traders, and Herero
would cost. No one wanted to “foot the bill.” In 1878, the British Cape only
occupied Walvis Bay as a symbol of their protection of the Herero.9 The Herero
paramount chief Maherero, also known as Kamaherero, commented that British
protection was not what he envisioned: “The British flag flew here [at Walvis
Bay]. It waved this way and that; we attached ourselves to it, and we were
waved backwards and forwards with it."io The Herero fell away from any

6

commitments to Britain as more and more Boer settlers entered their territory
without any Cape efforts to stop it, and with little evidence of British protection
from the Nama offered.
In 1880, London received its first hints of increased German interest in
Southwest Africa. In a letter of July 19 (which usually took over 20 days to be
sent from Cape Town to London and vice versa), Cape Governor H. B. E. Frere
sent a copy of an article by Ernst von Weber published in the Berlin
Geographische Nachrichten of November 1879 in which the writer argued for a
German colony in southern Africa after having visited the region in 1871. The
Cape Governor claimed that this idea had been “much discussed in German
commercial and political circles even before the Franco-German War.” He
added that a possible colony was “one of the immediate motives of the German
mission of scientific inquiry which visited Southern and Eastern Africa in 187071.” Governor Frere also warned London that “recent events have drawn
together the German and Dutch Republicans in the colony” and that Weber’s
article noted that the Dutch Boers have the same “Teutonic blood” as
Germans. 11 Weber supported the idea of a German occupation of Delagoa Bay
in Mozambique, which he claimed Germans possessed from 1776-1781, and
then push “forward, little by little, a chain of German trading stations as far as the
Upper Zambesi” such that the Boers in the Transvaal would have an open door
out of British encirclement. 12 London took the matter seriously. The Colonial
Office quickly forwarded the dispatch to the Foreign Office in September 1880,
after which the latter made inquiries to their embassy in Berlin. The British
ambassador there made an accurate assessment of the poor support for
colonies in the German imperial government. He cited that Germans preferred
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to emigrate to lands controlled by republican national governments rather than
colonial ones. The Ambassador felt that Germany was “more the want of
soldiers than of colonies” and that the rejection of the Samoa Bill in the
Reichstag had “marked its disinclination to acquire distant dependencies
however advantageous to German enterprise.” He assured London that “under
present circumstances therefore the plan for a German Colony in South Africa
has no prospect of success.” London then assured the Cape that such was the
case. However, those circumstances soon changed. 13
In 1880, the Herero-Nama war began anew. This war began because of
a water hole incident where both the Nama and Herero had cattle herds. One
cow was found missing among thousands, and accusations were made which
led to open conflict. Cape authorities sent the HMS Dwarf to Walvis Bay as a
show of force, which did little or nothing to aid the Herero. The conflict became
very bloody. Whites who had intervened in tribal affairs before or who had
unfairly traded with the indigenous population, found themselves to be targets.
Traders and missionaries lost property and sometimes their lives. The Cape,
instead of trying to provide protection for the whites or to resolve the conflict,
pulled the few officials it had there back to Walvis Bay and constructed a fort
there to protect them. When the RMS appealed to the Cape for protection
(while Germany appealed on their behalf to Britain), both London and the Cape
stated that only Walvis Bay was British, and they could only provide protection
t h e r e . 14

The British Foreign Secretary told the German government that “Her

Majesty's Government cannot be held responsible for anything that may take
place outside of British Territorial limits, which the latter only includes [Walvis]
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Bay and a small portion of country surrounding it.”i5 This statement would later
come back to haunt British officials, as they now left an excuse for the Germans
to become more actively involved in Southwest Africa to protect their subjects
there. To make Britain’s tenuous hold on the region worse, when London had
given the Cape powers to annex Walvis Bay in 1878, the latter dragged its feet
despite only needing to pass an act of annexation. Therefore the only area
occupied by Britain on the mainland of the Skeleton Coast was not even
officially British or Cape territory. The door was left completely open. 16
In 1882, the Cape tried working out the foundations of a peace in the
Herero-Nama conflict; but as soon as they lifted the threat of an attack on Walvis
Bay they left the rest of the peace effort to the German missionaries. In midJune the RMS concluded a peace on paper between the Herero and Nama at
the Baster capital of Rehoboth. However, conflicts still smoldered for a while
with Nama raids on Herero and Baster cattle. The Boers who had moved into
the region even joined in this pillage, which created further difficulties between
natives and whites. Finally by late fall the peace became more evident. Yet the
RMS made appeals once more to Germany for protection of their life and
property, distrusting the entente between the tribes.
At this point, Bismark was still completely opposed to intervention in or
creation of colonies, as were most Prussian Conservatives. The Chancellor
called colonies versorgungsposten or “maintenance posts” which took
resources and troops away from the Fatherland. 1

As early as 1868, before a

united Germany even existed, Bismark had expressed that private organiz
ations should colonize, not governments which then had to construct a navy to
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protect them and which would embroil themselves with other governments. He
felt it “difficult to justify the imposition of heavy taxation upon the whole nation for
the benefit of a few branches of

in d u s tr y .”i8

in the negotiations of 1871 over the

French surrender, the Iron Chancellor refused French offers of colonies in Asia.
In the following two years he likewise refused requests from Fiji’s ruler and the
Sultan of Zanzibar for German protection in the Pacific and East Africa
respectively. In early 1873 a British official reported to London that “colonies, in
his opinion, would only be a cause of weakness, because colonies could only
be defended by powerful fleets, and Germany’s geographical position did not
necessitate her development into a first-class maritime power.” i9 Three years
later Bismark denied approachments by German merchants (led by Weber and
F. A. E. Luderitz) for a German protectorate or colony in the Transvaal. This
position continued into the next decade, with the Chancellor boasting in 1881
that “so long as I am Chancellor we will carry no colonial

p o lic y .”2o

Bismark’s

policy against colonies was further evident when his Foreign Ministry sent a
dispatch to one of its officials in Egypt (which was occupied by Britain in 1882)
that: “The consciousness of being a major Great Power must not seduce us into
pursuing a policy based on prestige in the French fashion. In reality our
international and overall European interests are not sufficiently great to allow us
to take the lead in Egyptian affairs.”21 Britain, under Gladstone’s Liberal
government, even requested Germany’s position in Egypt. Leo George
Leveson-Gower (Lord Granville), Gladstone’s Foreign Secretary, in a letter to
Bismark said that a statement by Germany of its overseas role would be “a most
useful guide and probably prevent some unnecessary mistakes being made.”
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The German Chancellor responded that he “was not in a position to endanger
Germany’s relations with the other Powers by making suggestions for English
policy.” At this point, Germany was not going to get in the middle of France and
England in the contest over Egypt or any other colonial matter, nor endanger
relations with Russia by allying with Britain. The only suggestion Bismark made
to England was to “throw Gladstone out” which reflected his favoring a
Conservative rather than Liberal government in London as well as in Berlin .22
At this time, Bismark valued good relations with Russia above those with Britain.
The main concern for the Chancellor in 1882 was Russia’s superior railway
which everyday could move 20,000 more troops to the field than Germany. In
November, Bismark deemed the construction of defensive forts along the
eastern frontier with Russia as “urgently necessary” whereas the idea of
sending German troops overseas was unfathomable .23
Even into 1883, Bismark was more concerned with the European
balance of power than any extension of German power abroad, which in his
view might weaken the German position in Europe. With Germany’s endless
fear of encirclement, officials were carefully monitoring the turbulent situation in
and the uncertain policies of France and the possibility of a Franco-Russian
alliance that would threaten Germany. Berlin was actually encouraging Paris
and St. Petersburg to spend their resources in possessions outside Europe
rather than have them focus their efforts on the home continent. The secretary
of the German embassy in Paris, Bernhard Bulow who would later be head of
the Foreign Ministry and even German Chancellor, reported to Berlin that
France was entrenched in colonial matters with conflicts in Madagascar and
Tonkin. Germany feared that if the present French government fell it would
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“disengage France from her colonial enterprises in order to be able unhindered
to devote herself to building up a European coalition against us.”24 Berlin
successfully played British and French fears off each other, for instance pointing
out to London French gains in southern China. Paris was then infuriated by
British resistance to French colonial efforts which restored the balance in
Germany’s favor. Bulow pointed out in December that Britain’s exclusion of
France in the Egyptian Question was the worst French setback since 1871
when Germany defeated her in war. Germany’s embassy in Paris made efforts
to convince France that British and French interests clashed across the globe
whereas German and French interests only clashed in Alsace-Lorraine. Bulow
wrote to Berlin that “a more active French colonial policy is capable of making
the French aware of the disadvantages of the notion of revanche, of
demonstrating to them that they have other rivals besides ourselves, and, above
all, of improving their feelings towards us.”25 into the next year, Bulow had the
German embassy submit anonymous articles in French newspapers, supporting
a more active French colonial policy. It was clear that the German imperial
government looked at colonies as being a liability that a foreign power could
exploit rather than being an advantage.26
Bismark had mainly opposed colonies because of their cost in resources,
that the German navy was too small to defend them, that they would hurt
Germany’s balance with other Powers, and that the German people were not
ready for them. By 1883, circumstances changed. Differing with Bismark, some
Germans came to believe that founding colonies in Britain’s neighborhoods
would actually help rapprochement efforts with France, while retaining Britain’s
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dependence on Germany to keep France out of British colonial ventures such
as Egypt. Also, German Crown Prince Friedrich, the heir apparent to the
Kaiser’s throne, was a Liberal diehard and supported such factions in the
Reichstag in opposition to Bismark. To complicate it further for Bismark,
Friedrich was an adamant anglophile having married Queen Victoria’s
daughter. Therefore, it would be in Bismark’s favor to create colonies that
would estrange the Crown Prince from England before Friedrich and his wife
ascended the German throne. Also, the German public was very much ready
for colonies now--despite the reality of Germany being only little more than a
decade old. Deputies in the Reichstag were making speeches for colonies.
German newspapers were reporting a public colonial hunger. The Deutsche
Kolonial Verein, a colonial society, was founded with others soon to follow. In
the first year membership grew into the thousands, reaching well over ten
thousand within two years. By January 1884, membership was strong enough
to support the publication of the Kolonialzeitung which was to voice public
demands for German colonies. The public had already read about the
exploration and exploitation of Africa by England’s Stanley and France’s Brazza
and could now read about Germans like Bohm, Kaiser, or Reichard in the
Tanganyika region, Buchner, Wiesmann, Wolff, Schulze, or Kund in the Congo,
or Peters and Nachtigal in other parts of the “dark continent.” By the 1880’s
explorers and scholars were calling for German colonies in southern Africa
before Britain gained it all.

A sense that a door of opportunity for Germany was

closing created in early 1884 a colonial frenzy, called the Torschlusspanik or
“door-closing-panic,” which effected that year’s Reichstag election. Bismark
was acutely aware of all of

th is .2 7

13

However, Bismark’s greatest objection to colonies had been the cost
which still remained despite the colonial frenzy in the German electorate or the
beneficial effect it would have on Bismark’s enemies-especially the heir to the
German throne. Despite attempts by Adolph Woermann (a Hamburg merchant
who owned one of the largest trading firms in Africa especially in Cameroon)
and F. A. E. Luderitz (a Bremen merchant and entrepreneur interested in the
Skeleton Coast of Southwest Africa) to convince Bismark to extend German
protection or simply annex territory in certain areas, Bismark was hung up on
the cost. Regarding this fiscal challenge, Heinrich von Kusserow, a privy
councillor in the Foreign Ministry, came to Woermann and Luderitz’s rescue. In
April 1883, misinterpreting an Anglo-French agreement to respect each other’s
life and property in Sierra Leone as a trade agreement, Kusserow warned
Bismark to “beware of France and Britain” and that the two, with Portugal, would
gobble up the unclaimed regions of

A f r ic a .28

in February Bismark had

requested Britain to protect Luderitz in Southwest Africa since Germany had no
interest there. However by August, under Kusserow’s guidance, Bismark had
the German Consul in Cape Town announce German protection over Luderitz’s
enterprises. Kusserow had suggested that a British style charter system would
make colonies painless to the German taxpayer, unlike a French style imperial
system which Bismark feared. With the public responding favorably to
Bismark’s extension of protection to Luderitz and the fear of cost dispelled,
Bismark decided to throw his weight towards backing Luderitz. His change
caught London and his own Foreign Ministry completely off guard. Although the
Iron Chancellor had enforced German commercial rights abroad before (such
as in the South Pacific in 1876 and 1879), this endeavor seemed different from
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the start.29
In his office on 128 Leadenhall Street in London, Daniel de Pass sat
down to read the Daily News of July 12, 1883, particularly interested in what
was going on under the South African headlines since he had much invested in
the region. There he read a telegraphed article from Cape Town, dated July 9:
“Angra Pequena harbour on the West Coast between [Namaland] and
[Hereroland] has been bought from the Natives, and occupied by a German
trading company under an alleged guarantee of the German Government.” It
was also mentioned that: “Possession has been taken of some miles

in la n d . "so

De Pass was in shock, he was the one who possessed a lease over Angra
Pequena harbor, several inland copper mines, and all the guano islands of the
Ichaboe group which extended from Angra Pequena northward along the coast.
He immediately notified the Colonial Office, which constituted the government’s
first news of the German occupation in Southwestern Africa. The alarm sent
Colonial Secretary, Lord Derby, and Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville,
clambering to deal with the German appearance on the Skeleton Coast.
However they still retained the belief, which was specifically intended by
Bismark, that Germany was not securing colonies but only protecting German
subjects abroad.31
Before England could fully realize what was going on, Luderitz had made
a second purchase from the Bethanie Nama on August 25, 1883, thereby
expanding his possession from Angra Pequena south all the way to the Orange
River border of the Cape Colony and inland many miles. This put the British
government in a state of confusion, since many officials thought that all of the
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coastline between the Orange River and Walvis Bay had been officially taken
into possession in 1878, including Angra Pequena harbor. However, the Cape
Parliament never passed the necessary legislation to officially annex the
territory. Even Walvis Bay, though under de facto British occupation, had not
been officially annexed. Britain had left the door open and met the German
arrival completely

u n p r e p a r e d .32

On July 26, Derby forwarded De Pass’ letter and the Daily News article to
the Cape requesting information. But before there was an answer, De Pass’
company had sent more articles from the Standard and the South African which
told more of the German occupation. The Colonial Office then began a long
process of delaying responses to De Pass & Company, since they possessed
no more information than the business. The Cape administration sent a
dispatch from the Resident Magistrate of Walvis Bay who reported that “two
ships with a party of Germans have arrived in Angra Pequena in charge of a Mr.
Vogelson [Luderitz’s manager], that he has purchased the port from the Chief of
Southern

[ N a m a la n d ] . ”33

The magistrate feared that the Germans would

prolong the Herero-Nama conflict by supplying the Nama with modern weapons
against the Herero (whom the British had given

g u n s ) .34

On September 6, 1883, Foreign Secretary Granville received a dispatch
from the British Ambassador in Berlin, who was informed by the German
government that Luderitz had purchased territory in and around Angra Pequena
from a Nama chief and that the German government was extending its
protection of him and his enterprise. However, the Ambassador reported to
Granville that he believed this protection would only be like that offered any
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other German subject abroad and that London should not consider Luderitz’s
private possessions a French-like crown colonization process since Berlin was
only referring to it as a Handelsniederl-assung or commercial colony. On
September 12, London received news from the Cape that two ships of John
Spence, an associate of De Pass, reported observing German weapons
unloaded at Angra Pequena. With Colonial Secretary Derby’s approval, Lt.
General L. Smyth, the Cape administrating officer, sent the HMS Starling up the
coast to investigate, which he believed would also have “a beneficial effect on
the natives. ”35
By autumn, 1883, Bismark was carefully and secretly changing his own
personal attitudes towards colonies. The Chancellor decided to “raise the ante”
on Southwest Africa by requesting whether Britain claimed Angra Pequena and
if so on what grounds. On September 10, Baron Plessen, the German Charge
d ’Affairs at the London embassy, communicated that the Luderitz claim
extended from the Orange River boundary of the Cape Colony northward
through Angra Pequena to the Little Fish River. Derby, on October 2, requested
that the Foreign Office give Germany the Letters Patent of February 27, 1867
(official imperial recognition), which backed De Pass’ claims to the guano
islands off the coast of Luderitz’s purchase. Six days later, the Colonial
Secretary received a dispatch from the Cape that included a report that the
guano islands off the Skeleton Coast were claimed for Britain by Captain
Forsyth of the HMS Valorous on May 5, 1866, and annexed to the colony by
Cape Act No. 5 of 1874 and then proclaimed by Sir Henry Barkly on July 8,
1874, in accordance with the Letters Patent of February 27, 1867. However,
having met with Luderitz, Smyth found out that the German company did not
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want the guano islands to begin with and were only interested in the mainland
and interior of Southwest Africa. Luderitz assured him that he would not
interfere with preexisting rights and was only given approval by the German
Foreign Ministry if he did not interfere with such rights. Smyth reported that
Luderitz believed he could move ships in and out of Angra Pequena without
disturbing the guano deposits on the islands, as his company had done for five
years on the west coast of Mexico. Luderitz also revealed to Smyth his belief
that water was moving under the Namib Desert to the ocean, with only the
Bushmen hitherto having knowledge of, in which productive wells could be dug
to enable transportation across the coastal desert into the interior grasslands of
the Nama and Herero. This too made Luderitz’s enterprise more menacing to
De Pass & Company, who had failed to effectively access the interior.36
In a dramatic episode, De Pass, Spence & Company took matters into
their own hands. Smyth sent an urgent telegraph on October 19, 1883, which
was received by wire the same day in London. The Cape informed London that
British traders were planning to leave the next day for Angra Pequena to expel
the Germans physically from the harbor. Granville notified Derby that a gunboat
should be sent to prevent such a collision between the commercial forces of De
Pass and Luderitz. The Colonial Office sent a request to the Admiralty which in
turn sent orders to the Cape commander, Rear Admiral Salmon. On October
24, the Admiralty reported that the Cape commander sent the HMS Boadicea to
Angra Pequena. The ship returned a little more than a week later with the
collision prevented and with it De Pass’ hopes of removing the Germans
forcibly. 37
Meanwhile, Germany had laid the full burden of proof on Britain to argue
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her claims on Southwest Africa, which plunged London and Cape Town into an
intensive search of their records and archives trying to find evidence. The
Colonial Office received a report from the Cape on October 30 stating that upon
investigation they found that Britain and the Cape had failed to officially annex
Walvis Bay let alone any other stretch along the mainland. Three weeks later,
after Granville had forwarded to Derby Germany’s request of evidence of British
claim to Angra Pequena, the Foreign Secretary wrote to the German
Ambassador, Count Munster, that “although Her Majesty’s Government have
not proclaimed the Queen’s sovereignty along the whole country, but only
certain points, such as [Walvis] Bay and the Angra Pequena islands, they
consider that any claim to sovereignty or jurisdiction by a Foreign Power
between the southern point of Portuguese jurisdiction at latitude 18 and the
frontier of the Cape Colony would infringe their legitimate rights.” Granville
added that Britain could not offer the German government more information until
a report was received from the Cape regarding Britain’s claim to the mainland.
Interestingly Granville gave an exact boundary for the Portuguese while giving
only a vague one for the Cape, trying to have the latter be as inclusive as
possible. Also, the Foreign Secretary gave Munster the impression that Walvis
Bay had been officially annexed to the Cape, when the Cape Administrator had
already reported it had not. That bluff would at least work. For now, Britain
needed time.38
The Colonial Office received the Cape report on November 28, twentytwo days after it had been sent, which contained a letter from Spence who
enclosed a deed (dated September 21, 1863) signed by David Christian, then
chief of the Bethanie Nama. This deed gave De Pass, Spence & Company the
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right to mine in the coastal territory near Angra Pequena. De Pass’ associate
admitted in his letter that the British company had to suspend mining operations
of copper and silver until there were better roads into Southwest Africa, and that
therefore the company’s operations on the mainland had been abandoned for
some time. Beyond Spence’s information, Smyth also enclosed a report from
the Cape Ministers. The Ministers believed that Spence’s (and therefore De
Pass’) claim was a private right beyond the Cape Colony and that therefore they
as ministers of the Cape could not comment on its validity. The Ministers further
believed that the guano islands were officially annexed in 1867 regardless of
De Pass & Company’s private claims on them, and that the only possible
mainland annexation they knew of was Walvis Bay in 1878. The Ministers
expressed to the Cape Administrator that they were glad Germany’s colony
would only be a commercial one but that London needed to make a more exact
definition of British or Cape claims to Southwestern Africa.39
Smyth then forwarded a report from Rear Admiral Salmon, commanderin-chief of naval forces in southern Africa, enclosing a report from the HMS
Boadicea on its trip to Angra Pequena to prevent the collision of commercial
interests from becoming violent. Captain Church of said ship reported that
Luderitz wanted duties from British ships (i. e. De Pass & Company) that
entered the harbor, but would not enforce it. The Germans presented the British
warship with a deed of sale from Chief Joseph Fredrick of the Bethanie Nama,
and affirmed that De Pass’ deed for the mainland, which was only a mining
lease, was null and void. Captain Church believed RMS missionaries had
helped Luderitz secure the sale of land, but also reported that a resident of
Angra Pequena, John Grove (although an employee of De Pass), asserted that
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Angra Pequena harbor to be British despite there being no records to back this
up. Church enclosed a copy of Luderitz’s deed of sale. It follows: “On this day,
the 25th August 1883. . . (Chief) Joseph Fredriks, of Bethanie, did sell and give
up to the firm of F. A. E. Luderitz, of Bremen, in Germany. . . a portion of his
country, namely the entire coast from the Great or Orange River up to the
twenty-sixth degree of south latitude, inclusive of all harbours and bays, up to
20 geographical miles inland, reckoned from every point along the coast.”4o
This information sent both London and Cape Town scrambling. Derby received
a letter from Smyth on December 6, 1883, in which the Cape Administrator
argued that Angra Pequena was annexed by Captain Forsyth of the HMS
Valorous on May 5, 1866. The Colonial Office then forwarded the report of
Captain Church of the HMS Boadicea to the Admiralty on December 12 and
requested any “record of the proceedings of Her Majesty’s Ships” that might
support that Angra Pequena had been annexed by Britain so that they could
answer Germany’s request for evidence.^
Britain, true to form for all the colonial powers until Germany’s entry and
the subsequent scramble for the last unclaimed regions of Africa and Oceania,
was still not willing at this point to spend a great amount of resources on the
colonization process. Both London and Cape Town passed the economic and
political responsibility for colonial expansion back and forth, with neither party
willing to be responsible for the increased expenditure. Derby sent a dispatch
to the Cape Administrator on December 13, finally responding to Smyth’s letter,
in which he warned the Colonial Secretary that even Walvis Bay remained
officially unannexed. The Cape had wanted London to extend the Imperial Acts
26 & 27, which set and documented the boundaries of the British colony, to
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include Walvis Bay, but Derby refused:
Her Majesty’s Government are not prepared to propose such
legislation. . . . you are aware that a solution of the question would be
afforded by legislation on the part of the Cape Parliament, under Her
Majesty’s Letters Patents of 14th December 1878 for the annexation
of [Walvis] Bay to the Cape Colony; but I understand that the Colonial
Parliament would not be willing so to legislate, and in such case it will
become a serious question whether Her Majesty’s sovereignty can
continue to be maintained at that place.42
Obviously London had made arrangements in 1878 for the Cape to annex
Walvis Bay, but the Cape only dragged its feet. This began a long process of
both London and Cape Town passing the responsibility back and forth and in
effect doing much of nothing. The door remained open. This bought a
tremendous amount of time for Germany--time it needed for an about-face in
colonial policy.
On December 27, 1883, the Admiralty responded to the Colonial Office’s
request for evidence that a British ship had claimed Angra Pequena in the past.
The answer was not what Derby wanted to hear. According to the Admiralty’s
records, the HMS Grecian “visited Angra Pequena in 1851, but there is nothing
to show that the ship took possession of any portion of land on behalf of the
Crown.” A decade later, the HMS Furious visited the coast and annexed
Ichaboe Island, twenty-four English miles north of Angra Pequena, but the
Admiralty warned that “it must be observed that the ‘Furious’ did not call at
Angra Pequena in 1861 on her way to Ichaboe Island.”^

The Admiralty then

reported that Captain Forsyth of the HMS Valorous in 1866 annexed the rest of
the islands of the Ichaboe group that “extend from Hollam’s Bird Island, in
latitude 24 38’ S., . . . to Sinclair’s Island, in latitude 27 41’ S., . . . [with] Ichaboe
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forming about the centre.” The Colonial Secretary had wanted to hear that
more than just the guano islands had been officially claimed and annexed by
Britain. Derby had his office request the records of Captain Alexander of the
HMS Star from the Admiralty, who was thought to have visited Angra Pequena
in 1796, to see if he possibly made any official British claim to the mainland; but
nothing was found to that

e n d . 44

Derby was “grasping for straws,” and he had

yet to respond to the German request whether Britain claimed Angra Pequena
and if so on what grounds.
On December 31, 1883, Bismark had his ambassador in London, Count
Munster, who he had intentionally kept in the dark about Germany’s true
aspirations, deliver a message to Granville, which was then forwarded to Derby
in the new

y e a r .45

Germany knew Britain had no evidence of claim to the

mainland of Southwest Africa with the exception of possibly Walvis Bay. Berlin,
through Munster, was in the process of calling London’s bluff: “I have
communicated to my Government the reply which your Lordship [Granville]
gave . . . to my inquiry ‘whether England maintained claims to the territory of
Angra Pequena, and, if so, upon what foundation.’ The tenor of your Lordship’s
answer was that Her Majesty’s Government had not indeed proclaimed the
sovereignty of Her Majesty the Queen throughout the country, but only at certain
points, as, for instance, at [Walvis] Bay and on the Angra Pequena islands.” The
German Ambassador regurgitated Britain’s stand “that the pretension of any
other Power to sovereignty or jurisdiction over the territory lying between . . . the
Portuguese [frontier] and the frontier of Cape Colony, would be an infringement
of [Britain’s] legitimate rights.” Munster told Granville that Berlin doubted “the
legal ground of the claims of the British Government” and announced
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Germany’s stand: “That the British sovereignty beyond the frontier of Cape
Colony was limited to [Walvis] Bay and the islands off Angra Pequena, is on the
hypotheses under which the Imperial Government is entitled and bound to grant
the house of Luderitz the protection of the Empire for a settlement which this firm
contemplates establishing on territory outside the sovereignty of any other
Power, on the southwest coast of Africa.” Ambassador Munster then used
Britain’s own words and actions of the past, particularly in regard to the 1880
pullout due to the Herero-Nama war, against London’s arguments that the
region was within her sphere of claim: “ In consequence of an application from
the [Rhenish] Missionary Society for protection for their missionary and trade
settlements in [Namaland] and Herero[land], your Lordship had informed me in
your note of 25th May 1880 that the district under British sovereignty was
restricted to [Walvis] Bay and a small extent of surrounding territory.” Munster
then added: “An instruction to the Governor of Cape Colony, dated 30th
December 1880, from the then Secretary for the Colonies, Lord Kimberley,
communicated to the British Parliament under the heading of South Africa,
1881, stated in its 28th paragraph that the Orange River was to be regarded as
the northwest frontier of Cape Colony, and that the Government of Great Britain
would not carry out any plan for the extension of British jurisdiction over
[Namaland] and

H e r e r o [ la n d ] .”46

The German Ambassador recalled to

Granville’s attention a dispatch of January 13, 1881, from London to Cape Town
which cited such legislation limiting British jurisdiction to Walvis Bay and
territory south of the Orange River when London denied the application of the
RMS for British protection in Southwest Africa. Munster even stretched this to
the point of asserting that the Cape Parliament Act of 1873 annexing the guano
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islands would be in conflict with London’s commitment to the Orange River
boundary established in December 1880. Yet Munster quickly added that
Germany was not questioning the island claims. Britain had painted itself into a
corner with its own arguments. What made matters worse was that the German
Ambassador pointed to Britain’s arguments in March 1875 against Spanish
claims to the Caroline and Pelew Islands in the Pacific. England at that time
maintained that a power must have de facto control over the territory to claim it.
Munster followed this example with Britain’s negotiations with Spain over the
Sooloo Archipelago in March 1877 using the same argument. Thus using
Britain’s own policy, Southwest Africa-save possibly Walvis Bay and the guano
islands-between Portuguese Angola and the Orange River of the Cape Colony,
remained open. There was simply no defense that Britain could offer against its
own arguments. Therefore, London tried to buy time by delaying any response
to Berlin, while trying to get Cape Town to take action.47
However Bismark had kept up the appearance, with even Munster kept in
the dark to the true reasons, that Germany was still only seeking protection for
German traders and missionaries, and possibly creating some commercial
system abroad. Yet even at this point, London sensed that the ante had been
raised by Bismark despite believing that Germany had no colonial aspirations.
On February 5, 1884, Derby sent a dispatch to the Cape Administrator
requesting the Cape Government to annex or establish jurisdiction over Angra
Pequena, or else it would “be difficult to resist representations made by the
German Government that, failing other protection for German subjects there,
they would be compelled to assume jurisdiction over the place.” Cape Town
sent back a telegraphed reply the next day: “Angra Pequena. Ministers ask
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matter be kept open, pending Cabinet meeting here. Premier away.”48

a

quick

response was not to be had. Smyth had sent a dispatch to Derby that enclosed
a report by Colonel J. T. Eustace, the Cape’s official in contact with Namaland.
Eustace, Smyth reported, had met with Bethanie Nama Chief Joseph Fredrick
“successor of his uncle, David Christian.” The Nama Chief had indeed sold
Angra Pequena to Luderitz in May 1883 for 100 British pounds and 200 guns.
Joseph Fredrick then admitted to selling Luderitz the entire coast from the 26th
south latitude to the Orange River and twenty German miles inland for 600
British pounds and 60 more guns. The Chief denied the sale of any lands by
David Christian to anyone and stated that his uncle had only given leases.49
Derby also received a dispatch from the Cape which enclosed a report
from the Ministers regarding Walvis Bay. The Cape Ministers presented the fact
that the Cape had already informally annexed Walvis Bay to the Cape to gain
“some sort of control over one of the main inlets of the trade in munitions of war”
(i.e. the arming of the Herero) and called to Derby’s attention that the Cape had
bore the cost of such venture. Therefore, the Cape Ministers wanted to see
London make the first move in formally annexing Walvis Bay or any other part of
the Skeleton Coast “leaving the question of the settlement of the amount of
effective control and provision to be made in that behalf to be arranged between
Her Majesty’s Government and the Government of the [Cape] Colony.”so Again
the buck was passed with no one wanting to “foot the bill.” Both London and
Cape Town dragged their feet in the matter through the spring of 1884. In April,
Berlin had to respond to Cape doubts whether Germany would truly enforce its
claimed right to protect Luderitz in Southwest Africa. After being notified
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through the German Charge cTAffairs in London, Granville reported that
“Bismark has instructed the German Consul on the spot [in Cape Town] to say
that no doubt exists as to this right.”51
Germany was not alone in becoming frustrated at being practically
ignored by delays in London to buy time. De Pass & Company wrote to the
Colonial Office on May 6, 1884, asserting that they had not heard anything from
the government on its request for more information since August 1883. De Pass
wanted to know if there were any truth in the newspaper articles which reported
German intentions to establish a naval station to protect German settlements
“on the Gold Coast and at Angra Pequena.”52 However, the Colonial Office
continued to stonewall De Pass probably because they had no more answers
than the newspapers. Derby’s office could only tell De Pass “that the question
is still engaging the attention of Her Majesty’s Government.”53 De Pass
followed this by sending to the Colonial Office a clipping from the Standard of
May 14 entitled "Germany and Africa” which read:
The German Government intends to take over the suzerainty
of Angra Pequena and all the neighbouring territories acquired [by]
Herr Luderitz, of Bremen, the English claims in that part of the coast
being regarded as altogether invalid. German law courts will be
established, and a position will be assumed similar in all respects
to that of the French Republic in T u n is .54
However, Derby declared the article to be

u n f o u n d e d . 55

On May 7, 1884, feeling the increased pressure to give a reply to Berlin,
the Colonial Office sent a telegraph to the new Cape Governor, Sir Hercules
Robinson, that: “ It is necessary to tell German Minister what is intended by Her
Majesty’s Government respecting Angra Pequena and if [the Cape] Government
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desire that it should be under British jurisdiction they should immediately
express readiness to accept responsibility and cost.” Governor Robinson sent a
telegraph back on May 15 that read: “New Cabinet making inquiries re Angra
Pequena, and hope to send definite reply within ten

d a y s . ”56

The delays

continued.
Meanwhile, Granville had his Foreign Office send a letter to the Colonial
Office to force it into action regarding “the alleged assumption by the German
Government of sovereignty over Angra Pequena.” The Foreign Secretary
hoped “no unnecessary delay would be allowed to occur in giving an answer to
the inquiries made by Count Munster in the month of December last.”57 it had
been six months since the German Ambassador first requested whether Britain
claimed Southwest Africa and if so on what grounds. Further pressure on
Derby came form the Royal Colonial Institute which wrote to the Colonial Office
on May 28, expressing their concern over German actions regarding Angra
Pequena and their hopes that Britain would “maintain the r i ght . . . to exclude
foreign powers from the occupation of this valuable harbour and the country
adjacent thereto.”58 The Foreign Office again wrote to the Colonial Secretary
on the 29th requesting an answer soon, though it assured Derby that according
to Ambassador Munster Berlin had not taken any further steps beyond their
inquiry into British claims.59
Of course, London did not realize that Bismark was keeping his own
ambassador in London in the dark as to his true intentions. However, London’s
delay in responding to German requests for British claims and evidence was
frustrating Bismark’s plans. Earlier in December of 1883, Bismark had to deny a
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German lobby from annexing Cameroon, despite rumors that the British Consul
there was back in London trying to get Britain to annex the region. Bismark
could only suggest that a commissioner might be sent to Cameroon to make
commercial agreements with the indigenous leaders. Therefore, along similar
lines, Bismark’s patience was wearing thin by March 1884, with still no
response from Britain claiming or disclaiming Angra Pequena. Bismark
considered this delay Deutschfeindlichkeit or “hostility to Germany.” The
Chancellor came to believe that London was using this time to annex Angra
Pequena for themselves rather than give an honest reply to the German inquiry.
The Anglo-Portuguese treaty regarding the Congo, rumors that Britain was
planning to annex Togo (where German traders had already set up)., and the
return of Luderitz from the Cape Colony with news that the Cape believed it had
documents to support British claims to Angra Pequena all pushed Bismark’s
patience towards breaking-point.eo
It was at this point that Kusserow, the colonial proponent in the Foreign
Ministry, began to win over Bismark. He suggested the British-style chartersystem for colonization in which the colonial proprietors bore the full cost for the
colonies. Berlin would just hand Luderitz an imperial charter for the colony
without any drain on the resources of the Reich. It was on April 8, 1884, that
Kusserow’s suggestion in memo took hold of Bismark, as the Chancellor
confessed years later that it was then that “Kusserow dragged me into the
Kolonialtummel” or “colonial whirl.”61
With the worries of cost aside, Bismark received news by wire that same
day from Luderitz’s men in Cape Town that the British colony was prepared to
annex the Skeleton Coast, including Angra Pequena. The Chancellor told
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Kusserow that the time had come, “now let us act.”62 Bismark was now
prepared to have Angra Pequena, Togo, and Cameroon annexed, but it all had
to be done before those in the British government found out the plans and
annexed those locations for themselves. On April 24, 1884, the German Consul
in London was ordered to declare that Angra Pequena was “under the
protection of the Reich.”63 This was meant to confuse London. Germany stuck
its foot through the door just in case Britain or the Cape tried to close it, yet
without revealing Bismark’s new policy beyond just seeking protection for
German settlers. The same information was sent to Lord Ampthill, the British
Ambassador in Berlin, and to Berlin’s own ambassador in London, Count
Munster. Munster, and for that matter most of the Foreign Ministry, was misled
as to the real plan. In May, Bismark had a secret telegraph sent to a German
explorer on the German ship Mowe to raise German flags and establish the
Reich’s claims at Togo, Cameroon, and then Angra Pequena. Unfortunately,
Bismark estimated that Angra Pequena would not be annexed then until at least
July. Other possible plans to get to Angra Pequena were later explored. The
Chancellor hoped the declared protection over Luderitz would delay any British
response while he put his plan in motion.64
Good news came for Derby when Robinson telegraphed on May 29:
“Ministers have decided to recommend [Cape] Parliament to undertake control
and cost of coast line from Orange River to [Walvis]

B a y .”65

That spring the

Cape Parliament had finally, after Derby’s threat of a British pullout from Walvis
Bay, passed Cape Act No. 35 of 1884 which after six years of dragging their feet
officially annexed the British outpost. The Colonial Secretary wrote to Granville
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on June 2, 1884, that the Cape had finally accepted responsibility and cost in
annexing Southwest Africa’s coast, at least between Walvis Bay (which was
now finally annexed itself) and the Orange River. Derby wanted the Foreign
Secretary to immediately have Germany informed that after finally
communicating with the Cape, German subjects may be placed under the
protection of the British flag and that a possible joint commission could be
created to sort out the private claim disputes between De Pass, Spence &
Company and Luderitz. Also, upon being notified that a German warship was
heading for Angra Pequena, Derby suggested to Granville that a British warship
should also be sent “in order that there may be no ground for alleging that the
continued absence of British protection has rendered German intervention
necessary. ”66
However, on June 3 the Foreign Office sent Derby a copy of a dispatch
from their Berlin embassy. British Ambassador, Lord Ampthill, enclosed a
clipping from an article in the previous day’s Nord-Deutsche AHgemeine
Zeitung which published a telegram from Bismark to the German Consul in
Cape Town, W. A. Lippert:
According to statements of Herr Luderitz, Colonial authorities
doubt as to his acquisitions north of Orange River being entitled to
German protection. You will declare officially that he and his estab
lishments are under the protection of the Empire.67
The Zeitung followed with: “Up to the present time nothing further has come to
our knowledge with regard to this matter.”
Up to now, Germany had not heard anything from Britain since their
inquiry of December 31. London had yet to furnish any proof of ownership for
any part of Southwest Africa, though admittedly the Germans let the British off

31

the hook regarding Walvis Bay which Berlin acknowledged to be British. At the
same time, Bismark had not confessed his change of heart regarding
colonization. Through Ambassador Ampthill, Granville stated that he believed
the Standard article of May 14 “respecting the alleged assumption of the
sovereignty over Angra Pequena by the German Government [to be]
unfounded.” Bismark’s bluff was still working at this point, though Ampthill sent
another dispatch the same day warning London that Luderitz’s brother was
planning the departure of an expedition, to be led by Lt. Siegmund Israel (who
had been on two expeditions with Stanley), to find a road between Angra
Pequena and the Congo. Obviously the Germans thought Angra Pequena
might possibly be the door into all of central Africa. Ampthill asserted that
German warships will carry the expedition to Angra Pequena but that “this
would appear to be the limit of the support expected from the Imperial
Government to the enterprise.”68 The Foreign Office then followed this with a
note of June 7 from Ampthill, who reported a meeting of the West German
Society for Colonization and Export Trade which met at Dusseldorf and passed
a resolution to be sent to Bismark:
The society recognises with grateful satisfaction the recent
preparatory steps taken by the Imperial Government to protect Ger
many’s present and future interest in the district of the Congo,and
on the West Coast of Central Africa. With still greater gratitude and
satisfaction, the society has received the declaration of the Imperial
Chancellor that Angra Pequena and the coast line of the Great Namaqua country have been placed under the protection of the Empire.
The society expresses a confident hope that the protection of the Ger
man Empire will also be extended to the more northerly coast line of
the Herero country.69
London was only beginning to see that something much bigger than a Bremen

32

merchant on the Skeleton Coast was brewing in the policies of Berlin.
Four days after Derby was finally notified of the Cape’s willingness to
annex the Skeleton Coast from the Orange River to Walvis Bay, Cape officials
gave the same news to the German Consul in Cape Town. With Bismark yet to
be given a response from his inquiry made December 31 via Munster in
London, and with the secret expedition of the Mowe reported unable to make it
to Angra Pequena, Bismark exploded. The Chancellor sent his son, Herbert,
first to talk with the British Ambassador and then off to London to speak with
Granville personally.™ Having met with Herbert, the British embassy quickly
reported back to London that “while [the Chancellor] still entertained the same
friendly feelings towards Her Majesty’s Government and was desirous of
supporting [British] policy in Egypt, his thought that [Britain] should be warned
that the feeling in Germany as regarded the colonial question was so strong that
with best wishes, he felt that he would be unable to afford us the same friendly
assistance hitherto.”71 Bismark had his son “hit them below the belt” with Egypt,
in which Britain needed German support against France if the British were
going to retain exclusive control over the Nile and the Suez Canal. It was
blackmail. Herbert himself arrived in London on June 13, 1884, and was in the
Foreign Office meeting with Granville the next day. Herbert immediately “laid
the cards on the table” declaring that Britain had delayed in answering Berlin in
order to have the Cape annex Southwest Africa from under the

G e r m a n s .™

Granville, to Herbert’s surprise, took full responsibility with Derby on the delay in
responding to Germany which had so insulted the Chancellor. The Foreign
Secretary confessed to Herbert: “It is very hard for me, as I have so much to do,
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that I cannot go into detail on these colonial questions. . . . Besides this, a part of
the Parliamentary business falls on me as leader of the Upper House in this
difficult time. On top of this I have to conduct the awkward Egyptian
negotiations.”^

Granville had even written Derby in early June: “ I had

mentioned in the House of Lords the other day that any blame that was due as
regards the [six month] delay in the correspondence attached to our side,
though it had been unavoidable owing to the change of the [Cape] Ministry.”?*
Whatever the excuses, the truth remained that London had no idea Bismark
wanted a colony for himself at Angra Pequena and just believed the effort was
to afford protection--just the impression that the Chancellor had intended.
When Herbert made his father’s true intentions known, followed with the threat
to the Egyptian question, it was enough for Gladstone’s government, so they
capitulated. Herbert reported to the Foreign Ministry from London that Germany
“should be somewhat friendlier [now] towards the English in order that they may
see that it is to their advantage to comply with our wishes . . . [in] coming years
they will find themselves in a pickle on account of Egypt anyway, no matter what
one does

n o w .”75

However, this was not the last time Germany would use

Britain’s precarious position in Egypt as blackmail for colonial gains, at least
until Britain consolidated its position on the Nile.
On June 17, 1884, Derby telegraphed Governor Robinson in Cape Town
that the Cape Government “better not bring forward vote [on] control and cost
[of] coast line and Angra Pequena, at present, in order to avoid any misunder
standing between Her Majesty’s Government and German [Foreign] Ministry,
with whom communications are proceeding.” Although the Colonial Secretary
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was calling the Cape off for now, he did ask how long the Cape Parliament
would be in session just in case the situation changed and London could give
them the nod to annex Luderitz’s possession. Robinson telegraphed back two
days later a short message: “Session will last another month.”76 With the Cape
finally coming to a point of accepting cost and responsibility for annexing the
Skeleton Coast, London had called them off for now. Chancellor Bismark had
already been making speeches in the Reichstag calling on the assembly to
support protectorates over German enterprises abroad, though he made it clear
that they would be charter colonies. By June 21 London had finally accepted
the German diplomatic victory and accepted Germany’s sphere at Angra
Pequena and communicated this to the Foreign Ministry the following day. The
door could not be shut and Germany was allowed to walk uncontested into this
part of Africa.77
On June 26, the Colonial Office also received a letter from De Pass, who
had been disheartened that the Colonial Office had not provided his company
with any information. De Pass admitted he could only rely on information from
the press and then cited that day’s Times which reported Bismark’s speech to
the Budget Committee of the Reichstag professing German protection for
Luderitz. De Pass soberly commented: “ It would appear that Herr Luderitz’s
recent purchase will override that of mine, and of my occupation for so many
y e a r s . ”78

Derby sent De Pass’ letter to Granville with the suggestion that a joint

commission might be created now with Germany to deal with such private claim
disputes. But that was as far as Derby would go on De Pass’ behalf.79
In the meantime, the Foreign Office forwarded a dispatch from their Berlin
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embassy containing a copy of Bismark’s speech made on June 23 in the
Reichstag as summarized in the Zeitung. It included the statement by Bismark
that since London had denied RMS missionaries protection in 1880 because of
the strict Orange River boundary, Germany had been pursuing a policy to find
the means to protect them. Bismark reportedly cited the Foreign Ministry’s
request of December 1883 sent to London on whether Britain formally claimed
Southwest Africa and if so on what grounds. The Zeitung continued that:
For a long time no answer was received, although it could
undoubtedly have been possible to furnish one out of the official
documents relating to the actual extent of England’s colonial poss
essions. Instead of this a correspondence commenced between
London and Cape Town, which was looked upon there as if we had
expressed a desire for English protection for a German settlement.
A ministerial crisis occurred in Cape Town, and consequently a de
cision on this point was postponed there. Upon the circumstances
becoming known here, it appeared only natural, in order to clear
away that misapprehension, that the German Consul in Cape Town
should be instructed to inform the authorities there that Herr Luderitz
and his establishment were under the protection of the Empire. . . . Ac
cording to a telegram received yesterday from London, [the Chancel
lor] thought that he might consider the question settled. . . .The Imperial
Chancellor further declared his present intention to be to place un
der the protection of the Empire and similarly established settlements
in the future.80
Bismark also revealed Germany’s support of the Belgians in the Congo and
anticipated “securing German interests by a treaty which would give us
complete freedom of trade and communication” there. Bismark’s speech
reportedly affirmed:
In this manner, therefore, His Majesty the Emperor had endeav
oured to keep the wide domain of Central Africa open for free devel
opment. As to the form in which the Settlement of Angra Pequena
would receive the protection of the Empire, the Government had in
view the idea of issuing for it an Imperial Letter of Protection, similar
to the Royal Charter given by England to the East Indian Company,
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and lately to the North Borneo Company. This system would poss
ibly be supplemented by the establishment of coaling stations [for
warships] and an extension of the Consular system. This system
might possibly be also applied to other enterprises of the same na
ture on the African coast and in the South Sea.81
Bismark’s speech was ringing through the halls of the Reichstag while Germans
were making their way along the west coast of Africa towards Angra Pequena.
The Zeitung then reported Bismark's final plea to the Reichstag for Germany’s
new colonial policy: “Once foreign nations had recognised the firm will of the
German nation to protect each German according to the motto Civis Romanus
Sum , it would not be difficult to afford this protection without any special display
of force. But if, indeed, foreign nations were to see that we were not united, we
should then be powerless to do anything, and we do better to renounce all idea
of any development beyond the

s e a . ”82

On July 2, 1884, Granville’s office forwarded another dispatch from
Ampthill in Berlin that included his own summation of another speech made by
Bismark in front of the Reichstag, obviously concerned about the resistance of
his own Prussian agrarian Conservatives against colonization. Ampthill
reported that Bismark “repeated that he was entirely opposed to the creation of
colonies on what he considered a bad system, namely, to acquire a piece of
ground, appoint officials and a garrison, and then seek to entice persons to
come and live there.” Bismark considered what was happening in Angra
Pequena and elsewhere different, where Germans were already settled and
requesting a German protectorate. Ampthill wrote that the Chancellor
“approached the whole subject with great reserve, he admired the energy of the
men who wished to found these colonies, and he had said to himself how [he’d]
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be justified if he replied to them that Germany was too weak to found colonies;
her fleet not strong enough; and that difficulties might arise with foreign
Governments.” The British Ambassador continued that “it was impossible for
him, the first Chancellor of the newly created Empire, to say to these men, even
if he believed it, ‘Germany is too weak and too poor for such undertakings.’”83
Ampthill reported that Bismark then proceeded to give a full account of the
negotiations with England on the subject of Angra Pequena to the Reichstag.
Bismark emphasized Britain’s inability to furnish evidence for any official claim.
The German Chancellor had anteed up, called England’s bluff, and was now
grabbing for the winnings.
Meanwhile Cape Governor Robinson sent an urgent telegraph to Derby
on July 9 at the request of Cape Ministers:
As [the Cape] Parliament will soon be prorogued, Ministers
are anxiously awaiting information relative to negotiations with Ger
man Empire on question of [Skeleton] Coast. . . . Ministers advise me
that feeling in Colony is strongly in favour of retention of British au
thority over coast line from Orange River upwards, and that rumour
that British jurisdiction over [Walvis] Bay is to be abandoned has
caused great uneasiness. Annexation of [Hereroland] to German
Empire is also greatly deprecated.”84
The Cape was still ready to annex Southwest Africa, and it had no intentions of
having German neighbors who would undoubtedly sympathize with and
possibly support the Boers. Also, on July 4, De Pass had written to the Colonial
Office that he had two other harbors south of Walvis Bay in which Luderitz had
not set up claim yet, at Sandwich Harbor and Hottentot Bay. De Pass urged
them to have the HMS Boadicea sent to claim them before a German warship
heading for Angra Pequena could. Derby replied, however, that he had ceased
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trying to establish British claims in Luderitz’s domain saying that Britain was “not
in a position to oppose the intention of the German Government to afford its
protection to German subjects having duly acquired concessions or formed
establishments where no British sovereignty exists.”85 Yet, the Colonial
Secretary did point out to the Foreign Office that De Pass’ establishments at
Sandwich Harbor and Hottentot Bay could be possible annexation points for the
Cape if Granville concurred. On July 12 Granville gave his concurrence and
asserted that he was requesting assurances from Germany that British subjects
would be protected in the German sphere, that no penal settlement would be
created, and that a joint commission could resolve private claim disputes. Two
days later Derby, with Granville’s support, sent Governor Robinson a dispatch
giving up on Luderitz’s possession but asked if the Cape was willing to assume
cost and control over De Pass’ establishments at Sandwich Harbor and
Hottentot Bay if they were proven to be beyond Luderitz’s claim. However, with
Luderitz’s deed from the Bethanie Nama granting the entire coast and all its
harbors and bays from the Orange River to the 26th south latitude, there was
little support for such claims.86
In his reply to Derby Governor Robinson displayed how far behind
London had left Cape Town in the dark regarding the international situation;
reporting that the Cape Parliament passed a resolution declaring it “expedient”
to annex the Skeleton Coast to the Cape. Robinson also reported that the
Parliament was going to dismiss the next day, so he needed London’s nod
immediately. The Governor added that the Cape wanted to annex the coast
from Walvis Bay north to the Portuguese frontier as well. However, with the end
of the Cape Parliamentary session went the hopes of keeping Southwest Africa
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British, with London failing to give them approval for an annexation vote.87
Ampthill accepted the German protectorate but warned that “no doubt can be
entertained as to [Walvis] Bay and the islands adjacent to Angra Pequena being
British.”88 On August 6, Munster called on Granville to accept the British
acknowledgement. All that was needed now was the inevitable flag raising.
Cape Town gave a suspicious glance at any German ships in the region.
For example, a July 23 report from Rear Admiral Salmon reached the Colonial
Office in August, 1884, that the German warship Wolf was spotted arriving in
Cape Town from Singapore bound for Angra Pequena or the Congo. Although
waiting for the inevitable, the Cape at this point had problems of its own,
requesting more rockets from England “as [the British commander] still
anticipates trouble in Zululand.”89 Then came a telegraph from Governor
Robinson that the German frigate Elizabeth, had arrived along the Skeleton
Coast and claimed the Luderitz territory from the Orange River to the 26th south
latitude, including Angra Pequena, for the German Reich. However, the
German commander of the Elizabeth mistakenly claimed all the guano islands
within cannon shot of the coast as well as 'the mainland. This began a new
diplomatic struggle.^
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Chapter 2
The S c r a m b l e
When news reached the Cape that the commander of the German
warship Elizabeth ignorantly annexed the islands as well as the mainland of the
Skeleton Coast, save of course Walvis Bay, the Cape Ministers were infuriated.
They immediately had Governor Robinson ask London to inform Germany that
those islands were officially and formally claimed by the Cape as British territory
under the Letters Patent of 1867, in which Britain officially recognized and
authorized the annexation, and under the Act of Cape Parliament No. 4 of 1874,
in which the actual annexation was carried outJ Yet, when news reached
Germany of the commander’s misfeasance, Berlin seemed content to let the
matter slide for a while to see where it went rather than immediately correct it.
During 1884, however, Berlin was having its own challenges to deal with
now that it was trying to become a colonial power. Many colonial supporters in
Germany by this time criticized Bismark’s government for its slow progress.
Even Kaiser Wilhelm I openly criticized Leo von Caprivi, head of the German
Admiralty, for not sending warships to Zanzibar on the east coast of Africa to
protect German interests that were in competition with Britain. Coolheaded
Foreign Ministry officials, according to Senior Councillor Friedrich von Holstein,
were trying to protect Caprivi from the new frenzied Kolonialtummel that
seemed to throw all “caution to the wind.” Caprivi simply did not want to
disperse his fleet, which was much smaller than Britain’s anyway, across the
globe while the possibility of Anglo-German hostility remained. At the same
time, Ambassador Munster had become the scapegoat for any difficulties that
arose with Britain. Herbert Bismark wrote to the Foreign Ministry after his visit to
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London that Munster “ruins everything there; it would be far better not to have
any ambassador. . . . to embroil oneself with a Power unnecessarily is a great
mistake.“2 This seemed ironic since it was Herbert himself who had laid down
the law with Granville regarding Germany’s bid for colonies, while Munster was
misinformed the entire time by Berlin. While Berlin was questioning the
performance of its own ambassador, the diplomatic situation became more
uneasy, at least for a short time, when British Ambassador Ampthill died.
Therefore while London was considering a replacement, opinion grew in Berlin
that if relations were going to normalize with England, Munster had to be
transferred somewhere else.3
London had little wait before hearing news of German colonial
expansion. On August 22, the German Charge d ’Affairs in London, Baron von
Plessen, visited the Foreign Office and reportedly made the following statement:
“To the north of the territory which Luderitz acquired last year by treaty with the
Chief of [the Bethanie Nama], other subjects of the German Emperor have,
during the last two years, by treaties with independent Chiefs, or by cessions
from those previously in possession, obtained rights of property, and other
rights, in the territories of [Namaland] and [Hereroland].” Plessen stated that
these regions were not recognized as ever having been under British
jurisdiction and that in reference to the Germans there requesting “the
protection of the Empire for their acquisitions, the Imperial Government has
granted it to them. The Imperial Government give their protection as soon as it
is asked for, whenever German settlements are founded on territory not
previously occupied by another Power, and when the claim is supported by

47

valid treaties which do not violate the rights of third parties.”5
Such statements gave British colonialism new energy and support,
proving that there was indeed a scramble for the last unclaimed regions of the
world, particularly in Africa and Oceania. Plessen followed this statement with a
protest against the Cape government's efforts to claim the area north of
Luderitz’s possession. In 1880, the British restricted the Cape frontier to the
Orange River, with the exception of Walvis Bay, and this had not been changed
or nullified. The day following Plessen’s protest, Granville forwarded to Derby
the Cape’s suggestion to annex territory north of Luderitz’s, i. e. from the 26th
south latitude to the Angolan frontier of Portugal’s claim. The German Charge
d’Affairs complained that “most assuredly the German Government did not
calculate when they made the [December 1883] inquiry that the definitive
answer would be put off for more than six months, and that the interval would be
utilised to push forward rival schemes of English annexations of territory.”
Plessen further announced Germany’s contention that “it is impossible to admit
the theory advanced by the Cape Parliament of theoretical annexations of
extended and unexplored coasts and stretches of land by means of decrees
published at a distance; it is contrary to the law of nations and to tradition.”6
Britain’s own arguments against such annexation protocol, particularly against
Spain, were already in the record books in Germany’s favor. The German
embassy then supplied arguments on how the Cape had no evidence or
support for such claims. Both Britain and the Cape had still left doors open
further north of Luderitz’s claim, and could not legally shut them now, once
again with Bismark’s foot in those doors.7
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Reports of further German expansion then came when Cape Governor
Robinson telegraphed Derby on September 7, 1884, and reported that the
German Consul in Cape Town, W. A. Lippert, announced that the German
warship Wolf had placed under the German Southwest Africa Protectorate, with
the exception of Walvis Bay, the entire Skeleton Coast from Cape Frio to the
Orange River. Robinson noted that the protectorate included the islands of
Mercury and Hollamsbird which the Cape had claimed as their’s for some time
now. Interestingly, the Cape Governor telegraphed this German announce
ment, since his report of August 20 regarding the Elizabeth’s annexation of
Luderitz’s possession and the guano islands had been conventionally written
and thus delayed in reaching London. The Cape was now taking advantage of
the technology at hand finally to deal with the increased tempo of colonization
that Germany had brought to Africa. However a conventional report followed
the telegraph enclosing a letter from the German Consul which included the
actual report of Captain Schering of the Elizabeth. Consul Lippert reported that
the guano islands were now German territory according to the Law of Nations
which “means and includes all the islands within gunshot distance of the
mainland.”8 Governor Robinson also included a letter from his Ministers who,
although accepting the German Protectorate over the mainland, insisted that the
guano islands—including Hollamsbird and M ercury-were British territory.
Daniel de Pass also sent his concerns on September 11, after reading in the
London Times about the German extension north of the 26th southern latitude.
De Pass reminded the Colonial Office that he suggested to them back on July 4
to take possession of his establishments there. He was also alarmed by a
rumor that Germany was claiming the islands and soon sent clippings from the
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Times which confirmed the rumor. His associate John Spence also protested
the German island claim citing their official annexation in 1866 by the HMS
Valorous, which of course the Colonial Office already knew. However, the
Colonial Office ignored De Pass and Spence for a long time in this matter until
the matter was laid to rest with Berlin.9
Meanwhile, both countries continued to attempt to resolve the
boundaries of the new German Protectorate and the ownership of the guano
islands. On September 13, Foreign Secretary Granville acknowledged the
willingness of Germany to have a joint commission assembled to delimit the
boundary of Walvis Bay, which was now surrounded, and the German
Protectorate. Britain accepted Germany’s proposal. 10 Regarding the guano
islands, the Cape naval commander, Rear Admiral Salmon, provided an
explanation of the initial German occupation of Southwest Africa in greater
detail. Salmon told how the German ship Elizabeth from Europe bound to
Australia stopped at the Cape Colony after annexing Luderitz’s territory from the
Orange River north to the 26th, including the islands. Salmon reported that he
informed Captain Schering that England had those islands since 1866, which
the latter confessed he was not aware of and admitted that he had no
instructions from Berlin to annex them but just assumed according to
international law that he should. Salmon told the German captain that when the
HMS Boedicea last visited there the Union Jack was flying on Seal and
Penguin islands in Angra Pequena harbor, but Schering told the Admiral that
he had seen no flags there. Upon Salmon’s inquiry, Robinson wrote back to the
Admiral that ten islands, rocks, or islets along the coast from the Orange River to
the 26th were British: Ichaboe, Long, Seal, Penguin, Halifax, Possession,
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Albatross Rock, Pomona, Plum Pudding, and Sinclair’s Island (also known as
Roast Beef). Hollamsbird and Mercury north of the 26th south latitude were also
British. 11
On September 23, another question accompanying the boundary issue
from the British side was whether Southwest Africa was to be “described a
colony or a territorial political protectorate of a defined type.” However, the
Germans did not ever really give a definitive answer to Foreign Secretary
Granville. Though regarding the issue of boundaries, Granville did have the
British embassy in Berlin inform the German government that “Her Majesty’s
Government will welcome Germany as a neighbour in those parts of the coast
which are not already within the limits of the Cape Colony and not actually in
British possession.”^

Cordial, but to the point. Britain was acknowledging

Germany’s mainland claim from Cape Frio to the Orange River, save Walvis
Bay, but standing firm that the islands were British. Immediately the German
Charge d’Affairs, Baron Plessen, visited Granville and informed him that
Germany did not claim the guano islands and recognized them as British
territory which had been the original stand all along. This should have ended
the difficulty, but there were small islands and rocks that were not specifically
claimed in Cape records (Note: The German government had not yet informed
Luderitz of Berlin’s capitulation on the major islands which enhanced the
difficulty as well). In one such circumstance, Plessen announced to Foreign
Secretary Granville that “Shark Island, in the Bay of Angra Pequena, which is
joined to the mainland at low tide, is property of Herr Luderitz, and does not
appear to have been annexed at any time by the Cape Colony.”i3 So the
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matter remained for the time being. Regarding Britain’s welcome to Germany
as a new neighbor in the region, Granville acknowledged a note from Bismark
to Baron Plessen in which the German Chancellor saw it “a first step in that
direction which he had hoped British policy would take.”1*
However, ownership of these islands became an immediate issue when
De Pass wrote to the Colonial Office on September 24 that a German ship, the
Trojan, was about to leave Hamburg with German settlers bound for Angra
Pequena, and requested that the German government be asked to inform them
that some portions of that territory were still in dispute. Shark Island, as noted
above, was only one specific case though De Pass was still entertaining the
hope of keeping some mainland claims as well. Derby’s office informed De
Pass of Germany’s claim to Shark Island and requested what evidence he had
of that island or rock being British. Infuriated by now, De Pass immediately
responded citing Clause No. 2 of his lease, which was written in Cape Town on
November 1, 1871: “All rocks and islets lying between Hollamsbird Island on
the north and . . . Sinclair’s Island on the south, not herein specially named,
called the Ichaboe Group, shall nevertheless be declared and taken to be
included in this lease.”15 o f course, this was a lease from the Cape government
to De Pass with no specific acknowledgement or endorsement of an indigenous
leader of Southwest Africa recorded. Regardless, the German argument was
that Shark Island during low tide was attached to the mainland which Luderitz
had purchased from the Bethanie Nama, whereas De Pass at best had only a
lease. Therefore Luderitz felt he was De Pass’ new landlord, and as the new
landlord was simply asking the old tenants to vacate.16
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Making matters worse, London was informed that De Pass now alleged
having claims on the mainland from Baker’s Cove to Angra Pequena, which of
course Luderitz had taken into possession. While London seemed content with
the guano islands and Walvis Bay, and Berlin seemed content with the
mainland save Shark Island, De Pass was still claiming parts of the mainland
and Luderitz was still claiming several more islands. The entrepreneurs
attempted to push their respective governments into confrontation. 1?
German and British newspapers did try to make the public aware of the
confrontations at hand. The British public read about the German colonial
invasion of Africa and Oceania. The Times in London reported on September
4, 1884, that Dr. Nachtigal had annexed parts of Cameroon for Germany that
summer and had become the German Consul General for the region. The
article reported that “a protest against the German annexation is about to be
sent to the Foreign Office in London, it being stated that the majority of the
inhabitants of Cameroon are desirous that it should remain under British
control.”18 English readers were informed that Nachtigal was in fact delayed in
Cameroon so that the German warship Elizabeth was sent to Angra Pequena
for the flag-raising. Although the event had occurred in August, the Times
printed a letter on September 16, which had been published in the Zeitung for
German readers, from the warship’s captain congratulating Luderitz after the
event: “I beg to add that the act, notwithstanding the wildness of the country,
made a very promising impression, and will, I hope, form the basis of a good
future there.” The captain also enclosed his official proclamation which began:
“His Majesty the German Emperor, William the First, King of Prussia, has
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commanded me to go with his corvette Elizabeth to Angra Pequena, to place
the territory belonging to Herr Luderitz on the West Coast of Africa under the
direct protection of His Majesty.” The account also included the Captain’s
infamous island annexation “according to international law” which had
provoked such debate and difficulty between the governments. 19 The picture
was only now unfolding for the British and German public in realizing the tense
negotiations which had taken place. The Times further reported the next day
that “Dr. Nachtigal’s mission is by no means at an end, but that he has received
orders to proceed to the

C o n g o .”20

Though there were some articles which

followed acknowledging the quick German colonization of parts of Africa, the
Times did offer some reassurance to the British public. In one article, the paper
reported that German newspapers believed “that at Cameroon and other places
on the West African coast there has been no annexation in the name of the
Empire, but only a declaration of protectorate exactly of the same nature as at
Luderitzland, Angra Pequena.”21 For the time being, the German colonies were
really believed to be commercial or charter, but economic hardship would make
them increasingly dependent and therefore controlled by Berlin. However the
newspapers did make the British public more aware of the “scramble.”
Back on the diplomatic scene, in early October 1884, reports from Berlin
illuminated how Germany was trying to get control over the Kolonialtum m eland
possibly harness it. The British embassy reported that the German Colonial
Association had met on September 21 and passed some resolutions in which it
was known that “the Chancellor had to a certain extent sanctioned the policy of
the Association.” The Association president reportedly “warned his audience

54

against giving in ‘to a sort of colonial fever,’ which might carry the nation further
than might be prudent. . . and [to] remember the old adage erst wag’s, dann
w ag’s [or ‘look before you leap’].” The Association passed resolutions
requesting the Chancellor to place German factories in West Africa under the
protection of the Reich, and for the Reichstag to consider “the establishment of a
fixed and rapid steam service between Germany and distant lands . . . essential
for the proper development of German commerce . . . and for the maintenance
of a close relationship between Germans abroad and at

h o m e .”22

The British

Charge d’Affairs, Sir Charles Scott, who was in control of the Berlin embassy
since Ambassador Ampthill died, later sent an article in the Zeitung of
September 27 to London which reported a meeting between Bismark and
representatives of Hamburg firms that were engaged in trade in West Africa with
the discussion focused on the future of German settlements there--though
emphasis was on Togo and Cameroon. The Zeitung was under the impression
that negotiations with France and England would have a beneficial result for
German colonization. That same paper the next day reported the organization
of a West African squadron of German ships, which could also be used to
protect Southwest Africa, including the Bismark (flagship), the Gneisenau. the_
Olga, and the Ariadue. At the same time, Bismark’s other son, William, wrote to
Holstein in the Foreign Ministry regarding the coming elections in the Reichstag:
“If I can succeed in securing that the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung only
rides the colonial horse in the election . . . I will be very

g la d .”23

The Chancellor,

and those around him, were hoping that his new colonial policy would tap into
the popular enthusiasm and therefore fill the Reichstag seats with

55

Conservatives.24
Meanwhile in Europe the British, under Granville’s leadership in the
Foreign Office, were requesting friendlier relations with Germany while Berlin
was making headway in rapprochement with Paris. Bismark believed, and thus
it was German foreign policy, that friendlier relations with France would make
Britain respect German interests abroad by feeling threatened. The Chancellor
would just as soon deal with France than with Gladstone’s Liberal government
anyway. By now Luderitz had expanded German colonial interests beyond the
Skeleton Coast in Southwest Africa, with Britain forced to be the spectator. In
an effort to prevent Germany from acquiring another colony in Cameroon, the
British Foreign Office informed Germany that as early as 1879 chieftains in that
region had requested British protection and that in May 1884 London had finally
sent a consul to accept the cession. This did not impress Berlin. Many German
officials who had Bismark’s ear believed that Germany would “only gain
England’s goodw ill-if only a goodwill accompanied by gnashing of te e th -b y
way of an alliance with France. . . . [England must be told to be] in colonial
matters with us through thick and thin; or [England] cannot reckon upon our
friendship.” Herbert Bismark even asserted that Germany’s rapprochement with
France would “squash Gladstone against the wall. . . . but first [Gladstone] must
ride the English deeper into the mire so that his prestige will vanish even
among the masses of the stupid English electorate.”25 Furthermore, British
frustration with the French blockade of southern China in the Tonkin war with
China, now that it was hurting British commerce, gave Berlin further hope of less
resistance form London.26
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Soon the German Chancellor began pushing harder in colonial issues,
and even threw his own criticism Caprivi’s way when the latter refused at times
to send warships to the aid of German interests in Angra Pequena on the
southwest coast and in Zanzibar on the east coast of Africa. Caprivi, in his
distaste of the colonial policy, began referring to the founder of German
Southwest Africa as “King Luderitz” in jest. Bismark felt he needed to talk with
his head of the Admiralty. In September, Bismark confessed to Caprivi that he
himself still held “disdain” for colonization and explained that it had all been a
\

ploy to win the coming elections in the Reichstag. Still conservative in heart,
Bismark had merely ripped the planks from under the liberal-industrial platform
by using the popular idea of colonies to show how backward many of the
Conservatives, dominated by Prussian agrarians, had been in resisting the
idea. Yet the Chancellor did not keep only German liberals in his sights. Later,
in October, Bismark confessed to his son Herbert that Germany had better keep
some promises to France in order to “squeeze and isolate England still more,
until it becomes so bad that even the most stupid of the English Liberals will
become alive to the folly of Gladstone’s silly policy [of resisting Germany].”27
This of course exaggerated Gladstone’s resistance to German colonization,
since his government had basically rolled over for Germany on most issues.
Also, in the latter months of 1884, German officials fumbled the Franco-German
rapprochement that was suppose to bring Britain to her knees in fear of
Germany. 28
Regarding Southwest Africa, ambiguity still remained over the
possession of certain guano islands. Therefore Foreign Secretary Granville,
wanting to give a definitive statement, had the British embassy in Berlin inform
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the German government that all the islands off the coast were indeed British
and “that further communication will be made to them . . . in regard to Shark
Island, and probably some islets and other territory in the same vicinity.”29 It
seemed the respective governments were standing behind De Pass and
Luderitz in their conflicting claims to these still disputed areas. On October 3,
De Pass sent word to the Colonial Office that his Captain Spence had been
warned to leave the islands near Angra Pequena by Luderitz’s company. This
was supported by a telegraph from the Cape Governor Robinson informing
Colonial Secretary Derby that Luderitz was claiming all the islands from the
Orange River border to the 26th south latitude and had called on Spence to
vacate them. The Cape Ministers labeled Luderitz’s claim unlawful. Granville
sent information to Derby from British Charge d’ Affairs Scott in the Berlin
embassy that the German government had already agreed the islands were
British, save Shark and a few other rocks, and were still willing to have a joint
commission to sort out the mess. Also, German Charge d’Affairs Plessen in
London had notified Granville that Berlin declared the captain of the Elizabeth
wrong in having the German Consul notify the Cape government of the German
Protectorate. Plessen called it a “mistaken execution of instructions” and that
the British government should have been notified in London directly.30 in
addition, De Pass was also around to hound the Colonial Office after reading
the October 6 Times which reported Luderitz’s demand for Spence to vacate the
islands, and told Derby’s office that Luderitz was acting on the misfeasant
annexation by the Elizabeth commander. The frustrated businessman then
added the smug remark about the lengthy gunshot range claim by the German
commander: “I have to hope that the gunshot distance alluded to by the

58

German commander may be determined to be that of the longest range of our
best carrying

g u n .”3i

In the first week of October, the Colonial Office sent Foreign Secretary
Granville a lengthy report reexamining the entire negotiation history concerning
Southwest Africa, and included the German accusation that the British had used
their long delay in response to annex the territory from underneath Luderitz.
The Colonial Office admitted that “the extent of Herr Luderitz’s territory was,
apparently through inaccurate information, understated to the extent of more
than 2,000 per cent.”32 The long delays in information that could have been
sent via telegraph from the Cape did not help matters. The current situation
regarding the guano islands was snowballing for no real apparent reason. The
German government had already renounced claims to almost all the islands.
Only Luderitz was claiming more than that. Therefore Derby wanted to send,
with Granville’s concurrence, a telegraph to Robinson that in fact Berlin did not
support Luderitz in the guano island claims and with the suggestion that a
British gunboat should be sent to inform Luderitz thus, to protect the British
islands, and to finally end the entire matter which had drudged on for months.
However, Granville told the Colonial Secretary to hold off the gunboat for now,
and said he would ask the German government to have the Bremen merchant
withdraw his claim to the guano islands. The German Charge d’Affairs in
London sent word the next day that the Foreign Ministry in Berlin promised to
attend to Luderitz immediately. With this new sense of actually accomplishing
something on the matter, Derby had De Pass notified that the two governments
were in the process of setting up a joint commission to finally handle the private
claim disputes. However, this was only met with De Pass’ complaints on
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whether he would be given ample time to prepare his case.33
Despite De Pass’ murmurings, negotiations regarding Southwest Africa
ran as smoothly as could be expected. Plessen visited the Foreign Office on the
11th, handing Granville a note that contained Germany’s official approval of the
joint commission and nominated Dr. Bieber, the newly appointed consul for
Cape Town replacing Lippert, as their commissioner. Germany wanted the
commission to meet in Cape Town, and agreed that the disputed islands (Shark
Island and other islets or rocks unspecified in De Pass’ lease) would be settled
by the commission. Plessen restated Germany’s disclaim to any other islands
and agreed to protect the private rights of British subjects in German territory if
Britain reciprocated. However, Berlin wanted Granville reminded that “no
British population worth mentioning exists in the coastal region in question, as
but few British subjects frequent it for trade, seal-hunting or fishing.”34 a couple
of days later Derby had De Pass informed that Acting Foreign Minister Klemens
Busch (Note: Busch replaced former Foreign Minister Paul von Hatzfeldt who in
turn had been reassigned to replace Count Munster as Ambassador to Britain)
gave assurances that steps would be taken “to prevent any further molestation
of guano deposits.”35 Busch also offered reasons why Luderitz had yet to be
informed of Germany’s position not to claim the guano islands, despite the
commander of the Elizabeth’s misfeasance, with the paramount being the
absence of any German consul in Cape Town at present. On October 21, the
Foreign Office sent Derby word that Bieber had left for Cape Town and that
Plessen inquired whether Britain had nominated a commissioner yet. Four
days later Granville also had the Colonial Secretary informed that Busch had
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sent for Luderitz to inform him not to interfere with preexisting rights in
Southwest Africa and that disputes were to be settled by a joint

c o m m is s io n .36

Yet after a few days Colonial Secretary Derby still believed Luderitz was
trying to claim the islands, using the 1880 British proclamation of the Orange
River boundary with only Walvis Bay given exemption. The Colonial Office
wrote to Foreign Secretary Granville “that [Luderitz] is dealing with the question
j

of private property and not with that of public sovereignty, and with a singular
confusion of ideas, he believes that the three-mile doctrine is applicable to
questions of private ownership as well as to questions of territorial
jurisdiction.”37 in truth however, De Pass too had made this confusion
defending his personal property with arguments of British claims to sovereignty
which had nothing to do with his private grants or leases. Also, Derby’s office
was in this very statement acknowledging the three-mile doctrine of
international law that would have recognized many of the islands as being
German. All sides seemed to merge the issues which could easily go both
ways. The Colonial Secretary did have Granville informed that a commissioner
from their side would be appointed soon, and that the Cape Town site would be
appropriate. However, Derby did strongly assert that the commission should
visit “the localities in questions” before ruling on them. De Pass was already by
the end of the month pressing both the Foreign and Colonial offices for
information on the commission and its protocol. Granville had Derby write De
Pass that he would be the first to know and that all protocol would be decided
“on the spot. ”38
Tension grew as the joint commission began to form. On November 5,
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the German embassy in London informed the British government that Berlin
>

was going to back Luderitz’s claims of ownership over De Pass’ claims as
tenant on the mainland, which was especially critical since De Pass claimed
several mining leases around Angra Pequena. The embassy had Luderitz’s
deed of sale forwarded to the Foreign Office which in turn was given to Derby.
Chief Joseph Fredrick of the Bethanie Nama and successor of David Christian
described in the deed to Luderitz the “grant [not sale] by David Christian under
date of 21 September 1863, to . . . De Pass, Spence & Co. of the tract of land
from Baker’s Cove to the southern corner of Angra Pequena," the very land De
Pass was now claiming. The Nama chief declared:
That the aforesaid tract of land and my right thereover was
never sold to Mssrs. De Pass, Spence & Co., but that they acquired
only the concession (verguming) thereof. Nor have they ever paid
anything for it. . . . Whereas Herr F. A. E. Luderitz, of Bremen, in Germany,
in virtue of contracts of sale of May 1, 1883, and August 25, 1883, has
purchased from me the whole coast from 26 S. latitude to the Great
[Orange] River, including all havens and bays . . . and is thereby become
from this time the sole and rightful owner thereof, the abovemention
ed grant to Messrs. De Pass, Spence & Co. ceases herewith of itself.39
The indigenous authority in the region was also backing Luderitz’s exclusive
mainland claims. Derby sent the deed to De Pass and the Cape, though he did
acknowledge to De Pass that Granville believed the documents to only effect
private ownership not sovereignty. Of course, De Pass was only interested in
the private issue which effected his wallet. It seemed Luderitz was the new
landlord, at least until the commission decided anything. By this time Sydney G.
Shippard was approved as the British commissioner. On November 11, the
Foreign Office sent the German embassy documents contesting their side of the
issue, including the full text of the 1866 Proclamation and the Letters Patent o f .
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1867, although these were restricted only to the matter of the islands which
Germany was not contesting anyway-save Shark Island. However, this
seemed enough for a fight and De Pass sent a letter to Derby a week later
disagreeing with the language of Luderitz’s deed stating “whatever may be the
rights of Josef Fredricks . . . he only sells havens and bays to Herr Luderitz, no
mention is made of

is la n d s .”40

For the first time, De Pass furnished a map

showing the location of the islands, which was quickly forwarded to Granville.41
In November 1884, Britain was getting ready for the West African
Conference to be held in Berlin and the inevitable repercussions of the AngloGerman tension over Southwest Africa. Sir Edward Malet, the former British
ambassador in Egypt, was now the ambassador in Berlin and England’s
delegate to the Conference. London expected the worse; that Germany would
exploit its fairly good relations with France to make huge claims in Africa.
Granville also sent Percy Anderson, who headed the African department in the
Foreign Office. His instructions were clear: Give Bismark anything he
demanded, except the Niger, and block French efforts. Yet when the German
Chancellor, in the early afternoon of November 15, rose to greet and address
the conference, he blasted out the “3 C ’s” of Livingstone-“commerce,
Christianity, and civilization.” To the surprise, and delight of the British
delegation, Bismark laid down the issues of the conference being only to
promote the free navigation of the Niger, the free trade in the Congo, and to set
up some kind of protocol for future annexation efforts. With the discussion
confined only to the future rules for the scramble of colonies and on matters of
free trade and navigation which Britain supported, London breathed a sigh of
relief and began looking at Berlin in a more cordial light, though some issues
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still needed defending. 42
In December 1884 after the conference, the Assistant Under Secretary of
the British Colonial Office, R. H. Meade, went to Berlin where he met with Dr.
Busch, the Under Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, and with the Iron Chancellor
himself. In a December 13 letter to Granville, Meade reported his unofficial
discussions with Busch on colonial issues. While in Berlin the British official first
met with Daniel de Pass who was there, and reported to London that De Pass
“was quite prepared to make terms with the Germans, and only desired to be
placed in communication with the German Government, so I do not anticipate
any difficulty in that quarter. If [De Pass] is satisfied and we secure promise of
fair treatment for any others of our countrymen established within the new
German Protectorate, I do not think that the Cape would object to the cession of
these islands and rocks to

G e r m a n y . ”43

After the British official visited the

Foreign Ministry, Meade reported that “I assured [Busch] that we at the Colonial
Office had no jealousy of the recent development of German colonial enterprise,
that we felt the world was large enough for all.” However, Meade was told of
German suspicions of British intentions regarding Cameroon, Samoa, and
Bechuanaland. In regards to Cameroon: “I said that we were doing and
contemplating nothing which would militate in any way against their free action
. . . we wished the Germans all success . . . that there was, no doubt, some
natural feeling of irritation on the part of the English residents when the German
Protectorate was announced, but that his was all past; we certainly intended to
take the Cameroons, but [Germany] had forestalled us, and we had no other
wish now than for their success.” Meade assured Busch that “at this moment
Mr. Baynes, the Secretary of the Baptist Missionary Society, was in Berlin,
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anxious to explain to the Foreign [Ministry] that though he would have preferred
the sovereignty of our own country, he was quite prepared loyally to accept the
new order of things.”44 After hearing from Busch of some local British officials
resisting German intentions in Cameroon, Meade suggested to Granville that
the officials there “should be careful to cultivate the most friendly relations with
the German authorities . . . [and that the officials should] smooth the matter
down, using whatever influence [they] may possess with the natives to accept
their new masters, and with the English traders to keep quiet, and not raise
difficulties.”45 Meade did dodge the matter of Samoa, which was far from being
resolved any time soon.
Regarding Bechuanaland, which had direct consequences for German
Southwest Africa, Meade described the British expedition of 3,500 men into that
region as a “clearing out [of] certain freebooters from the British Protectorate” of
the Cape. This was a creative excuse for Britain wanting to create a buffer via
the Kalahari between the Germans of Southwest Africa and the Boers of the
Transvaal who they wished to keep separated.^ Meade “pointed out that
Angra Pequena, the inland limits of which are stated by Germany to be 20
[German] miles, is separated from Bechuanaland by over 700 miles, of which
the greater part is desert, and that there could be no possible connexion [sic]
between our expedition and the interest of the German Colony.” This of course
underestimated the true appetite for the hinterland that Bismark wanted, which
the British had become aware of and wanted to stop before it grew any further
from the coast. The British official told Busch that Germany should not listen to
any rumors regarding the British expedition into Bechuanaland, and that when
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“we sometimes heard rumours that Germany had designs on the strip of coast
between Natal and Delagoa [on the southeast coast of Africa]. . . we knew that
this was impossible.”47 Of course Meade did not mention how the Cape quickly
tried annexing this unclaimed coast before any Germans arrived. Meade
exaggerated Britain’s lack of suspicions in his criticism of Germany’s skepticism
over British action in Bechuanaland, which was apparent in another of his
rebuking examples-regardless how false it was: “It never occurred to us to
attribute dark designs . . . when [Germany] sent an unusually powerful squadron
of five ships to visit their new acquisitions on the West Coast of Africa. We did
not express any uneasiness and imagine that a coup de main was intended by
Germany against any of our colonial possessions.”^

Meade then reported that

Busch told him, regarding Bechuanaland, “that Prince Bismark feared we were
about to use the large force we had collected forcibly to annex further territories,
cutting the Germans off from any extension inland beyond their general limit of
20 miles; but that he was very glad to hear that we had no ulterior objects in
sending the force . . . [other] than those I had mentioned.” Of course that force
was cutting off any German expansion too far east, but gave Germany 700 miles
to “chew on” in the meantime. Meade then reported Busch’s comments on
Germany’s basic colonial philosophy: “He said he looked on this step taken by
Germany as an experiment. It might succeed or it might fail. If it succeeded, in
all probability England would reap a large share of the reward by the opening
up of fresh trade routes. If, as was possible, it should fail, then at least
something would have been done by Germany, and whatever fruit there might
be would then certainly be gathered by England.”49
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On December 14, Busch called on Meade to inform him that the
Chancellor wanted to see the British envoy himself. In person then, Meade
agreed that there should be free access to all African rivers, but then the
discussion quickly focused on Bechuanaland. The Chancellor still believed
Britain was cutting his colony off from a hinterland in central Africa so Meade
reported that:
[Bismark] produced a map and showed me the Kalahari De
sert, and said that he was informed that it was erroneously described
as a desert, that there are elephants there, trees, grass, and water. I
told him that we were within our rights in taking over the Kalahari dis
trict, which merges into Bechuanaland, but that behind the coastline
of Angra Pequena was a waterless tract some 30 miles broad [the
Namib], but behind that again was a better country [Namaland], and
that Lord Granville had said that therejA/as . . . no objection from our point
of view to Germany going into the interior even as far as the 20th de
gree of longitude, which I pointed out to him on his map, and beyond
which westward we did not propose to go.si
In other words, Britain was not willing to allow Germany to move so far inward
as to have the ability to link up with the Boers, but London was willing to allow
Germany to take over the lands of the Nama and Herero.
After Bismark protested British resistance to Germany’s colonization of
the northern coast of New Guinea, and reminded Meade how Germany had
supported England in Egypt, Meade made the offer of the guano islands off the
Skeleton Coast and in Angra Pequena harbor to Germany. Bismark quickly
interrupted Meade and asked: “Including [Walvis] Bay?” The British envoy
answered: “Oh no; that is a regular British Settlement on the mainland; I am
only proposing to deal with the islands.” Meade tried to argue how Germany
would be better off controlling the islands which are so close to “the very mouth
of the principle harbour.” But Bismark “attached no importance to it” and barked
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"I do not find your proposals sufficient.”52 Meade, quite troubled, visited Busch
after his meeting with Bismark. However Meade’s main objections focused on
Bismark’s undiplomatic position regarding New Guinea, not Southwest Africa. It
was then discovered that a note which was suppose to have been given to
London by Munster back in July, so that England could have had time enough
to deal with any Australian jealousy, was not.

Therefore the whole New Guinea

affair came as a surprise to London. Again Berlin used Munster as a scape
goat, before his official transfer to their Paris embassy.53
Although 1885 brought smoother Anglo-German relations, with Britain
concentrating on the Russian threat in Central Asia, there were other objections
to German colonial expansion. Spanish officials were outraged at German
advances into areas in the Pacific which they considered their own since the
days of Magellan. German officials reported from Madrid of the “excited state of
public feeling.” They added that “the idea that a foreign Power wanted to take
from Spain part of its territory was enough to set the entire nation ablaze.”
Although the Spanish King and his Conservatives kept calm, Spanish
Republicans were trying to arouse a frenzy against Germany. One German
negotiator revealed his frustrations in resolving the issue by commenting:
“Spain does not have a single statesman.”54 Germany had to back off
somewhat from her more aggressive plans of seizing the Caroline Islands,
which now Spain claimed to have held for three and a half centuries. Also,
1885 brought a new Russian threat in the Balkans for German officials and
strategists to concentrate on. Yet, through all of this, negotiations and
controversy regarding Southwest Africa continued.55
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In January 1885, Derby acknowledged an earlier dispatch from Cape
Governor Robinson which reported that the Resident Magistrate of Walvis Bay,
William Palgrave, was helping British interests in Hereroland “as far as he can
do so, whilst residing at his post at [Walvis] Bay.” Derby was adamant that
Palgrave give no more than token support for the Herero and give the Germans
as much room as they needed. The Colonial Secretary rejected the idea of
having Palgrave or anyone else become the resident magistrate with the
Herero paramount chief, Maherero, “seeing that there has been no Resident
with the Chief since the end of 1880, the appointment of one now would have
the appearance of an attempt to thwart the development of the German
protectorate which Her Majesty’s Government has recently recognised.” The
British did not intend to reestablish themselves in Hereroland after England had
pulled back to Walvis Bay during the Herero-Nama war of 1880.56
The joint commission to resolve private claim disputes was still organiz
ing, though both Berlin and London dropped the issue of the major guano
islands since both now recognized them as British and under De Pass’ lease
from the Cape. However, the Colonial Office informed De Pass on February 10,
1885, that “with regard to Shark Island . . . and any unnamed islets and rocks . . .
it will be for you and your advisers to make out your title to them before the
C o m m is s io n .”57

Three days later, Granville informed the German embassy that

De Pass was on his own defending Shark Island or any other islet or rock not
specifically named in his lease. The Foreign Secretary also acknowledged that
the Cape Governor gave the Cape lease of 1869 to De Pass, replacing the
older imperial lease of 1861 which did not include unspecified islets or rocks.
Granville also admitted that the Cape lease of 1869 was actually made two
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years before the Cape was invested with such independent powers. Granville
hoped Germany would not exploit this infraction since the former Governor was
acting on good faith then. In addition, the Foreign Secretary reported to the
German embassy “that the cable to South Africa is broken . . . instructions will
be sent by post and will be followed by a telegraphic communication as soon as
the cable is repaired.”58 Whether by simply using private wire channels or
actually misleading the German government, London was still able to receive
wired information from the region for some time. Whatever the case, this did
interestingly enough give Britain some advantage at least in biding time.59
On February 17, 1885, after the British government waited for quite
awhile for De Pass to go to the Cape to represent himself, De Pass wrote to the
Colonial Office that the Commission need not wait for him, as he had a lawyer
representing his firm already in Cape Town. The next day Derby sent
instructions to Governor Robinson for the Commission to begin, inviting them to
decide on the validity of conflicting claims between De Pass and Lpderitz on
Shark Island and other unspecified islands included in the lease of 1869.
Derby instructed Robinson to have Resident Magistrate Palgrave in Walvis Bay
announce that all those with claims in the Walvis Bay vicinity should attend the
Commission.60
However, Palgrave had been taking matters into his own hands, ignoring
orders from London via the Cape which tried to limit his assistance to the
Herero. Via the Reuter’s Telegraphic Agency, the British Colonial Office was
informed on February 25, 1885: “Cape Town, February 24--Mr. Palgrave . . . [in
Hereroland] held conference with principal Chiefs, the result of which was
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satisfactory, the Chiefs unanimously deciding to accept British rule.”6i Derby
immediately sent his own telegraph back that he wanted Palgrave out of
Hereroland and to act only within his instructions. Governor Robinson
responded three days later that “Palgrave has returned here, having been
recalled.” Although the Governor had not the time for an official investigation,
he assured Derby that “if press version true, I propose to inform [Maherero] Her
Majesty’s Government cannot accept his offer to place his people and country
under British rule.”62 Not until March was Robinson able to furnish any official
information on the meeting with Herero chiefs. According to Robinson’s later
report, an English trader, Robert Lewis, visited Palgrave requesting that he visit
Maherero (who was also known as Kamaherero), paramount chief of the
Herero, which he had done on December 29, 1884. Palgrave reported that:
“On my arrival, Kamaherero at once took measures to collect his headmen and
councillors, and, after some day’s deliberation, he handed me a deed of
cession of his whole country to the British Government.” Apparently Maherero
only stipulated that “the [Herero] laws should, as far as possible, remain in force
until the laws of the Government were understood by his people, and that he
should continue to be acknowledged as the paramount Chief of the country,
and that the two mining concessions granted by him [to Lewis] should be
respected.” Maherero’s deed of cession stated:
“ I, KAMAHERERO, paramount Chief of [Hereroland], with the
consent of my under Chiefs and Counsellors [sic], subject ourselves to
the Government of the Queen of England in Her Government of the
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope as one of Her posts, namely our
whole country . . . . In the name, and with the consent, of myself and my
people, I subject myself to the Government in order that we may re
ceive that protection which we have for so long a time asked for in
vain, and now, in firm confidence, I know for certain that we shall be
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treated in all respects as the true subjects of the Queen herself.”63
The Herero, having been defeated by the Nama who were supplied with
German arms in exchange for land, tried to turn back to their old protectors, the
British, who had forsaken them in the last Nama-Herero war in 1880 and
withdrawn to Walvis Bay. However, Governor Robinson admitted to Maherero
that the Cape had considered annexing all of the lands of the Herero and
Nama, but that his government now recognized the German colony and was not
going to interfere with its expansion into the heartland of the Southwest African
tribes.64

Meanwhile, the British Colonial Secretary was busy trying to repair

the damage caused by Palgrave’s acceptance of the Herero concession.

By

April 8, Derby sent his approval to Robinson for his actions, and received news
that the rejection of the Herero protectorate by London and the Cape satisfied
the Germans. Derby informed the Governor that the German embassy also
suggested that: “Her Majesty’s Government should express to your Ministers a
hope that no endeavour will be made to obtain influence in the country north of
the Orange River and west of the 20th degree of east longitude. Such a hope is
in conformity with the policy which your Ministers are aware Her Majesty’s
Government have adopted in regard to the portion of South[ern] Africa in
question.” However Derby, who was easily influenced by colonial
entrepreneuring, did add that “ I consider the expression ‘influence’ to apply to
political influence, and I have no desire to suggest that the legitimate operations
of trade between the [British] Colonists and natives should be curtailed or
terminated.”65 Therefore, British business was not prohibited from operating in
German Southwest Africa. Furthermore, the British were not in a hurry to
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comply with German requests to quickly notify natives of Britain’s capitulation by
again using the excuse of broken telegraph lines or ships having already left
dock.66 Though the inevitable did come a week later when Foreign Secretary
Granville’s instructions were sent to Robinson in Cape Town which confirmed
that the tribes residing in Southwest Africa would become German subjects:
I shall be glad if, whenever an opportunity occurs for commun
ication with any of the Chiefs living to the west of the 20th degree of
east longitude, you will intimate to them that Her Majesty’s Govern
ment have agreed to limit the Queen’s authority to the country east
ward of that line [Bechuanaland], and that if the authority of the Ger
man Government should be extended inland up to that line, Her Maj
esty’s Government will not do anything to interfere with such and
extension.67
The British sent a copy of these instructions to the German embassy on June 9,
1885, concluding this potential conflict.68
Matters regarding Daniel De Pass were still heated throughout this time,
though the British Colonial Office seemed less the advocate for the company.
Back in September 1884, Colonial Secretary Derby informed De Pass that the
Foreign Office had requested that Germany take action against any more
gunshots by Luderitz’s men around the guano islands. However, Derby’s office
warned the British businessman “that the formation of a settlement in the
immediate neighbourhood of the islands . . . [will] have a tendency to drive away
the birds.”69 Obviously a different tone was afoot. De Pass’ associate, Captain
John Spence, had likewise complained to Governor Robinson, reporting that _
the German cannons were scaring birds away (claimed that one shot could
scare away the birds in a vicinity for years), though a similar disinterest was
received from officials. In March 1885, De Pass had sent yet another complaint
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to the Derby’s office, claiming that he was losing money in the guano islands
because of German traffic in Angra Pequena harbor. To emphasize this, De
Pass reported that extracting 580 tons of guano from the islands in 1883 worth
5,075 British pounds, comparing this with the only 300 tons extracted in 1884
worth 2,200 pounds. De Pass then claimed that, according to Spence, they
would be lucky to get 100 tons worth less than 750 pounds in 1885. The
businessman complained that he had lost 4,200 pounds already and projected
that since he had a lease for eleven to twelve more years, he would lose 40,000
pounds at this rateTO John Bramston, the Assistant Colonial Under Secretary,
answered him on April 4, 1885: “Lord Derby desires me in reply to say that he
regrets to hear of the diminution in the yield of the islands, which he hopes is
only temporary, but I am to remind you that no guarantee has ever been given
you that settlements on the mainland would be prevented with a view to your
benefit.”71 De Pass sent an abrupt rebuke two weeks later: “We apprehend, if
your Lordship fully appreciated all the facts, that you would not form this
conclusion.”72 For now, with tempers on edge, both sides allowed the matter to
slide.
On June 8, Gladstone’s Liberals resigned over a taxation dispute and
two weeks later Lord Salisbury, Robert Cecil, accepted Gladstone’s seal
becoming Prime Minister. With new elections far away, a new conservative
Tory government had to rule weakly with Parliament still in a Liberal majority. A
worst case scenario for any British prime minister--all the responsibility without
most of the power. Salisbury made Colonel Frederick Stanley the new Colonial
Secretary, while reserving the office of Foreign Secretary for himself (Note:
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Salisbury governed as Prime Minister right out of the Foreign Office). Salisbury
had criticized the Liberal government, as opposition leader in the Commons, for
its “vacillation and inconsistency” in its African policy over the last five years. He
had denounced Gladstone’s diplomatic defeats, the concessions to the Boers in
the Transvaal, and the mess emerging in the Sudan with the rise of the Mahdist
state. Salisbury wanted to make foreign policy the priority of the day. He turned
to Percy Anderson, who held the African desk in the Foreign Office, and carved
out a new strategy of securing England’s position in Egypt so Germany could
never again use it as blackmail. Overall, the Prime Minister began to push a
more vigorous British participation in the “scramble for Africa.”73
Despite this, Salisbury let Germany keep her sphere west of the 20th
east longitude in Southwest Africa along with its gains in Cameroon. His
strategy was not as much to inhibit the Reich in Africa as it was to race
Germany, and everyone else, for control over the “dark continent.” Therefore,
although Bismark and the Foreign Ministry (who were mostly conservatives)
preferred Salisbury over Gladstone, British policy towards Germany during this
transition of British governments remained very much the same. The fact that
the lower government officials in London rarely changed with the leadership
also assisted this. In the end however, Salisbury proved a more worthy
opponent for Berlin, despite its preference for him74
In July 1885, Governor Robinson, in his first dispatch to the new
government, requested instructions from Colonial Secretary Stanley for the joint
commission regarding claims by British subjects caught between Luderitz’s
coastal claim and the 20th east longitude which Britain was informally
recognizing as the eastern limit of acceptable German advance into the
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Kalahari. Stanley did not answer until September and then only with
instructions for the British commissioner to operate within the bounds of his
original instructions from Gladstone’s government. Accordingly, British subjects
wanting London’s protection were to keep out of Germany’s way west of the
Kalahari bo rde r.^ However, the Cape Ministers had other convictions about
letting Germany that far inland and had hoped a change in government in
London might effect that. In a dispatch of August 1885, the Cape Ministers
objected to Britain’s refusal to protect or annex Hereroland east of Walvis Bay
and requested that the Governor “urge Her Majesty’s Government to refrain
from forcing the inhabitants of that country to acquiesce in German
annexation.”76 However, bowing to London’s clear instructions, Robinson
answered his ministers on July 30 with a note that sounded much like Granville
and Derby: “Her Majesty’s Government have expressed a hope that no
endeavour will be made by [the Cape] Ministers to obtain political influence in
the country north of the Orange River and west of the 20th meridian of longitude,
and the Governor trusts that [the] Ministers will be so good as to instruct the
various frontier officers accordingly. ”77 At this time, Robinson also reported
informing Maherero of the Herero and William Christian of the Bondelswarts (a
southern Nama tribe just north of the Orange River) that Britain, and thus the
Cape, refused to intervene in their regions.
In regard to the remaining rivalry between De Pass and Luderitz, the
Joint Commission on Southwest African private claim disputes finally made its
decisions known in September 1885. Although the German and British
Commissioners were able to agree in some cases, they went to their respective
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corners on the major issues, as reflected in a telegraph from Robinson: “ British
Commissioner considers islands in lease of 1869, although not annexed to
Colony, to be British, and the claims under lease valid; German Commissioner
disagrees.” Regarding the Luderitz-De Pass rivalry on the mainland, Governor
Robinson relayed: “British Commissioner considers De Pass, Spence, and
Co[mpany]’s proprietary claims on mainland, under grants from [Bethanie
Nama] Chief David Christian of 1863 and 1864, including entire coast of Angra
Pequena, to be valid; German Commissioner disagrees.” Robinson added that
the “British Commissioner considers De Pass, Spence, and Co[mpany]’s claims
for rent [from Luderitz’s] German factory at Angra Pequena, and for
compensation for damage done to Penguin island through such factory on
mainland opposite, valid; German Commissioner

d is a g r e e s .”^

Robinson’s subsequent written report went into more detail. The
Commission agreed to many small, preexisting claims by British, Boer, and
German entrepreneurs in Southwest Africa, especially regarding small mining
claims. The Commission also agreed to give the Rhenish Missionary Society
land and privileges in Walvis Bay to build a church, a school, and other
buildings throughout the Bay’s territory. Therefore all of Southwest Africa was
now open to the RMS. The Commission did agree to deny questionable grants
and claims made by many, especially Boers, to capitalize on the situation in the
change of landlords. Though the British commissioner wanted to give the large
mining grant, given by Maherero, to the British businessman Lewis, which the
German commissioner vetoed. Likewise, the British commissioner wanted to
give the title of land to Anders Ohlsson, an employee of De Pass, in Sandwich
Harbor while his German counterpart only wanted to recommend that no one
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disturb him as long as he confined himself to fishing. The real conflicts came on
issues between De Pass, Spence & Company versus Luderitz’s Southwest
African Colonization Company, in which both commissioners backed their
countrymen. The British representative supported De Pass’ questionable claim
to Shark Island, whereas the German commissioner denied that it was included
in any lease though he was willing to allow De Pass & Company to use Angra
Pequena harbor for their guano business without any official land title. The
German representative rejected De Pass’ 1864 deed which included the
mainland because it was only a lease, whereas Luderitz’s was a deed of
purchase. The German commissioner also rejected his counterpart’s support
for De Pass’ 1000 pounds per annum rent claim on Luderitz, since by Spence’s
own admission Luderitz’s factory was well outside De Pass’ supposed claim.
Furthermore, the German commissioner flatly denied De Pass’ claim to 89,205
pounds worth of damages to guano supply on Penguin island--he declared that
Spence had submitted the claim after the established deadline anyway.
Overall, the dispute between Luderitz and De Pass remained

u n r e s o lv e d 7 9

a

real scare alarmed Cape Town and London though in late September and early
October, 1885, when the Commission found the eastern boundary of Walvis Bay
to be incorrectly defined. However, whether respecting that Britain had
cooperated in withdrawing support for the Herero or whether giving Salisbury’s
new government some room, Germany decided not to exploit this and
cooperated with the British in redefining the eastern boundary correctly.80
Making a productive colony out of Southwest Africa was just as uncertain
and clumsy as the negotiations that created it. The first year of the German
colony was a disappointment for Luderitz’s mining. Roads had to be laid, wells
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dug, and mines improved or created. More money was going in than coming
out. To make matters worse, one of Luderitz’s ships, the Tilly, sunk off the coast
with expensive drilling equipment for water wells and other essential
equipment. This disaster coupled with a poor start put the Bremen merchant on
the threshold of ruin. Bismark himself called Luderitz’s domain the sandpotjie
or “little sand pot.”8i
However the diplomatic channels became emblazed once more when
news came that a British trader, W. W. Jordan, had purchased land from an
Ovambo chief; the land was disputed territory between the Ovambos and the
Herero in the northern part of the colony. The Ovambos inhabited the far
northern regions where adequate rainfall enabled cultivation. Their numbers
far exceeded the Herero and Nama put together, yet the southern-most of the
Ovambo seemed dominated by the Herero, possibly because of the modern
weapons the Herero had from English traders. What came as a shock was that
Jordan had declared the region he purchased, which the Herero also claimed,
an independent republic. He named his supposed republic “Upingtonia” after a
Cape official who was a proponent of northern expansion for the Cape .82
Jordan declared himself president and considered a group of Boer settlers
around him as his council. The Cape’s agent-general or lobbyist in London,
wrote to the Colonial Office on January 7, 1886, after telegraphing a short
request to the Cape the previous day: “Excitement-Reuter’s cable Upingtonia
Republic--Wire Facts.”83 The Cape telegraphed back:
Jordan trader alleges purchase part [Ovamboland] from Chief.
He resold in farms to Europeans who without authority have named
district Upingtonia, and established some Council. Cape Government
never heard of transaction till newspapers had obtained information
and have no connexion [sic] with matter. They are studiously avoiding
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all interference north of Orange River as requested by Imperial Govern
ment. 84
There were some British subjects who were so frustrated with not being able to
officially keep parts of Southwest Africa out of German hands that they were
willing to do it on their own privately. Although the Germans had not claimed
Ovamboland as far as Portuguese Angola yet, they had already claimed control
over Hereroland, and Upingtonia was right in between Ovamboland and
Hereroland. The Ovambo claimed the region was their’s to sell to Jordan,
which the Herero denied.

In fact, the Herero even regarded these particular

Ovambo as their vassals. This time the Germans supported the Herero, having
been firm supporters of the Nama up until this time. Of course, they were
supporting Maherero for their own gain, to eliminate any rival claims to
Southwest Africa. Although the Cape was officially “hands off,” there were
many who hoped Upingtonia would succeed. Colonial Secretary Stanley had
Salisbury informed of the matter on January 12, 1886, stating that: “Having
regard to the declarations made by Her Majesty’s Government as to their
abandonment of all claims or interest [in Hereroland], they could not interfere . . .
without incurring the risk of a serious misunderstanding with the German
Government.’^

Also at this time, British officials gave attention to a Times

article of January 8, which announced the arrival of a German official in Berlin
with treaties securing German control over all of Southwest Africa from the
Orange River in the south to Cape Frio in the north, and to 22 degrees east
longitude (which was in conflict with the Anglo-German agreement regarding
the 20 degree east longitude Kalahari border). The Colonial Office wanted
Ambassador Edward Malet, Ampthill’s replacement in Berlin, to inquire into this
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new eastern claim “as the Government of the Cape Colony and the German
Government have already been informed that the British protectorate over
Bechuanaland extends westward as far as the 20th degree of East longitude
and northward to the 22nd parallel of South latitude.”86 Furthermore, Colonial
Secretary Stanley in a dispatch to Cape Governor Robinson on January 13,
reaffirmed that Salisbury’s government intended to stand with the decision of
Gladstone’s not to get involved west of the 20th east longitude, and therefore
not to get any ideas regarding Upingtonia.87 Matters remained intense though.
Interestingly, some British subjects in Southwest Africa resented Jordan’s
self-proclaimed republic as much as the Germans did. Robinson received a
letter from R. Lewis, the same English mining entrepreneur who had been
denied a Herero mining concession near Otavi (which would lie in Upingtonia)
by the German commissioner. This time Lewis was on the German side in
rejecting Upingtonia, for obvious self-interest. Lewis claimed to be writing to the
Cape Governor on behalf of Maherero, though his own interests seem at the
heart of it:
I am desired by [Maherero] . . . to seek your aid in the withdrawal
of one W.W. Jordan who is going about buying certain tracts of country
belonging to me. . . . For instance he has purchased Raipoort from the
[Nama] to whom it certainly does not belong. He has further bought
at Ondonga from an Ovambo minor Chief, certain land on my northern
territory, including Otavi. He is buying from whom he can, whether
they have the power or right to sell it or not. This to him seems to be
outside the question altogether. I would here further state that we do
not acknowledge any such p u r c h a s e s .8 8
Lewis, still claiming Maherero’s words, went on to say that Jordan’s life was in
danger because of his mischief and mischance. In one instance, when Jordan
gave an Ovambo minor chief some brandy, the chief died an hour later making
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the Ovambo tribe believe that Jordan poisoned him. Maherero claimed that the
Ovambo “will kill Jordan if they can lay hands on him.” The Herero overlord
also reported that his own people, the Herero, “are so enraged against him . . .
that the Chief will not hold himself responsible for what the people may do to
him.”89 Robinson replied to the Herero request with the standard conviction that
the Cape could not involve itself in matters west of the Kalahari line, save for
Walvis Bay. The Governor could only suggest that Lewis write a complaint to
the German Commissioner, and Stanley sent his approval of Robinson’s
actions, so
German expansion in Southwest Africa continued despite the phantom
republic of Upingtonia, making the issue of the specific eastern boundary of the
colony sensitive. British Ambassador Malet finally did send confirmation from
Berlin that the Germans did not claim an extended eastern border for Southwest
Africa as the Times had earlier reported (the Germans acknowledged the 20
degree east longitude Kalahari border, not 22 degrees east as reported by the
London paper). However, despite the fact that Germany confirmed the
boundary between Southwest Africa and Bechuanaland, this was really only
applicable in the southern reaches of the colony-no border had yet been
agreed upon north of 22 degrees south latitude, or just north of the Tropic of
Capricorn. In the meantime the Germans tried to at least become more involved
in the Kalahari by pushing its occupation to the very borders of Bechuanaland.
German Ambassador Hatzfeldt informed London that “territories which are
situated eastward of the Southwest African Protectorate . . . which belong to the
[Nama] of Berseba and Gibeon, to the Bastards of Rehoboth, to the Herero, and
to the Red People [a branch off the Nama] have, in consequence of Treaties . . .
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been placed under the protection of the Reich.”91 On February 3, 1886,
Colonial Secretary Stanley sent word to Robinson that Germany had finally and
officially declared its expansion all the way to Bechuanaland, including all of
Hereroland and Namaland. With the eastern part of the colony for the most part
established, Germany’s only task seemed now to negotiate control over
Ovamboland--at least in terms of international recognition--part of which laid in
Portuguese Angola and part in Southwest

A f r ic a .92

In the midst of Germany’s expansion and the resulting difficulties, a new
government formed again in London in February 1886, with Rosebery chosen
as Foreign Secretary and Granville, who was Gladstone’s old Foreign
Secretary, now the new Colonial Secretary. However, again the minor officials
in both offices remained much the same, with interdepartmental affairs
remaining fairly

u n c h a n g e d .93

in this government’s first actions regarding

Southwest Africa, Rosebery sent Granville a note enclosing information from a
British official in Lisbon, Portugal. The Portuguese were not happy in regards to
Upingtonia which they considered created “by some Boers and Englishmen”
and must have considered the district farther north than what it actually was to
consider it a threat. The official reported that “anything likely to interfere with a
free expansion eastward of Portuguese territory into the heart of the South
African Continent traverses a fixed purpose of Portuguese and Colonial Policy,
and therefore excites vigilant attention

h e r e .”94

Portugal had also been

whipped into the new colonial enthusiasm and “scramble for Africa” by
Germany’s presence and had now entered the situation as another opponent of
Upingtonia along with Germany and the Herero. However the major
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breakthrough came in March 1886. Foreign Secretary Rosebery had sent a
dispatch to Ambassador Malet in Berlin, ordering him to inquire from Bismark
whether an Anglo-German conference could meet in Berlin to sort out the still
unresolved private claims in Southwest Africa which the Joint Commission in
Cape Town failed to agree upon. Rosebery suggested a possible meeting
between British officials and Dr. Friedrich Krauel, the German Foreign Ministry’s
colonial planner. Bismark agreed. If a major Anglo-German agreement could
be made resolving all outstanding issues regarding the colonies, Germany and
Britain could look more into a possible alliance. However, both sides delayed
organizing the conference for several months. In the meantime, both London
and Berlin bickered over unresolved details trying to gain an advantage.
German Ambassador Hatzfeldt filed a complaint from Chief Manasse Noresch
of the Red People (a subtribe of the Nama) with London, in that:
The western and northern boundary, 20 E. long, and 22 S. lat.,
fixed by the English Government for its protected district in Bechuana
land, cuts o f f . . . a portion of lands and hunting grounds belonging to the
Red People. The bushmen subject to him had lived from time immem
orial to a point as far east as Nosob. He places his boundary in the
east as reaching from the Chamob River to the Nyami [or Ngami],
which seems to agree with the boundary which separates the territories
of the [Nama] from those of Betschuana. The [German] Imperial Gov
ernment . . . is not in a position to judge of the justness of these claims
within the British Protectorate which it has recognised. It would how
ever, regret if in consequence simply of a boundary drawn according
to latitude and longitude the Red People should be deprived of lands
which have belonged to them for a long time.95
Evidently Germany, at least along the northern section of its eastern frontier with
Bechuanaland, felt confident enough to pursue a more eastern limit towards the
Okavango region, a region that annually flooded to become a luscious watering
hole in the middle of the arid region north of the Kalahari. It seemed to Britain
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that Germany wanted a piece of it, with the Germans actually using the
suzerainty of some Nama over particular bushmen as a means to that end. This
would definitely be one issue in the coming conference.96
In April and on into May 1886, while London was trying to get its side of a
conference delegation organized, the Colonial Office was swamped amid an
increased tempo of actions regarding Southwest Africa. On May 7, for example,
De Pass & Company sent a simple request to the Colonial Office: “We should
be happy to hear if any progress has been made in the Angra Pequena and
coastal claims, as we have not been favoured with any communication of
late.”97 Colonial Secretary Granville had De Pass answered with news of the
new conference. London also received requests from the Portuguese
government wanting information about Upingtonia. However, it was not until
June that Granville’s office was even able to send Robinson’s report on
Upingtonia to Foreign Secretary Rosebery. This report did confirm that Jordan
had purchased the area from the Ovambo and was now inviting South Africans
to come and settle. Governor Robinson also reported that Chief Maherero
likewise claimed it and had already given it as a silver mining concession to R.
Lewis. Yet, most of the important information the Governor sent was unrelated
to Upingtonia but regarded the German colony in general. Cape Governor
Robinson warned in his report that the northern regions of and around
Bechuanaland, which was ambiguously defined (with only the southern part of
the western boundary recognized with the German colony) be attended to else
it “is likely to be appropriated by some other power.”98 These seemed to be
issues destined for the planned conference. The Colonial Office was also
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prompted in May with news from Ambassador Malet that the Reichstag had
received and recorded all treaties securing control over the Southwest African
tribes, save the Ovambo. Such news made London quicken its pace. Granville
suggested to Rosebery that they send John Bramston, Assistant Under
Secretary in the Colonial Office under Gladstone and Salisbury governments, to
the Berlin conference to help British Charge d’Affairs Scott since Bramston had
been involved in the affair since the very genesis of the German

c o lo n y .99

While London awaited the conference it received more news regarding
the status of German and British power in the region of Southwest Africa. In late
June, London received a dispatch from Walvis Bay that a German ship on her
way to Cameroon had stopped there. It stated that: “The captain made
particular inquiries as to the possibility of landing at the mouth of Swakop River,
which the magistrate told him was not possible on account of the surf and reefs
of rocks at the mouth.” Actually, the later German establishment of Swakopmund as a port would challenge this opinion. A German professor and
geologist also came through Walvis Bay on his way to the interior “to examine
the various mines” while other Germans were buying up “the various mines
from the present owners, natives, and traders.”ioo German momentum seemed
to be building both on the coast and in the interior, while Walvis Bay was
becoming a ghost port. A British naval commander reported that although meat
from fishing and herding was plentiful, vegetables in Walvis Bay were rare, and
that:
None but slightly brackish water is to be procured; all drink
ing water is brought from the Cape by the schooners trading with the
settlement. Of trade there is very little indeed, and that falling off; a
good many years ago, a quantity of ivory, ostrich feathers, and skins
used to be exported to the Cape, but little now; occasionally a few
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cattle are shipped to St. Helena. [The Resident Magistrate] said that
one small schooner of a 100 tons would bring all the merchandise
and carry away all the produce for a whole year. No merchant vess
els or whalers ever visit the harbour; the coasting schooners . . . call
about once in three months from the Cape, and bring the drinking
water and the few stores that are required . . . and get a cargo of dried
fish which they take to the Cape. No revenue is collected at [Walvis],
as it is established as a free port of entry and export, except from li
censes to sell spirits, etcJoi
Evidently Walvis Bay, also known as Walfisch (“Whale fish”) Bay, was now
worthless with the whaling days of its namesake gone. Also, Walvis Bay was
only of value as a doorway into Southwest Africa. With the Germans cutting it
off from the interior, its only value to the Cape was that it was not in German
hands. If the Germans could control a port with the geography of Walvis Bay it
would enhance their power tremendously. Instead the Germans built
Swakopmund next door to Walvis Bay. Luderitz had wanted to find a harbor on
the northern coast equal in potential to that of Angra Pequena, but he settled on
making something at the mouth of the Swakop River despite warnings against
the surf.
Finally, the Berlin Conference on Southwest Africa met in July 1886, with
Bramston and the British embassy Charge d’Affairs Scott representing Britain,
and with German colonial head Dr. Friedrich Krauel and Southwest African
commissioner Dr. Heinrich Goering (the father of the later Luftwaffe head),
representing the Reich. Overall, the Germans were the acknowledged rulers of
mainland Southwest Africa, with the commercial rights of Daniel De Pass
respected only offshore though not to De Pass’ liking. Dr. Goering
acknowledged De Pass’ private property rights on all of the islands save a few
unspecified islets and rocks, including Shark Island in Angra Pequena harbor,

87

which Goering believed to be German. He pointed out that De Pass’ lease ran
out on some islands in 1895 after which Luderitz’s company would take over
the private rights. Dr. Goering also affirmed that De Pass’ claims to interior
mines and mainland areas should be canceled, using Spence’s deed as
evidence. Where Spence had interpreted the Dutch word vergunning to mean
land “grant” Goering pointed out that it really means “permission” to use the
land in Dutch, which is what David Christian speaking in Dutch would have
meant. Therefore when Luderitz purchased the land, he became the landlord
and could cancel that permission. The German delegates presented other
issues in arguments favorable to Luderitz’s position. However, the Germans did
not press their issues too far, and most of the issues of private ownership or
lease were decided in favor of the British. The main concern for Berlin was to
resolve the issues and bring British involvement in Southwest Africa to an end,
while still keeping Angra Pequena German and the British in a favorable
enough mood to eventually deal with other colonial issues. The British
delegation basically complied with Goering’s decisions, they agreed that the
islands would become Luderitz’s after De Pass’ leases ran out and even
agreed to give up their sovereignty over the unspecified islands, islets, and
rocks, such as Shark Island if the Germans respected De Pass’ leases until their
expiration. On July 15 all four representatives signed the protocol (though not
nearly enough outstanding issues had been resolved involving Anglo-German
rivalry over Southwest Africa let alone the other German colonies).
Unfortunately for Luderitz, he would never see the day when De Pass’
possessions fell into his hands. The Bremen merchant drowned later that year
when his boat capsized while on an expedition on the Orange River. More out
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of patriotism than any faith in Southwest Africa’s resources, German
businessmen came to the aid and formed the Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft
fur Sudwestafrika, or German Colonial Company for Southwest Africa. This
organization assumed control over the colony, though almost immediately many
British investors moved in. 102
The effects of the race for private claims in Southwest Africa were being
felt. On July 27, 1886, De Pass & Company wrote to Granville’s office informing
them that Spence was now bankrupt and that therefore all his interests was De
Pass’ alone. In a slightly self-serving tone, De Pass wrote: “The compensation
and other benefits which will be made in respect of the Angra Pequena and
coast claim will therefore belong to

u s

.”103

The London businessman also

wrote that he expected that the Colonial Office would inform him of the
settlement just completed in Berlin. Of course, unknown to De Pass, the
Protocol of July 15 contained no monetary compensation for De Pass’ guano
loss. The Colonial Office answered De Pass within a few days, but only
acknowledged Spence’s reported bankruptcy and told him that they would
furnish information on the Berlin agreement shortly .104
On August 2, the Colonial Secretary gave formal approval of the Berlin
Protocol involving Southwest Africa. The Colonial Office reported to Rosebery
that “Lord Granville is glad that this satisfactory termination of the questions
awaiting settlement has been attained.”105 London, it seemed, was relieved to
have the issue finally resolved after three years, and the attention of three
ministries. Berlin too was delighted to have the private issues involving the
British in Southwest Africa resolved, so that the Reich could turn its attention

89

towards carving out a hinterland for the colony and resolving more official, and
in Berlin’s eyes more important, issues with Britain concerning Southwest Africa
and the other German colonies. At least the 1886 Berlin Protocol Agreement
removed De Pass and Luderitz as stumbling blocks.
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Chapter 3
W alls Raised
Late in the summer of 1886 the British government switched hands again
when the Liberal Unionists deserted the Liberal Party. Salisbury’s old friend
Stafford Northcote, who was now the Earl of Iddesleigh, was made Foreign
Secretary replacing Rosebery. Likewise, Granville was replaced with Edward
Stanhope as the new head of the Colonial Office; yet familiar names remained
in the lower echelons of both offices--including John Bramston. Iddesleigh sent
off a letter to the Colonial Office as early as August 9, confirming the protocol
reached with Berlin that summer which resolved the private disputes plaguing
Anglo-German negotiations over Southwest Africa. Again the new officials
backed decisions of the prior ministry and there was a smooth transition in
colonial diplomacy without any abrupt reversals. Besides, the Skeleton Coast
and the lands between the Namib and Kalahari were not any areas to fight for;
the real target now became the trans-Zambezi region and East Africa. Yet
Southwest Africa continued to be important as Germany tightened its grip on the
colony and expanded the colony into the interior. 1
Upingtonia was one standing issue of private, and official, dispute not
dealt with by the Berlin conference. Englishman W. W. Jordan had purchased
land from the Ovambo and declared his realm an independent republic in the
face of German and Herero claims. In early August 1886, new Colonial
Secretary Stanhope indirectly received a request from Upingtonia settlers to
reveal the German efforts of supporting the Herero in their claim to the region
over the O vam bo-and therefore over Jordan who claimed it. The Colonial
Office obtained a copy of the April 21, 1885, deed of purchase from the Ovambo
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which had Chief Kambonde Kampingana’s (of the southern Ovambo tribe of
Ondanga) pledge that “in case it should at any time become necessary for Mr.
W. W. Jordan to hold possession of [Upingtonia] . . . by force, we pledge
ourselves to assist him and to do so with the strength of the whole of our tribe.”2
Of course, this was before Jordan had his brandy debacle with the Ovambo.
Evidently Jordan made some sort of an appeal to the German representative in
Southwest Africa, L. Nels (Reich Commissioner Goering’s representative). Nels
replied to Jordan: “In consequence of the preliminary information which I have
gathered the Herero will at present be protected in the possession of [the Otavi
region or Upingtonia]. I therefore request you and those Boers commissioned
by you to sojourn on neutral grounds till the question shall be definitely settled.”
The German official also wrote to Jordan that “the German Government can but
consent to a settlement of Boers in a territory under German protection provided
that it is performed in a just and peaceful manner, as such would be favourable
to the advancement of civilization in this territory. Please make the Boers
acquainted with the above.” So began Germany’s attack on the phantom
republic, while trying not to alienate any Boers. Nels informed Jordan that the
latter would not be able to send goods through Herero territory “in consideration
of the notorious hostile behaviour which you have formerly shown towards the
Hereros and which has been evidently declared to me by creditable
Europeans.” As for lifting this embargo in the future, the German declared that
“it will depend on your future behaviour.”3 Jordan retorted:
[I] in reply beg to inform you that by virtue of deed of purchase
and by right of occupation I and the burghers of the district intend hold
ing firm possession of the same, and totally ignore the pretentious
claims of the Hereros to this portion of Ovamboland in which is situat
ed the Otavi Mines. In re[gard] to your actions in sanctioning the pro
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hibitions of my goods and transport passing through [Hereroland],
and of your assuming sovereign rights prior to the confirmation of the
German Imperial Government to the establishing of its protectorate
over [Hereroland], I will hold you responsible for all losses I sustain in
my business or otherwise. Any further communication you have to
make on this subject you will please address to J. Lees, Esq., 9. Cape
Good Hope Bank Chambers, Cape Town.4
Jordan intended to fight for Upingtonia. Interestingly, though there was never
any official support from the Cape, some Cape colonists did give Jordan some
private support. However, Stanhope’s Colonial Office wrote to Upingtonian
associates with the now standard response for involvement in Southwest Africa:
Britain would not interfere west of the 20th east longitude, where Upingtonia
was clearly situated.5
Later on October 22, 1886, news reached London that W. W. Jordan, the
self-proclaimed president of his self-proclaimed republic of Upingtonia, had
been murdered. The Cape Times and a private letter provided the Colonial
Office with a description of the incident which occurred on August 8. According
to this information, thirty Ovambo found Jordan’s wagon parked outside a
missionary house for the evening. Talking with Jordan’s driver:
The driver replied that his master was still asleep, but that he
would call him. Whereupon Mr. Jordan was roused, and got out of
the wagon, greeted all those present, and sat down by the fire, and
commenced lacing his boots. While so engaged the driver handed
him a cup of tea, and as Jordan raised himself to take the tea, the
Ovambo directly opposite him, at a distance of some three feet, dis
charged the contents of a double-barreled elephant-gun right into his
chest. Mr. Jordan fell, and death was instantaneous. The driver on
seeing this ran to the wagon for his gun, whereupon the Ovambos
opened fire . .. from the effects of which he died some 48 hours after. . . .
[Their chief upon being informed] dispatched some eight bushmen
to the scene of the murder in order to bury J o r d a n .e
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John Cane, the Cape Times correspondent in Southwest Africa, added:
It is only to be hoped that immediate steps will be taken by our
[Cape] Government to aid us, and exterminate this cowardly, wicked,
and treacherous Ovambo race. The blood of missionaries, the blood
of traders, and the blood of Will Jordan to-day cries out in vengeance
against these people, the Ovambo tribes, and we petition to you, the
civilised Powers of Europe-England, Germany, Belgium, France,
and Portugal-to come over and help us.7
Most of the time the Ovambo kept out of the affairs of lands farther south but
were known in the past to have killed some Catholic missionaries and others.
Only the FMS seemed to make headway with them evangelically, but few
Europeans tried to ever encroach upon their land. However, in this case Jordan
had been provoking both the Herero and the Ovambo into a confrontation, and
he had been warned by Maherero, the paramount Herero chief who wanted the
Cape to get Jordan out of the region. As for any revenge, obeying London’s
instructions the Cape could not intervene in matters north of the Orange River
and west of the Kalahari border. An anonymous letter from Southwest Africa to
the Cape, dated August 18, read: “There is little doubt that ‘Upingtonia’ will now
collapse, and I think the Boers will soon leave either for the Transvaal or for
Humpata in Portuguese territory.”8 Many of the Boers did stay in Southwest
Africa, however under German control. In fact, the Boer population increased
steadily, with many Cape Boers finding the Germans more to their liking. It is
doubtful that the Germans had any hand in Jordan’s murder, because the Reich
barely had minimal control over the Herero and had never really tried to control
the Ovambo. It seems Jordan’s mistreatment of the indigenous population
merely caught up with him.9 Later in November 1886, the Foreign Office
decided to have Ambassador Malet in Berlin at least bring the issue of Jordan’s
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murder to Germany’s attention, if it had not been done so already. The British
Ambassador reported back that Count Herbert Bismark (the Chancellor’s son)
“spoke to me with regard to it yesterday and said that the Imperial Government
was still in negotiation with the Portuguese Government respecting the northern
limits of the territory over which Germany desired to exert its influence, but until
these negotiations were complete the authority of the German Government
would not be exerted in the regions concerned, and the tribe of Ovambos
appeared to be within them.”io In other words, Germany shrugged off
responsibility in the matter by stating it had as yet no official power in the region
though they were working on getting that power. This happened despite the
fact that the German representative earlier in the year felt he had enough power
to make sanctions against Jordan in the region. Fortunately for Berlin, London
did not press the matter.
Meanwhile, another old issue continued to cause controversy. Governor
Robinson had finally responded to London’s request for information on the Red
People’s (and therefore Germany’s) claim to lands east of the 20th east
longitude into Bechuanaland. The Cape Governor had researched the subject
with inquiries made to those who had traveled through or resided with the Red
People, a poor branch off the Nama who claimed suzerainty over the desert.
Dr. Theophilus Hahn for instance told Robinson that he doubted the succession
of the chief who Germany recognized over the Red People, and therefore
questioned their claim over particular bushmen who dwelled and/or hunted
between his realm and the Okavango region (to which Germany wanted
access). However, Hahn did admit that the Red People themselves inhabited
territory over to the 21 30’ east longitude and sometimes all the way to Lake
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Ngami in the Okavango, and that bushmen did in fact extend throughout
western Bechuanaland both in and north of the Kalahari proper. Robinson also
cited as an authority a former Cape civil commissioner who once officiated in
Namaland, and “a trader who has been traveling through the country for the
past 31 years.”11 Both seemed to agree that the Red People did in fact occupy
lands further east than the 20th east longitude in some areas and that the
bushmen were all over western Bechuanaland; yet they also reported that all
the subtribes of the Nama and Herero had mistreated the bushmen. In the end
Governor Robinson, in response to Germany’s protest of the 20th east longitude
border, believed that “any other boundary than an arbitrary astronomical line
through such an unknown desert would be an impossibility, and it is inevitable
that in the case of any such line drawn without reference to ethnological or
topographical considerations, questions such as the present must arise with
reference to claims which are sure to be set up by Chiefs on both the British and
German sides of the

b o u n d a r y .”12

Robinson suggested that London should

inform Berlin that, no matter where the border existed, Britain would guarantee
the Red People access to hunting grounds in what England considered
Bechuanaland. Stanhope forwarded Robinson’s suggestion to the Foreign
Office, with the recommendation that Iddesleigh have Berlin given the gist of it. “*3
Although the Anglo-German private property dispute involving Southwest
Africa had been resolved, problems for Daniel De Pass remained when his
associate, John Spence, went bankrupt. On November 9, 1886, Daniel De
Pass wrote once again to the Colonial Office, this time complaining about the
Cape not Luderitz. The Cape was forfeiting Spence’s share in the company
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(which was one-third) to possible public auction rather than giving them to De
Pass. It seemed that traditional British law and new Cape policies were in
conflict as to how Spence’s bankrupt shares should be forfeited. Nevertheless,
De Pass wrote to Stanhope that “if the Cape Government come into this
property through the action of laws unprovided for, I have to urge that you will
bring before the Cape Government the hardship and loss I should suffer should
they take measures to sell this share by public auction, and set up a conflicting
disturbance on the islands to the ruination of my property.”13 The Colonial
Office replied nine days later with the confirmation that the Colonial Secretary
understood the fact that De Pass had control over the islands before they were
annexed to the Cape and even before the Cape was given domestic autonomy
from Britain. Yet Stanhope remained unclear how the shares should be
forfeited, either by Cape or British policy, but could “express no opinion on it.”n
However, the Colonial Secretary did have the Cape consider De Pass’
situation, though admitting this would be his only intervention. The London firm
wrote to Stanhope afterwards declaring their belief that the Cape policy would
triumph and then suggested a possible deal in which the Cape could “make
over to me this third share for, say a moderate increase of rent, the amount of
which might be mutually arranged, and provided me with such documents that
will protect me from the action of the present Cape insolvent law as regards
forfeiture.”1^ The Colonial Secretary sent De Pass’ letters to the Cape for the
Ministers to consider. London wanted no more of De Pass’ problems dealing
with the islands off Southwest Africa.
By the end of the year more crucial issues affecting Southwest Africa
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occurred. An agreement with Portugal established Southwest Africa’s northern
border. Germany pushed the boundary north from Cape Frio to the Kunene
River. The border extended from the mouth of that river eastward to the
Okavango River, which farther east dipped south into the inland delta region
that Germany desired to gain from the British. With the northern border firmly
established, and the southern Orange River border having been established
very early on, Southwest Africa’s eastern border (still technically open north of
22 south latitude) became the new focus. Berlin wanted at least part of the
Okavango flood region and access to the Zambezi River which it considered a
future highway into Central Africa and to German possessions in East Africa.16
However, the colonial rivalry and negotiations among the foremost
European powers were not resolved during the course of 1886, nor into the next
year, primarily due to matters in Europe. The new year of 1887 brought with it
the continued mounting emergency in the Balkans in which Austria-Hungary’s
High Command was preparing for war with Russia in which Vienna would call
upon Berlin for support. In addition, France again seemed to be moving further
over to Russia’s side. By March the German Reichstag approved an increased
military budget for the next seven years, which by the end of the year they
increased yet again, with the German High Command preparing for a two-front
war against both France and Russia. However, with Britain having problems
with France regarding Egypt (and Russia in Central Asia) and with Germany
wanting to keep as much of its troops at home rather than abroad defending
colonies, both Berlin and London moved towards a more helpful atmosphere
while also trying to maintain the “scramble” against one another for Africa and
Oceania.17 Salisbury continued to bring new vitality in Britain’s race, and was
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again both Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, replacing his old friend
Iddesleigh, and having Stanhope replaced with H. T. Holland in the Colonial
O ffice-though Bramston still remained at his desk. One of Salisbury’s earliest
actions in the Foreign Office was to officially accept the July 15 Protocol
regarding Southwest Africa which his predecessors concluded. True to form,
De Pass did not waste any time in sending a request to Colonial Secretary
Holland to obtain a copy of it.19
De Pass, despite Scott and Bramston’s ability to secure most of his
private rights, was not pleased upon reading the Protocol agreement. On
February 11, he wrote to Holland: “We have perused the copy of [the] Protocol
. . . and do not consider that the agreement entered into . . . in reference to our
claims is drawn in accordance with the justice which we . . . have a right to
expect, and we will endeavour in due course to put this plainly before you. No
mention is made of our claims to the mainland under a grant from David
Christian so we shall be obliged if you will inform us of the result of the
Commissioner’s investigations of our title thereto.” De Pass then inquired “what
documents or title deeds we shall receive in reference to the Protocol to enable
us to sell or transfer properties therein mentioned should we at any time wish to
do

s o .”19

The Colonial Office answered De Pass on February 23, 1887, with: “ It

was found quite impossible to induce the German Government to admit the
present validity of the documents of 1863-64 . . . and the best compromise that
was possible was made. . . . Further papers on the subject will shortly be
presented to Parliament and that a copy of them will be sent to you.”20 Holland
did agree to have the Germans provide documentation, but that was the extent
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of it.
Animosity still remained in Southwest Africa despite any agreements, as
evident by still another complaint from De Pass on March 22, 1887, reporting
that Germans were still firing salutes to approaching ships, even for De Pass’
ships who of course wanted no such thing since it scared the birds away. The
London businessman enclosed a complaint his firm sent to the German Consul
in Cape Town, which reported that a German employee, named only as
Bedeker, was hurt firing a cannon salute to De Pass’ ship, the S eabird, when it
arrived at Luderitzbucht (Angra Pequena): “From the very earliest occupation of
the shores of Angra Pequena by Luderitz’s people we had reason to complain
of disturbance by explosions, blasting of rocks, and firing of light and heavy
guns. We represented through the Government that our guano islands were
being injured, and we were informed that this unnecessary firing of heavy guns
would be discontinued. We made certain claims through the Anglo-German
Commission for the loss of guano, and our evidence as to disturbance was
ignored.” To highlight the effects of this irresponsibility, the complaint continued
with: “The man Bedeker now brought up is a living witness of the truth of our
statement, and we hope you will give order’s to Mr. Luderitz’s representative at
Angra Pequena to deliver up this piece of artillery, the firing of which is heard at
[the islands] . ”22 On April 2, 1887, the Colonial Office reported to De Pass that
Salisbury was having Germany informed of the matter, though little was done.
The standoff between Austria and Russia continued through the year and
into 1888, with both Germany and England dragging their feet in making any
commitments to each other as far as any alliance if war broke out. But if a
European war was to come, no one was willing to fire the first shot. Actually, the
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death of Kaiser Wilhelm I on March 9, 1888, had a greater impact on German
policymaking than international tensions. His son and successor, anglophile
Crown Prince Friedrich III, however only ruled as Kaiser for 90 days before he in
turn, died from throat cancer. So 1888 brought the Reich a new, young (only 29
years old), energetic Kaiser, Wilhelm II who had no interest in his father’s
liberalism but savored his grandfather’s imperialism. Despite his grandmother
being Britain’s Queen Victoria, he was willing to shed the present anglophile
attitudes if it served him.
The new Kaiser brought increased vitality into the “scramble for Africa,”
countered only by Salisbury’s renewed imperialism once a vice-consul in
Africa, Harry Johnston, gained his ear. In August, Foreign Office officials were
astonished to open the Times of the 22nd to find all of Salisbury’s secret plans
for British extension into Africa published. When officials asked Johnston
whether he did this, the young official replied: “Yes, and I think I may say Lord
Salisbury knew of my doing so and did not disapprove.”22 it told of Salisbury’s
plan for a British corridor extending from “the Cape-to-Cairo” to be laid out with
plans to push north from the Cape into the trans-Zambezi region, through a
corridor skirting Leopold’s Congo and the Germans in East Africa, and to link up
with the Nile. Diamond entrepreneur Cecil Rhodes, in South Africa, was only
too willing to help with Salisbury’s plans to cross the Zambezi.23
As for Germany, the new Kaiser quickly began lessening tensions
between Austria-Hungary and Russia, so that the Reich could once again focus
on creating a large navy and extending imperial territories abroad. However,
Chancellor Bismark seemed too old and out-dated for the young Kaiser.
Bismark began receiving more criticism from Wilhelm M’s throne than he had
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from Kaiser Friedrich’s and his English wife. The Iron Chancellor was losing his
die-cast hold of the government. Alfred von Waldersee of the German High
Command told Berlin officials how the Foreign Ministry many times did not know
what the Reich Chancellery was doing and claimed that Bismark on one
occasion drank two bottles of alcohol with him in less than two hours. Bismark
was losing his influence and in late October 1888, he even had to remind the
Foreign Ministry to direct matters for the Kaiser only through himself as it had
been for so long.24 By 1890, Bismark even began losing the support of the
German public to the gain of the young Kaiser’s popularity. Holstein advised
Herbert Bismark that “under these circumstances it is inadvisable to push things
to extremes as [the Chancellor] may have made up his mind to do during his
solitary walks.”25 Tensions between Kaiser Wilhelm and the Iron Chancellor
became too intense by now. The German emperor demanded that Bismark
resign, which the Chancellor did in late March 1890. Holstein commented from
the Foreign Ministry that Bismark had gradually become isolated because he
himself avoided contact with political circles.” The Foreign Ministry official
commented, as if looking for an epitaph: “This fact was confirmed in a way
which even I found surprising when yesterday in the Landtag not a single party
could find a good word for Prince Bismark, not even the Conservatives. I find
that quite incredible, but significant.”26 in the end, Bismark alienated rather than
balanced the forces around him. Count Munster, who had been Berlin’s
ambassador in London (1873-1885) and now was ambassador in Paris (18851900), had been one of Bismark’s pawns in the game and wrote an analysis of
Anglo-German relations now that Bismark had fallen. Munster acknowledged

108

that Salisbury wanted to avoid colonial conflicts with Germany by reaching an
agreement, though there were forces in London which did not--like Salisbury’s
own Colonial Secretary. The German Ambassador did shed light on the effects
of Bismark’s colonial policymaking:
While still Ambassador in London, I foresaw very clearly the in
evitable outcome of the violent, reckless way in which Prince Bismark
launched his colonial policy and unleashed a savage Press campaign
against England. I gave repeated but fruitless warnings [to Berlin]--unfortunately no one would listen. Even those Englishmen who regard
Russia as their natural foe and Germany their natural friend are indeed
deeply shocked at the way we conducted our colonial affairs. Envy
and rivalry play their part too; in Central Africa the [British and German
East Africa companies] are at each other’s throats and are setting their
two countries against each other. . . . The wily [British East Africa Com
pany] director, [William] Mackinnon, accordingly enlisted [Henry] Stan
ley, whose stand against Salisbury is intended to pull the chestnuts out
of the fire for the English Company and the British government, just as
we have unfortunately tried to do for our own. He will not succeed, but
he is putting the British government in a very difficult position.27
Munster then continued with comments about Paul von Hatzfeldt (the German
ambassador in London after Munster, 1885-1901) who he believed: “Hopes to
reach an agreement with Salisbury over East Africa through direct negotiations;
but this will be very difficult because Salisbury can make no concessions to us
that might endanger his position. . . .The Carolines fiasco set us at odds with
Spain . . . the Samoa fiasco cost us well-earned influence . . . [but an East Africa
fiasco] would be the most dangerous of all, for it would drive England into the
arms of Russia and

F r a n c e .’’28

Although not a top priority for Munster,

Southwest Africa was right in the middle of this conflict as well.
Yet before Bismark’s fall Germany had strengthened its wall around
Southwest Africa, though it ran into some resistance. Bismark had sent Reich
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Commissioner Dr. Goering to the colony to secure additional treaties from the
indigenous groups. Goering was successful in negotiating a treaty with
Maherero who wanted his Herero protected from the ever strengthening Nama.
Goering found similar success with the Rehoboth Basters who even promised to
muster troops to fight for the Germans if necessary. However the Nama,
particularly under the guidance of Hendrik Witbooi, proved to be more of an
obstacle. In fact, in April 1888 the Nama attacked the Herero. Though
Maherero’s forces were able to repel the attack the Herero paramount chief
withdrew his treaty with Germany and expelled Goering, who quickly withdrew
to Walvis Bay and from there to Berlin. The Herero believed the Germans
would no more protect them from the Nama than the British had done. Goering
convinced Berlin to send at least a few German soldiers to Southwest Africa in
1889 under the command of Captain K. Francois. Francois, though claiming
Windhoek to be “no man’s land” knew it was in Hereroland and in March 1890
asked the aging Maherero to cede the area to the German forces to be used as
a military station. When the German officer received no reply of any
commitment he occupied the deserted Windhoek, thereby gaining control over
the most critical crossroad in Southwest Africa. Later when the Herero
protested Francois exclaimed that “the expected objections of the Herero came
too late.”29 Windhoek now became Germany’s colonial capital in Southwest
Africa. Although this gave Germany a foothold in the center of the colony (since
up to now the Germans had only stations along the coast), this also allowed
Francois to prevent any more modern weapons from reaching the Nama by
controlling the interior crossroads. However, it was four years before the
German commander felt confident enough to leave Windhoek and challenge
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the Witbooi Nama of Gibeon led by Hendrick Witbooi.
Francois became obsessed with fighting a war to subdue the indigenous
population. When the Herero forced some of Francois men in 1892 to return
after making an unsuccessful attempt at escorting an expedition by the
Southwest African Company to Otavi in northern Hereroland, the German
officer's attitudes became extreme. The German commander even gained
Reich Commissioner Goering’s approval in taking action against the
indigenous. However Chancellor Leo von Caprivi, former head of the Admiralty
who succeeded Bismark, refused to allow such wars. The German commander
in Southwest Africa could only submit plans for dealing with the Herero and
Nama in the event that hostilities broke out. Yet ironically the most significant
event during Francois’ command was the conclusion of a peace in November
1892 between the Herero and Nama, ending the open rivalry which had
affected the region for such a long time. Although the Herero and Nama
believed that Germany was stronger than they were, the German commander
quickly complained to Berlin about the weak position his meager force was now
in. Not until March 1893, did Caprivi agree that Southwest Africa needed a
greater force. Pressured by colonial supporters, of which he was not, the
German Chancellor acquiesced: “Southwest Africa is ours. . . . How it all
happened and whether it was a good thing or not is irrelevant. It is ours,
German territory, and it must remain so.”30
Two weeks later, 216 German soldiers landed in Southwest Africa as
reinforcements. Then Francois, ignoring Caprivi’s orders and not informing his
own men until the very night before, attacked Hendrik Witbooi’s camp at
Hornkranz. He had his men fire 16,000 rounds into the camp within a half hour
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on the morning of April 12. It is uncertain how many Nama soldiers died there,
but most sources agree that few were actually there. Yet the German troops
slaughtered 78 women and children and wounded as many as a 100 more.
Hendrik Witbooi and his force, however, followed the German unit back to
Windhoek and stole most of their horses on night raids. Thus most of the
German cavalry was now on foot. The German force became trapped in
Windhoek like a prison, while the Nama all but halted German trade which had
freely run through Namaland before. This fiasco was too much for Chancellor
Caprivi and in 1894 Berlin recalled Francois replacing him with Major Theodor
Leutwein. Leutwein, though an officer in the German Army, according to Berlin
was Southwest Africa’s first civil governor. He succeeded in forcing Hendrik
Witbooi to surrender his Nama into German “protection” in July 1894 (after
which Witbooi actually helped Leutwein suppress Herero and other Nama
revolts), though the Nama leader’s rebel spirit had yet to be crushed completely.
By 1898, the Germans had placed the indigenous tribes in respective reserves
and the percentage of native-held land dwindled quickly. Germany had finally
and effectively enclosed its walls around Southwest Africa, with the exception of
Ovamboland. Southwest Africa was truly Germany’s colony

n o w .3 2

Berlin changed somewhat as a result of the new chancellor. Although a
Prussian Conservative and opponent of colonization, Caprivi helped German
industrialists even at the expense of Prussian agrarians. With Bismarkian
policies brushed off the books (with his entanglement of alliances to balance
European power), efforts at rapprochement with France and Russia were not
given as much effort so long as Berlin could secure peace. Under Caprivi,
Germany took a more definitive policy in European politics, supporting Austria-
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Hungary more. In Anglo-German diplomacy, Caprivi actually gave the approval
for vigorous efforts to reach agreements with England, and possibly even an
alliance.33
The German government did continue its efforts to keep Britain and
France apart, since an Anglo-French understanding would create “difficulties” in
Africa. However, Britain had pretty much accepted Germany’s presence in
Africa, which now included Togo and East Africa in addition to Southwest Africa
and Cameroon. Carl Peters had established the German East Africa Company
to compete with Mackinnon’s company for control of the area from Zanzibar to
Lake Tanganyika on the border with the Congo. Germany had already many
Lutheran and Catholic missionaries roaming the countrysides and still more
traders. By 1890 both countries wanted to take some preventative measures to
ensure that British and German interests would not clash in the scramble for
hinterlands into the heart of Africa. Salisbury sent Percy Anderson, head of the
African desk in the Foreign Office, to Berlin to create an Anglo-German
agreement that would resolve all outstanding African issues, including
Southwest Africa’s northeastern frontier with Bechuanaland which recently
became uncertain since Germany’s efforts to expand towards the Okavango
Delta and the Zambezi River.34 a similar situation was found in other parts of
Africa where Anglo-German interests clashed. London received Anderson’s
report on the meetings with Dr. Krauel on June 28, 1890, which described them
as successful and that “the object has been so to define the sphere as to
endeavour to avert the danger of the revival of ‘hinterland’ disputes.”35
Anderson reported that the delimitation of British and German East Africa
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created two consolidated spheres in place of the checkerboard of German and
British occupation that existed prior to the agreement. British East Africa (later
called Kenya and Uganda) was now “from its extensive coast-line with its
valuable harbours to the western watershed of the Upper Nile, made
conterminous . . . no gap is left in the boundaries.” Anderson believed German
East Africa (later called Tanganyika, then Tanzania), was “equally protected.”
The British negotiator admitted that allowing German East Africa to extend from
the Indian Ocean all the way to Lake Tanganyika on the border with the Congo
“may not correspond with the desire which has been expressed in some
quarters that an uninterrupted British sphere should extend through Central
Africa, but it must be remembered that the realization of this idea was already
impracticable when the negotiations

c o m m e n c e d .”36

It was the very dream of

Cecil Rhodes, supported by Salisbury after 1888, to have the British Empire run
from Cairo down the spine of Africa all the way to Cape Town. This had been
the very reason why Britain had outflanked Germany by occupying
Bechuanaland and scrambling across the Zambezi to the very shores of Lakes
Tanganyika and Nyasa, only now to be blocked by the Germans in East Africa.
Anderson believed that British traders now had to rely on the eighth article of
this agreement reached with Germany for their security “which gives ample
guarantees for untrammeled communication between the British spheres both
by land and water.” In theory, British trade and communications were not to be
cut off between the Cape and Cairo. In addition, Anderson included in his
report the official boundaries of Anglo-German borders involving West Africa,
Cameroon, East Africa, and Southwest Africa agreed upon in Berlin. Anderson
added the comment that more permanent and consolidated German and British
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spheres would put “an end forever to the existence, in any shape, of the Slave
Trade” which Portugal and some muslims had kept up in the

re g io n s .3 7

Most interesting in the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 was the final
clarification of Southwest Africa’s eastern border with British Bechuanaland and
with the Zambezi region (or Rhodesia, which Britain named after the colonial
expansionist Cecil Rhodes). Both London and Berlin by this time knew of the
rich potential for Ngamiland, the region situated between the Kalahari Desert
and the Zambezi River in northwestern Bechuanaland. The Okavango River
entered from the German-Angolan borderland bringing annual flood waters into
this otherwise semi-arid region emptying itself into the desert in one of the
world’s few inland deltas. At around the 18th south latitude the river during
flood season swells over its banks to create a huge swampy lake and inland
delta over 70 miles wide at times. Elephants, zebra, buffalo, and wildebeests
make treks to it during and after every flood for the explosion of vegetation that
followed; but more importantly for imperialists this region was valued for
potential cattle ranching. Both London and Berlin in 1890 mistook this watery
area for Lake Ngami which was the name given to this fluid sanctuary on all the
maps at the time. However, Lake Ngami is only a part of the Okavango Delta
and may remain dry for several years if flood waters are not high

e n o u g h .38

Whatever the name, both sides wanted it, or for Germany, at least a western
portion of it. Anderson wrote that “the territory hitherto assigned to neither
Power (since Britain had only officially defined the Kalahari border for southern
Bechuanaland adjacent to Namaland, not between the northern regions of
German Southwest Africa and northern Bechuanaland) extended from the 20th
to the 24th degree of east longitude” with the Okavango Delta lying within it. In
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other words, there were four degrees of longitude which had remained obscure
in the north, and Germany was trying to take its share. However, allowing for
German gains in East Africa (Britain allowed the Germans to extend inland to
Lake Tanganyika), British delegate Anderson remained firm in the Southwest
Africa-Bechuanaland border dispute that “a portion covering three degrees will
be under British, the remainder covering one degree will be under German,
influence.”39 Therefore, Britain allowed Germany to extend the northern portion
of Southwest Africa’s eastern border one degree east to the 21 st degree of east
longitude, but well short of the rich Okavango Delta region which according to
Anderson’s information laid east of the 22nd east longitude, or about 70 miles
beyond the new German boundary. Southwest Africa only gained more arid
land of the Omaheke Desert, which was merely a northern extension of the
Kalahari, dividing Hereroland from the Okavango.40
However, Britain did give Germany one more concession for Southwest
Africa: access to the Zambezi River, which runs across south-central Africa to
empty into the Indian Ocean. German strategists predicted this would be
Southwest Africa’s tap into rich Central Africa and a more direct highway to
German East Africa on the Indian coast (rather than travel all the way around
the Cape). Actually, it was less a British concession than correcting a prior
geographical mistake. Anderson explained in his letter that this rectification “is
inserted because in certain maps Andara, which is the southern limit of the
Portuguese sphere under the arrangement with Germany, is placed south of the
18th (latitude); in all the best maps, however. . . it is placed well to the north of
that parallel.” Therefore there was a narrow strip of land left between
Portuguese Angola and British Bechuanaland north of the 18th south latitude.
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This gave Germany a 60 mile wide stretch of the Zambezi River, but
unfortunately upriver from Victoria Falls which challenged navigation on it and
thus proved less the easy highway than Berlin had imagined. Anderson
assured his government that Germany would protect the private rights of British
companies operating within the region where the Zambezi and Chobe rivers
forked, which was now part of Southwest Africa.41
On July 1, 1890, Salisbury requested Ambassador Malet, in Berlin, “to
express to Sir Percy Anderson my entire approval of the manner in which he
has performed the duties entrusted to him in connection with this Agreement,
and of the tact and ability with which he has carried on the negotiations with the
German Foreign

[M in is tr y ].”42

Regarding Southwest Africa, the third article of

the Anglo-German African Agreement, which was negotiated and signed by
Malet, Anderson, Dr. Krauel, and Caprivi, read:
In South-West Africa the sphere in which the exercise of influ
ence is reserved to Germany is bounded:
1. To the south by a line commencing at the mouth of the Or
ange River, and ascending the north bank of that river to the point of
its intersection by the 20th degree of east longitude.
2. To the east by a line commencing at the above-named
point, and following the 20th degree of east longitude to the point of
its intersection by the 22nd of parallel south latitude, it runs eastward
along that parallel to the point of its intersection by the 21st degree of
east longitude; then it follows that degree northward to the point of its
intersection by the 18th parallel of south latitude; it runs eastward
along that parallel till it reaches the River Chobe; and descends the
centre of the main channel of that river to its junction with the Zambesi,
where it terminates.
It is understood that under this arrangement Germany shall
have free access from her Protectorate to the Zambesi by a strip of
territory which shall at no point be less than 20 miles in width.
The sphere in which the exercise of influence is reserved to
Great Britain is bound to the west and north-west by the abovemen
tioned line. It includes Lake N g a m i.4 3
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Appropriately or not, Germany named the strip or zipfel giving Germany
access to the Zambezi after Caprivi.44 Although in the past he had been against
colonies, refusing to send warships at times to Angra Pequena and Zanzibar,
and highly critical of “King Luderitz,” the German Chancellor did help bring
Anglo-German relations to this point of cordial agreement. The third article of
the Agreement went on in regards to the still disputed southern boundary of
Walvis Bay, and stated that it was “reserved for arbitration, unless it shall be
settled by the consent of the two Powers within two years from the date of the
conclusion of this Agreement.” In addition, until such a settlement “the territory
[in dispute] shall be considered neutral.”45 Except for Walvis Bay’s exact
southern border, the limits of German Southwest Africa were finally established
on all sides, since Germany had back in 1886 in an agreement with Portugal,
pushed its northern boundary towards Angola, enveloping at least half of
Ovamboland. After 1890, Britain washed its hands of Southwest Africa until the
20th century, however this did not mean that matters affecting the German
colony were quiet throughout the last decade of the old century.46
After Portugal’s monarchy fell to a republican revolution, as a result of
humiliating Portuguese concessions to British demands in the colonies,
Germany began negotiating with Britain over a possible division of Portuguese
colonies in Africa-particularly with regard to Angola and Mozambique. German
Ambassador Hatzfeldt reported to Berlin after negotiations with Salisbury on
February 11, 1891: “Make no mistake about it, we can achieve a satisfactory
result in this matter only by coming to a previous understanding with England
. . . . [Otherwise] British companies and adventurers . . . would close in from all
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sides and take possession. . . . Will anyone make war on England for that, or
even pick a serious quarrel? I think n o t”47 Hatzfeldt told Prime Minister
Salisbury a month later: “‘You are in an excellent position from which you can
profit. Either Portugal gives in to your demands, and in that case you will get
what you want; or the government in Lisbon falls and you will pick up her
colonies like ripe fruit.” ’ Hatzfeldt reported to Berlin that Salisbury “said nothing
to contradict me, and smiled with gratification to think I had grasped the
subtleties of the situation.’^

So Germany tried to rekindle old sore spots with

England by talking of Zanzibar and possible cooperation with French interests
in Egypt if Britain did not back off from the possibility of taking the Portuguese
colonies without regard to German interests. Holstein, still Senior Councillor in
the Foreign Ministry, wrote in a memo that a Cape Colony strengthened by
Portuguese territory would be an “undesirable neighbour for us.” Holstein
believed that the Anglo-German African Agreement of the previous year should
have shown “that we rate our European relations higher than our colonial
interests,” since for instance Germany let the British have Ngamiland.49 Britain
caught the hints from Berlin and allowed Germany to take over the mediation
between England and Portugal, resulting in a treaty signed on June 11, 1891.
This put on hold any possibility of splitting Portuguese territories in southern
Africa as neither London nor Berlin wished the other to have any portion of
them. For Britain, Delagoa Bay in southern Mozambique would have been a
strategic possession for it would have completed the encirclement of the Boers
in the Transvaal. It seemed, because of Germany, the Boers maintained their
link to the neutral port as a door to the outside world. Britain could not close
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even that open

d o o r.5 0

Between 1891 and 1895 London and Berlin tried to bridge their
differences and work for a possible agreement or even an alliance. Poor AngloFrench relations, over several colonial and trade issues, and a Russian build-up
in Central Asia, which Britain perceived as a threat to India, probably helped
this process. Yet for a variety of reasons, both Germany and Britain fumbled this
opportunity. German Ambassador Hatzfeldt reported to Berlin that Salisbury
was “hold[ing] as far aloof as possible” from Anglo-German issues because of
the 1892 elections 51 When the Tory prime minister lost to Gladstone’s Liberal
government in the June general elections, German Conservatives balked.
Within a short time Hatzfeldt was criticizing Gladstone’s Colonial Office for its
“unfriendliness” towards Germany. In addition, it did not help matters having a
German Chancellor estranged from his own government either. Caprivi had
lost support from the Kaiser, Conservatives, and the military for various liberal
and commercial programs that he introduced in the Reichstag. By 1894 the
strain between the Chancellor and the now popular Kaiser was too much. After
resigning in October, Caprivi was replaced by Prince Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe.
The Kaiser’s actions frustrated the German Foreign Ministry which they believed
hurt Berlin’s credibility and prestige abroad. Holstein criticized the young
emperor for interfering in delicate foreign affairs and for irresponsibly replacing
officials who stood in his way, “nowadays no European nation is ruled in the
way he is ruling.” Somewhat prophetically Holstein wrote that this Kaiser would
not die on the throne but fall to a republic, but in the meantime he was making
the “whole world

n e r v o u s .”52

On the British side, A. P. Primrose (Lord
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eventual partition of [Portugal’s]

M o z a m b iq u e . ”57

in greater detail, Hatzfeldt

explained:
The speech of President Kruger had a very disquieting effect
here, and Kimberley has just poured out his heart to me about it. The
[British] Government is doing its best here for the Boers [by giving
them Swaziland], even put the damper on [Cape Colony Prime Min
ister, Cecil] Rhodes, and things like that speech worsen an already
difficult situation. People here are extraordinarily sensitive about
South Africa. The Government is especially anxious to prevent public
opinion from turning against us on account of such speeches, espec
ially now, when Kimberley wants to reach a closer understanding with
us about Mozambique and in general wants to make extensive ar
rangements in colonial matters. Moral: The moment is as favourable
for colonial matters as is conceivable here. I must therefore very short
ly be prepared for a confidential talk about Moz. and other questions,
probably the hinterland of Togo, and in order not to lose the opportu
nity it is necessary for me to know exactly what we want and what we
don’t want. Therefore I beg you most urgently to grant my telegraphic
request for immediate instructions.58
Thus the Boer situation came to Germany’s rescue in developing a stronger
international position from which it could bargain with Britain, despite the
cooling relations between the two. The next day Berlin responded to Hatzfeldt
with instructions that Germany could not agree to give Delagoa Bay in southern
Mozambique to Britain nor allow British forces to occupy it in the event of the
territory being partitioned. This stand was necessary even if Germany gained
access to the Zambezi River on the east coast which could then access
Southwest Africa’s Caprivi Strip, at least commercially. Unfortunately for
negotiations, Delagoa Bay was the only strategic position Britain wanted in the
deal. This would complete the encirclement of and therefore control over the
Boers. Berlin even had the audacity to instruct Hatzfeldt to demand a hinterland
for Togo which would gain access to the Niger River. This too was very
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unlikely .59
In the meantime, Governor Leutwein moved to gain further control over
the Herero and Nama tribes in Southwest Africa. In fact one of Leutwein’s
earliest successes was to get Witbooi to sign a protection treaty in which the
Nama chief retained his position but promised to provide Nama troops in
supporting the Germans if necessary. The German governor also successfully
backed Samuel Maherero’s rise to power in the more centralized Herero tribe.
When Samuel’s father, Maherero, died in October 1890, many Herero refused
to acknowledge his son’s ascension since he was a baptized Christian. The
issue of succession among the Herero remained alive until 1897 when
Governor Leutwein faced his first revolt. A portion of the Herero, particularly in
the eastern reaches of the colony, had refused Samuel Maherero as their chief
and joined with the Nama of the Kalahari in an effort to gain their independence
from the Germans. However, Hendrik Witbooi made good on his promise and
sent his own Nama forces to help subdue the rebellion. In the end, the
Germans and Samuel Maherero executed two eastern Herero subchiefs
placing the paramount chief firmly in power. The Germans gave control over
the remnants of the Kalahari Nama to Witbooi for his effort, though many of
these defeated Nama rebels had fled into Bechuanaland. Since the Germans
allowed the Ovambo to have their autonomy (the Germans believed they would
be “biting off more than they could chew" if they did tried to gain control over the
numerous Ovambo) and since the greater part of the Herero and Nama were
now under treaties, Leutwein felt confident enough to leave the capital,
Windhoek, with his small force and suppress smaller Nama tribes in the far
south near the Orange River. For the most part, the German colonial

123

government had effective control over Southwest Africa by

1 8 9 7 .6 0

Despite Leutwein relative control over the situation in Southwest Africa,
factions in Berlin made Chancellor Hohenlohe’s position more difficult. Once
more Berlin seemed poised for another catastrophe in the imperial chancellery.
Criticism had been mounting against Hohenlohe, first for being Catholic and
then for his dismissal of Carl Peters as governor of German East Africa for the
latter’s severe treatment of the indigenous population there. German officials
convinced the Kaiser in the end to not replace Hohenlohe and create another
spectacle, though Kaiser Wilhelm made his position and beliefs known when he
made Carl Peters his own aide-de-camp. Friction only continued between the
Chancellor and the young

K a is e r.6 1

However the international situation remained uncertain and full of
controversy which affected German and British African policies as well as any
alliance possibilities between them. Relations between England and Germany
seemed to be heading in a better direction again, though their relations tended
to trough and crest as frequently as waves on the ocean. Though there were
some in Germany, including the Bismark family, who tried to stir anti-British
sentiment. One such opinionated official even wrote to Holstein on May 3,
1895, that in matters of world trade “our deadly enemy in this field is England
[regardless of] whether Rosebery or Salisbury is in

p o w e r .”62

Yet moderate

officials in the Foreign Ministry, like Holstein, kept such opinions in check.
Furthermore, when France and Russia made a joint demonstration at the
opening celebration of the Kiel Canal in Germany that June, both London and
Berlin went back to the table to discuss better relations. A correspondent of the
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London Times even wrote to Holstein from Peking: “I am convinced that in spite
of keen commercial rivalry . . . between England and Germany, the political and
in the long run commercial interests too of both countries, are, if not identical, at
least parallel.”63 Further good news came to Berlin in July 1895, when
Salisbury and his Conservatives won the general elections. The new Prime
Minister even visited the Kaiser to propose future actions which might end the
hostility between Britain and the Triple Alliance which had plagued AngloGerman relations. However hopes of any benefits from the return of the
Conservatives in England fell when London refused any concessions in
German Togo (because Britain had already given large concessions to France
in West Africa to keep the French out of the Nile Valley). Both governments tried
to smooth the issue over but with little productivity. Ambassador Hatzfeldt
reported back to Berlin “the apparent concern of Salisbury that we are
demanding too much in Africa” though the Prime Minister asked what the
“minimum demands would be.”64 The British military attache in Berlin even
wrote to Hatzfeldt on October 4, in a letter marked “Secret!” that: “Africa is and
will remain a stumbling block to both Powers. . . . we must continue the struggle
as good humouredly as we may.”65 in the end, German sympathy for the Boers
in South Africa became the critical obstacle.66
After the Jameson Raid in South Africa (December 29, 1895-January 2,
1896), a deliberate though unsuccessful attempt by British subjects from Cape
Colony to take control of Transvaal, Kaiser Wilhelm flew into a pro-Boer frenzy.
On January 2, the Kaiser sent a letter to the Russian Tsar that, “now suddenly
the Transvaal Republic has been attacked in a most foul way as it seems not

125

without England’s knowledge. I have used very severe language in London,
and have opened communications with Paris for common defence of our
endangered interests, as French and German colonists have immediately
joined hands of their own accord to help the outraged Boers.” The Kaiser then
added: “I hope you will also kindly consider the question. . . . I hope that all will
come right, but come what may, I never shall allow the British to stamp out the
T r a n s v a a l . ”67

Of course any attempt to block the British, if they made further

attacks against the Boers, would involve using Southwest Africa. However, the
Foreign Ministry was successful in preventing some of the damage the Kaiser
caused by not opening communications on the subject with anyone other than
England. In an air of dissension with the Kaiser, Holstein reported in the
Foreign Ministry on January 10 that “none of our embassies, except London,
has received anything. . . . When our ambassadors are without instructions it is
the best proof that they are not instructed to approach other Powers for
support.”68 However the the Kaiser bypassed the Foreign Ministry and sent a
message of congratulations to President Kruger for the Boer victory over the
Jameson raiders. British public opinion exploded against the Kruger Telegram.
Ambassador Munster in Paris reported to Berlin, having been the former
ambassador in London:
Our Kaiser only saw the surface of things [when he visited
London previously] . . . this is how I explain how His Majesty sent the
telegram, without realising in advance that it was a match to set fire to
an accumulation of inflammatory material; I do not believe that it will
really come to war. I hope not. God preserve us from that. . . . But even
without war the political and commercial damage is very great and
cannot be estimated. The English Admiralty has used the pretext to
strengthen and to arm the fleet to an enormous extent. . . . Here [in Paris]
they are rejoicing. . . . But I can see from many signs that the French
are trying to get closer to E n g la n d . 69
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Kaiser Wilhelm pressed issues further after hearing rumors that the British had
landed in Delagoa Bay, Mozambique, to cut off the Boers. Holstein pleaded
with Hatzfeldt to have British newspapers print a “reassuring paragraph,” to
have London instruct British Ambassador Malet in Berlin to make an
announcement, or to have Salisbury at least give assurances to Hatzfeldt
himself, that the British had taken no such actions. Also, the Kaiser planned a
militant speech to the members of the original 1871 Reichstag, on their 25th
anniversary assembly, to get Germany “fired up” against Britain. Wilhelm also
requested a bill providing additional appropriations for the German navy, but
Chancellor Hohenlohe refused to introduce it, thus widening the breach
between the two. To the relief of the German Foreign Ministry, Hatzfeldt
reported on January 17, 1896 that Salisbury denied any landing at Delagoa
Bay. However, the Kaiser commented “all bosh” against the newsTo

a

week

later, Holstein stated that the emperor was “in a state of pathological
excitement” and obsessed with a naval build-up to the point of dissolving the
present Reichstag if he m ust7i
In this now trough in Anglo-German relations, Britain sent troops up the
Nile to secure its position in Egypt and Sudan, especially since southern Africa
seemed now so unstable. Germany could no longer hold British insecurities in
Egypt over London’s head as it had done to secure footholds on the African
continent. The Foreign Ministry remained apprehensive regarding the South
African issue which the Kaiser seemed intent on keeping open. On April 8,
Senior Councillor Holstein wrote that unless Britain “indulges in some manifest
tactlessness in South Africa” Germany would not side with France and Russia
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and that he was “fed up with the whole of South Africa because we have
nothing to gain there under any circumstances. ”72 Holstein even wrote to his
superior, Bernhard Bulow, that although the possibility of an Anglo-German war
had decreased, France was still pledging support to Britain. Germany had to
keep a better wedge between Paris and London. 73
By May 1896 British public opinion still ran high against Germany for the
Kruger Telegram, and tension in South Africa was getting fairly close to German
Southwest Africa. German officials there were requesting reinforcements of
German infantry and compulsory service for German nationals residing in the
colony. Wilhelm agreed, though ever the naval enthusiast he wanted to send a
battalion of marines which displayed his inexperience. The Foreign Ministry,
the High Command, and the Kaiser’s own advisors convinced him that marines
would not fair well crossing the Namib Desert “not withstanding the fact that no
troops have had less training in riding.”74 Thus corrected, Wilhelm agreed to
send mounted infantry to Southwest Africa. Governor Leutwein was likewise
intent on making Germany’s colony defendable with the reinforcements, not
only against possible indigenous uprisings, but against the British Cape if
necessary.75
While tensions in southern Africa escalated, and while Britain secured its
position in Egypt, the Foreign Ministry continued its efforts to smooth relations
with London. When Russia asked for German assistance in protesting the
English replacement of Egyptian garrisons with Imperial troops from India,
Berlin refused. This coolness on the part of the Foreign Ministry paid off;
Hatzfeldt reported from London in late May: “If one goes to the Foreign Office or
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meets an English statesman elsewhere, one gets the impression that Europe is
living in a state of profound peace and that there is not a cloud on the horizon
out of which a thunderstorm could develop within the next fifty years. . . . interest
in the Transvaal, although it is still being stirred up by some newspapers, is
beginning to evaporate.”76 Anglo-German relations were finally normalizing, six
months after the Kruger Telegram 77
However by November 1896 Kaiser Wilhelm made matters worse again.
He disclosed his real beliefs regarding Southwest Africa via a talk with the
Director of the Colonial Department in the Foreign Ministry announcing:
“Bismark conceived of our entire colonial policy only to drive a wedge between
ourselves and England on account of the ‘English influences’ [namely Kaiser
and Kaiserin Friedrich] . . . so use the money the Reichstag gives [to the
Colonial Department] for East Africa. Nothing will come of South-West Africa in
any case. We will have to sell that at a good price to England one of these
days.” Holstein wondered, after all the efforts by Francois and Leutwein to gain
control over the Southwest African natives, what “the German people will say if
the news leaks out that the Kaiser is talking about abandoning an area which
we have already fought to preserve. . . . [it would be] most

d is m a l.”78

To make

matters worse by the year’s end, German newspapers and the Kaiser blamed
the British for supporting strikes in Hamburg. The Foreign Ministry again tried to
control the damage, but Hatzfeldt reported only grim relations with London:
“With respect to England, to be sure, our alliance possibilities won’t get any
worse because the English seem resolved in any case to abstain from any
alliance with

u s .”79

in light of such relations, German officials observed
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Germany’s tenuous hold over her overseas colonies. The German consulgeneral in China wrote on January, 17, 1897: “Our warships can’t swim about
here forever like homeless waifs, and we run the risk of losing prestige because
we have expressed wishes without pushing them through. . . . A strong maritime
force is a vital necessity, and that our fleet cannot do without the firm support of
a naval base in overseas territories.” Such was the case for Southwest Africa
too. 80
In February 1897 Transvaal became an issue once more when the
Kaiser commented to a Boer representative: “You may depend on me.”
Holstein wrote to Foreign Minister Bulow on his concerns how this might affect
England: “ I would be surprised if this remark of the Kaiser’s will pass
unnoticed.” The Senior Councillor did however succeed in having officials
prevent the Kaiser’s statement from going to press, commenting “I did not know
what else could be done.”8i This all came as divisions widened between those
who believed Germany should have a strong global empire, which the Kaiser
supported, and those Junkers who believed in concentrating resources at
home. A navy bill met bitter resistance in the Reichstag with the Kaiser’s men
showing charts of German naval strength in comparison with other Powers; but
to emphasize their point rather deceptively they accounted for only Germany’s
most modern vessels in comparison with every French and British ship
including “even the most ancient barges.” Wilhelm wanted Hohenlohe to give a
speech in the Reichstag emphasizing Germany’s “dangerous international
position” but the Chancellor refused. Holstein even commented to Bulow that “it
is only due to the ineptitude, ill-will, and lack of interest on the part of (the
Kaiser’s) Government that the money for the gigantic fleet hasn’t yet been
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granted or that the first steps have not yet been taken to secure the
appropriations.” He added further criticism that “with respect to [Wilhelm’s]
treatment of foreign affairs . . . the Ambassadors already know . . . that in every
conversation [the Kaiser] is trying to warn the Russians against the English and
the English against the Russians. What do you think that will accomplish in the
long run?” The Kaiser was Germany’s greatest liability in Anglo-German
relations.82
Matters in southern Africa heated up again in April 1897. Rumors came
that British ships were sighted off Delagoa Bay. Holstein urged Chancellor
Hohenlohe to resist any of the Kaiser’s demands for immediate action or words
against England. The Chancellor agreed. However, Holstein admitted to
Hatzfeldt that “the prevention of further disasters will not get us out of the South
African blind alley-w e must do more than this.”83 The Senior Councillor
believed that if the Ambassador could convince Salisbury to give Germany
some colonial concessions, German public opinion would be neutralized in
future British actions against the Boers. Holstein added that this could be the
opportunity to “settle once and for all the difficulties over Walvis Bay and Samoa
both of which the Germans wanted” and that even the Kaiser “despite his naval
hobby-horse” would then see the benefits of better relations with Britain.
However, in a note to Hatzfeldt, Holstein emphasized two “possibilities of
danger.” The first danger was if Britain seized Delagoa Bay. Then German
“chauvinists” would block any compensation efforts by Britain unless it included
giving Portuguese territory “bordering German Southwest Africa on the north
(and) Walvis Bay.”84 Yet the Senior Councillor admitted that England had to
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move first: “So long as England leaves Portuguese possessions alone and
only expands or intensifies her power at the expense of the Transvaal, I can see
no half-way plausible excuse for us to annex Portuguese territory.” The German
Foreign Ministry was willing to cut a deal with London, allowing the latter “to
subordinate further the (Boer) elements in South Africa” if Britain gave Germany
a fair share of Portuguese territory, especially in Angola and

M o z a m b iq u e .8 5

However, as yet, Salisbury remained unwilling to initiate this. The second
danger, which Holstein warned, was the growing contingent in Berlin who felt
that English “animosity” for Germany was only partly due to colonialism but
really focused on commercial competition which could never be settled. They
believed that Britain was setting Germany up for “a situation in which it can fail
upon the German merchant fleet and destroy it.” Holstein admitted that “all navy
enthusiasts think this is the

c a s e .”86

in other words, with Germany’s naval build

up increasingly souring Anglo-German relations, the Foreign Ministry knew time
was running out for gaining any more colonial concessions from Britain and in
particular the division of Portuguese territories. Only in an immediate BoerBritish conflict could Germany use its offer of neutrality to gain such
concessions. Hatzfeldt responded on April 22, 1897, with news that British
ships could be in Delagoa Bay or in the Zambezi River moving inland, which
prompted him to try to find Prime Minister Salisbury to make a deal. Hatzfeldt
believed: “[Germany has] nothing to gain form a conflict between England and
the Transvaal. . . . [and if] Hohenlohe shares this view . . . he will have to take a
very firm stand against new Kruger Telegrams or worse. Take my word for it: if
[Colonial Secretary Joseph] Chamberlain, with Salisbury’s approval, has now
actually decided on aggressive action, no protest on our part and no dispatch of
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auxiliary troops from [Southwest Africa] would prevent it from being carried out.”
The German Ambassador then warns: “The sole result of such steps would be
a conflict between England and ourselves, in which we could do absolutely ,
nothing . . . whereas they could . . . perhaps bombard Hamburg. To desire to
intervene under such circumstances would therefore be sheer madness.” If
Britain were to shake up the status quo in southern Africa with an attack on the
Boers, Hatzfeldt informed Holstein that he would point out to Salisbury Britain’s
choices: “Either [England] must give us compensation, which was the only thing
by which we could calm down our public opinion; o r . . . from now on and in
every question . . . we would under all circumstances take the side of the
enemies of England.” If Germany could not protect the Boers, the Foreign
Ministry wanted to at least benefit from their demise.87
However, to the fears of the Foreign Ministry who knew time was slipping
away for such a deal, Hatzfeldt reported that Britain was not seeking such action
against the Transvaal yet. Though the German ambassador was not so
convinced, believing this “by no means proves that some sort of action is not
being prepared with Chamberlain and Rhodes behind the scenes.” Hatzfeldt
thought Colonial Secretary Chamberlain was pushing Prime Minister Salisbury
into stronger actions against the Boers because of the latter’s extended
absence from London which “would be very typical of him to arrange for
everything to happen during his absence so that he could not be immediately
called to account.” The German embassy could only wait, with Hatzfeldt
emphasizing to Berlin: “For Heaven’s sake no new Kruger Telegrams, no
threats of colonial troops [in Southwest Africa], and above all, nothing whatever
which could bring about a conflict.”88 Yet even if the Kaiser supported a deal
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with London, Hatzfeldt believed “Walvis Bay and especially Samoa seem to me
to be extremely dubious and I don’t think [Salisbury] would have the courage to
defend these concessions

h e r e .”88

The opportunity for territorial gain in

Southwest Africa or in the Pacific did not improve. On May 12, 1897, Hatzfeldt
reported: “[Salisbury] hasn’t forgiven us for the Kruger Telegram, but he would
nevertheless like to see relations improved . . . if it doesn’t cost anything. With
respect to the Transvaal, he assumes that Kruger will now be as amenable as
necessary . . . and therefore sees no reason why he should make concessions
to

u s .89

This time Britain was able to close the door in Germany’s face.

By the following year, however, this stagnation in colonial expansion
seemed to be drawing to a close. On March 29, 1898, Chamberlain actually
approached Hatzfeldt with the possibility of an alliance and with concession
possibilities in Africa though nothing specific. Yet by April both Berlin and
London again fumbled the opportunity with neither side willing to make any firm
commitments to each other.

Both sides feared such commitments would

entangle them with the other Powers. Interestingly, the German Foreign
Ministry already at this time feared England being convinced to stand aside and
Italy being bought off by France and Russia in an attack on Germany and
Austria-Hungary. On a different front, Hatzfeldt reported in May that Spanish
rule in the Pacific was coming to an end due to American victories, but warned
against any “premature grabbing” that would upset international relations.
However, when the German Ambassador reported what the British were willing
to give Germany, which seemed confined to giving up British possessions in
Borneo, the Kaiser only commented “not

e n o u g h ! ”90

The situation in the Pacific
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improved on June 17 when Ambassador Hatzfeldt reported to Berlin that with
the Spanish command in Manila ready to fall to the Americans, this was the time
for Germany to seize the Carolines. Further correspondence between Hatzfeldt
and Bulow concluded that if London and Berlin should conclude another AngloGerman agreement, Germany should receive southern Angola to attach to
Southwest Africa and northern Mozambique for German East Africa, while
Britain could have Delagoa Bay to complete their encirclement of the Boers.
Though this was a reversal of an earlier position, the British would not support
such an agreement. The only resolution both sides could agree on was to keep
the Portuguese territories out of anyone eise’s hands. On August 30, 1898,
England and Germany signed the Secret Convention on Portuguese Colonies
which prevented any other power from moving in on Mozambique and
Angola.91
The next year, 1899, hampered possibilities of further agreements which
might have benefited Southwest Africa. First, Anglo-German relations became
bleak after the king of Samoa recognized by Germany, Britain, and the United
States died, afterwhich a civil war commenced. Military action had been taken
by all three supervisory powers with Germany countered by England and
America. The Germans suffered the largest set back there with much of their
property and some ships destroyed when the British bombarded the port of
Apia. In April Hatzfeldt soberingly told Salisbury that it gave him “no pleasure to
watch here how my efforts over many years to bring about a better GermanEnglish understanding had been ruined because of a miserable object like
S a m o a . ”92

Second, in a letter written on August 27, 1899 Hatzfeldt made his

worst prediction to date by believing there would not be a British-Boer war
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“unless they have gone mad in Pretoria.” Yet the Ambassador conceded that
although Salisbury was firmly against war “he will be dragged along if Kruger
insists that England must expressly renounce suzerainty” over Transvaal.93
When tensions in southern Africa escalated Berlin used this to the utmost, with
enthusiastic support from the Kaiser, to get concessions out of London on
Samoa, which it finally received. On October 10, 1899, Holstein commented to
Hatzfeldt that this militant attitude in Berlin and its international consequences
“would then dictate Germany’s policy for the next period of history.”94 Hatzfeldt
replied two days later doubting the Kaiser’s aggressive policy backed by the
German Admiralty: “If our foreign policy depends on the views of Herr Tirpitz we
will not go far in the world.”95
However, the Kaiser’s visit to England November 20-28, which was
made only after British concessions in Samoa, brought Anglo-German relations
again to a better level. On the 30th, Chamberlain even made a speech in
Leicester calling Germany and Britain a “natural

a llia n c e .”96

Yet these feelings

were short-lived. The Boer War which erupted by the year’s end, slowly
finished Anglo-German rapprochement because of the Kaiser’s and the
German public’s pro-Boer sentiment, despite the efforts by the Foreign Ministry
to go in the opposite direction. Hatzfeldt’s assistant, H. Eckardstein, observed
that this war was settling the question whether England would have total control
over southern Africa or whether the Boers had the strength to push the British off
the Cape. Foreign Minister Bulow added a marginal comment: “Surely it is in
our interest [especially in Southwest Africa] that Boers and English should
balance each other in South Africa, neither one completely driving out the
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other.”97 Eckardstein reported on December 21, 1899 that:
I am convinced that England will master this problem in the
end, but if she had waited only one more year to fight this war, she
would have been simply thrown out of South Africa. In that case we
would have seen an Afrikander republic in South Africa . . . [which]
would have created a kind of Monroe Doctrine for the whole of the
South Africa continent, to which both our German colonies as well
as the Portuguese colonies would inevitably have fallen victims. I
am firmly convinced that within a very short time Germany would have
lost her best colony, i.e. Southwest Africa, without being capable of
the least resistance.98
Though the German official noted: .“[Yet] if England were to win, the danger
could arise for us t h a t . . . a large part of the refractory Boer population,
encouraged by German public opinion, would emigrate to German Southwest
Africa and from there continue to intrigue constantly against England. Taking
the pro-Boer attitude in Germany into account, our Government would after all
probably find it very difficult to prevent this.” Bulow agreed and was already
making plans to pursue issues like the German Baghdad railway and coaling
stations in the Red sea, along with concession issues, with England. In other
words, the Foreign Ministry was willing to stick to an anglophile policy as long
as England gave concessions that Bulow could hand to the German public and
as long as Britain did not obliterate the Boer republics. The London embassy
even reported to Bulow’s office on January 23, 1900, that Britain probably
would use a strong Anglo-German relationship “to get England’s chestnuts out
of the fire” with fears of a Russian threat to Persia while the Boer War demanded
Britain’s attention.99
However, tensions did mount when the British seized and searched
German ships bound for southern Africa from December 1899 to January 1900.
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The German mail steamer Bundesrath was seized and searched for contraband
heading for the Boers. On January 16, England promised to release all the
ships and pay any indemnity, but the diplomatic damage had been done. In
February even Holstein agreed with Karl Wichmann, a member of the
Southwest Africa Colonial Society and a representative of the high-explosive
industry, that an article should be published condemning these actions. The
Senior Councillor commented that “England’s astonishment at Germany’s
bitterness can in turn only be regarded here with the greatest astonishment. Is
[the] English astonishment real? If yes, a slap in the face must have a different
meaning in England than it does in Germany. Just a year ago we received
more than one slap in the face over Samoa. The worst was the bombardment
of

A p ia . ”ioo

Thus even the coolest minds in Berlin were resenting British

actions.
In April 1900, there came more doom and gloom in the Foreign Ministry
with dissension and intrigue, along with the prolonged illness of Hatzfeldt.
However by summer the situation improved with Holstein making calls for an
Anglo-German agreement now that German public support of the Boer’s had
deflated because of the latter’s new guerrilla tactics: “A nation of soldiers like
Germany was bound to be sobered by the manner in which the Boers have
behaved since (Boer General Piet A. Cronje’s) capitulation (on February 27,
1900).”101 The Kaiser had even congratulated the British on their success.
Yet relations remained oscillating. It troughed once more when London
secured an agreement from Portugal to close Delagoa Bay from arms
shipments to the Boers, thus avoiding a deal with Germany. This was followed
by an issued statement that Britain claimed all of southern China in its sphere
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as German interests became established there. Following the Samoan affair in
which German property was destroyed by British warships, the search and
seizure of ships bound for southern Africa, these new developments hurt the
Foreign Ministry’s efforts to convince the Kaiser to support Anglo-German
relations. Those efforts did not impress the Kaiser, despite the Anglo-German
Yangtze Agreement (signed in October 1900, which resolved the southern
China issue), because of continued British resistance to German policy and
plans. Although the Kaiser was well received in London in January, 1901,
visiting the Queen who was sick, Anglo-German relations seemed to stagnate
with a mutual exhaustion from trying to build a colonial agreement, much less
an alliance, in these troubled times. Hatzfeldt reported that the new Director of
the Colonial Department in the German Foreign Ministry, Dr. O. W. Stubel, was
received poorly in London, with the Germans dumbfounded why. In May 1901,
the Germans tried to initiate negotiations, with Hatzfeldt telling one of
Salisbury’s men “if an alliance treaty were not concluded now it would never be
concluded.” Salisbury later commented to the embassy that “he refused to
negotiate at pistol-point.’’1o2 Thus one of the last windows of opportunity slid
shut for improved relations which might have benefited German colonies in
Africa. A wall seemed to be raised between Britain and Germany. 103
Yet the real blow to Anglo-German relations came when certain elements
in Germany began criticizing British conduct in dealing with the guerrilla warfare
of the Boers, including the use of concentration camps. On October 24, 1901,
Chamberlain gave a speech in Edinburgh challenging German criticism and
pointing out that in the last war with France German troops were not above
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criticism, which of course threw the German public into a fury. 104 a press war
between the countries mounted .105 Chancellor Bulow who believed
Chamberlain was not being “ill intentioned” but “incredibly clumsy” tried to do
what he could to suppress German opinion, and the Kaiser’s, but admitted “we
would only be pouring oil on the flames .”106 When one Reichstag member
called Chamberlain “the most villainous knave on God’s earth” for criticizing the
German Army and proceeded to criticize the British Army in South Africa,
Chancellor Bulow rose up in rebuke: “I believe I am in accord with the vast
majority of this House when expressing the hope that it should not become
custom to insult foreign Ministers from the tribune of the Reichstag . . . I am
equally bound to express my deep regret at the manner in which the previous
speaker referred to the army of a nation with which we live in peace and
friendship.”io7
An end of an era of opportunity in Anglo-German relations seemed to be
felt by everyone. Following Hatzfeldt’s dismissal in 1901 and Salisbury’s
resignation as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in 1902, the link between
London and Berlin seemed severed. Chancellor Bulow brought an end to the
press war but with mixed results, since both Otto von Bismark and his son
Herbert were behind many of the insulting editorials. With the Kaiser ruining
further attempts at reconciliation, many officials such as Eckardstein in the
London embassy, simply resigned. Anglo-German relations were beyond
repair, with many in Berlin feeling a sense of doom that the pax Europa would
end with Germany attacked by everyone around them. Interestingly however,
the Kaiser entered his first war not in Europe, but in Southwest Africa. 108
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Chapter 4
Blood, Diamonds, and the End
In the first two decades of this century, economic, political, social, and
military matters in Southwest Africa came to a climax with very extreme results.
The indigenous population offered their last attempt to throw out the Germans,
the discovery of diamonds created an economic boom, and the first world war
ended German imperialism abroad, including the very existence of German
Southwest Africa.
By 1904, Germany reached new levels of isolation, with the Kaiser’s
actions doing little to help the situation, and with England moving farther and
farther into a relationship with France and thus with Russia. On July 11,
Holstein wrote from the Foreign Ministry that “Germany’s prestige has shrunk in
the last few years, while our opponents and rivals are on the point of encircling
us. Difficult situations must therefore be expected to arise for which I would
prefer not to take the share of moral responsibility which every collaborator
bears.”1 On September 5, 1904, the Senior Councillor of the Foreign Ministry
further wrote: “ I don’t think that our future is going to become easier, standing
between England, France, and Japan--a group united by a common hatred of
G e r m a n y . ”2

By the year’s end Chancellor Bulow, after predicting that even Italy

could enter as Germany’s enemy, wrote: “[In the event of an Anglo-German
war] we are practically powerless [to do anything serious] against England. By
capturing our colonies and shipping, England could within a foreseeable time
force us to a disadvantageous peace.”3 By 1905, Germany was giving in to the
French on many issues, fearing that with England, Russia, Japan, and possibly
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Italy to aid the French, they would successfully carry out their revanche if
matters went into open conflict. Holstein reported, after receiving news from the
German High Command, in late June that:
[French] reservists had been called up for the frontier corps,
while none were being released. Further that the troops in the fron
tier garrisons had received combat uniforms and equipment with tin
ned rations for four days. For the time being the Chancellor wants to
prevent counter-measures being ta ke n -l think he is definitely right in
this, because once that starts, both sides will drive each other further
and further. . . . Let us hope for the best.4
Despite this particular alarm, with the creation of the entente cordiale between
London and Paris imminent, and with the impending sensation of doom that the
European pax was finally over, open hostilities were still a decade off. In the
meantime, the Kaiser had to fight his first war against his own subjects, in
Southwest Africa.s
While the Germans were establishing themselves in Southwest Africa, by
building their northern port of Swakopmund at the edge of Walvis Bay and by
occupying Windhoek for their capital in the interior, the native population met
hardship. The German mining industry was still struggling in the colony, with
the only railway from Swakopmund to Windhoek, the Otavi Railway, still
incomplete. In fact, the Southwest Africa Company was actually a British firm
which obtained exclusive mining rights in the Otavi region for copper; thus the
mining, rail building, and administration in that region of Southwest Africa were
not even German. In addition, the Otavi Minen und Eisenbahn Gesellshaft
(Otavi Mining and Railway Company) which had only partial rights in the Otavi
and primary control over the Tsumeb area to the north, was a joint GermanBritish firm. British businessmen seemed equally as influential in developing
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the German colony. 6 Also, whereas the Germans were able to occupy footholds
among the Herero, like Windhoek, Okahandja, Otjimbingwa, and Omaruru, and
thus connect Swakopmund with the interior, the Nama strongholds of Bethanie,
Keetmanshoop, and Gibeon remained outside German control thereby
restricting German penetration from Luderitzbucht (Angra Pequena) in the
southern part of the colony.
In 1897 a rinderpest epidemic was actually very significant in giving the
Germans control over their colony. Up to 90 percent of Herero cattle in some
areas died while 50 to 95 percent, depending on the location, of European
colonist cattle herds survived. At one point the Herero previously had 250,000
head. These dwindled to around 40,000 in just a few years and were only
about the number that the few hundred German farmers and ranchers owned.
Natives sold land to German and Boer farmers and ranchers so that they could
afford to inoculate at least some of their remaining cattle.7 Therefore both
German and Afrikaner (Boer) control increased rapidly. Yet there were still only
some 5,000 Germans facing 80,000 Herero and 20,000 Nama. Interestingly,
while German colonists left the larger Ovambo tribes alone in the northern
regions, they allied with the few thousand Basters of Rehoboth south of
Windhoek who had themselves been vulnerable between the two super-powers
of the grasslands--the Herero and Nama. In this way the Germans could
concentrate on those that might rebel.
Still by 1904 Governor Leutwein had only four companies of troops in the
colony, and early in the year had taken three of them south to deal with an
uprising of the Bondelswart Nama on the Orange River border. This left
Windhoek and the northern half, the Herero portion, of the colony practically
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undefended since the governor thought he had the firm allegiance of Samuel
Maherero of the Herero and Hendrik Witbooi of the Witbooi (or Gibeon) Nama.8
In January 1904, Samuel Maherero wrote to Hendrik Witbooi and
revealed his plans for a revolt against German imperialism. He requested
Nama support, despite the many years of bitter war between the tribes-which
had finally ended in 1892 with a general peace. Later the Herero chief wrote to
Witbooi:
All our obedience and patience with the Germans is of little
avail, for each day they shoot someone dead for no reason at all.
Hence I appeal to you, my Brother, not to hold aloof from the uprising,
but to make your voice heard so that all of Africa may take up arms
against the Germans. Let us die fighting rather than die as a result of
maltreatment, imprisonment or some other calamity. Tell all the [other
Nama] down there to rise and do battle.9
However, this letter and others never reached Hendrik Witbooi, for other Nama
betrayed the correspondence to the Germans. Yet this probably would not have
altered much if it had reached the powerful Nama chief, because once the
Herero Revolt came, Witbooi actually sent some of his own troops to help fight
the Herero according to the promise he gave Leutwein years before. If the
Nama had combined with the Herero effort, the outcome would have been
much different indeed. 10
Samuel Maherero issued a decree, and told the missionaries, that “none
of my people lay their hands upon the English, the Bast(ers), . . . the Nama and
the Boers.”i i Furthermore, Herero subchief Daniel Kariko reported that “at our
clandestine meetings our chiefs decided to spare the lives of all German
women and children-the missionaries, too.” Thus the rebels were going to act
as humanely as possible in what would become “Germany’s bloodiest and most
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protracted colonial

w a r . ”12

However, despite the initial strategic advantage,

communication was not the rebellion’s strong suit, as evident when the rebels
failed to inform about 600 Herero working on the Otavi Railway about the revolt
until it was too late.
On the first day of revolution, January 12, 1904 the rebels gained the
entirety of Hereroland and the herds of the German colonists. Only the fortified
garrison towns of Windhoek, Okahandja, Otjimbingwe, and Omaruru remained,
but were themselves besieged. 13 Over one hundred German soldiers and
colonists, men only, died that first day. However, unwilling to assault the
German strongholds in Hereroland, which were defended with machine guns,
the Herero began losing their initial advantage. The Germans refused to come
out of their fortified towns into open battle as the Herero had intended. They
decided to play a waiting game, calling up reservists until Leutwein and his
troops in Namaland could return or until Berlin could send reinforcements.
Captain Franke, on his way south to reinforce Governor Leutwein’s operation
against the Bondelswarts, quickly turned around when informed of the revolt.
Franke called on his troops: “I must demand from everyman, whether trooper or
officer, the utmost!”i4

His cavalry covered over two hundred miles of hostile

terrain in just one hundred hours. His forces raised the siege of Windhoek, then
further north and west relieved Okahandja and Omaruru.15 in addition, just prior
to the Herero cutting the only communications (one telegraph line) between
Windhoek and Swakopmund, the Germans notified their warship Habricht of the
revolt. The warship sent eighty-five marines inland to help reinforce the
garrison towns which Franke had relieved. By the time Germany steamed initial
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reinforcements to the colony, and by the time Leutwein disengaged himself from
the Bondelswarts and proceeded northward, it was mid to late February. 16
The head of the Colonial Department in the Foreign Ministry had only ten
other officials with which to deal with this colonial crisis and maintain the rest of
Germany’s colonies. This lack of developing a colonial division autonomous
from the Foreign Ministry and lack of personnel shown blatantly Germany’s lack
of colonial organization. Yet ironically with only a few individuals needing to
make the calls and very little bureaucracy needing to be crossed, this did speed
up Germany’s reaction. On January 18, the Colonial Department called for
reinforcements for Southwest Africa and received approval the same day.
Soon five hundred marines, who volunteered for this first war since the FrancoPrussian, departed. This was done despite Governor Leutwein’s initial and
inaccurate report (which was made while he was still in the southern reaches of
the colony) that reinforcements were unnecessary. Also, on January 18, Bulow
went before the Reichstag and informed them of the Herero revolt after which
the body approved a 2.8 million mark act for military operations in Southwest
Africa. Even the noted anti-imperialist and Socialist leader, August Bebel, did
not challenge this surge of patriotic enthusiasm in defending their first colony
and fighting Germany’s first war of the twentieth century, though Bebel did
request an investigation into its causes.17
While the German troops and settlers in the colony barricaded them
selves in their fortified towns in Hereroland, the 500 marines were steaming for
Swakopmund, and while the Army organized further reinforcements, German
officials were already planning the inevitable fate of the Herero. The Otavi
Railway’s chief engineer wrote to the Southwest African desk of the Colonial
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Department in Berlin, that “all here in the colony agree that this rebellion must
be put down with severity and that all those responsible must receive their just
desserts.” At the same time the commander of the warship Habricht cabled that
“the most severe punishment needs to be inflicted on the enemy,” and he talked
of confiscating all the land and cattle of the

H e r e r o . 18

Some who had the

Kaiser’s ear envisioned even more severe punishment. They talked of
executions, expulsions, forced labor camps, and even the genocide of the entire
Herero tribe. This resembled similar talk, even about genocide, by British and
Cape officials and journalists when W. W. Jordan was killed many years before
by the Ovambo—and that involved only two men killed, this was over a hundred
German colonists and still growing. Whereas the Herero leadership had
decided to leave German missionaries, women, and children alone, the
Germans were looking for complete revenge. One missionary described the
horrific frenzy of revenge that was spilling from the lips of German Southwest
Africans: “The Germans are consumed with inexpiable hatred and a terrible
thirst for revenge, one might even say they are thirsting for the blood of the
Herero.” The missionary reported only hearing “give no quarter” among the
colonists and confessed: “I shudder to think of what may happen in the months
a h e a d . ”19

Already anticipating victory once their forces landed,cooler minds in

Berlin were making plans, to export Herero throughout Germany’s overseas
colonies for cheap

la b o r .20

In the initial stage of the war, from January to June, 1904, Governor
Leutwein, who was still dumbfounded by the Herero’s revolt, led the German
forces. Leutwein had opposed colonists’ calls for disarming the Herero in the
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past and had criticized the rassengegenfatzen or “race-hatred” which existed
among the colonists. He had especially denounced any murder, flogging, or
rape of the Herero, which in fact was common. The Governor confessed being
sickened when no jury ever convicted a white settler of these crimes .21 At the
same time Leutwein criticized high-minded liberals like Bebel who thought
there could be a more civilized way to colonize, once saying “colonization is
always inhumane” and that any promises ever made to the Herero, or any
others, was only due to “our weak strategic position at the time .”22 The
Governor already in the first months of the revolt gave Berlin hints that he
wanted to negotiate with Maherero, which Berlin countered with direct orders of
demanding unconditional surrender. Leutwein was in Swakopmund by midFebruary and by March had a force of 2,500, with cannon and machine guns,
ready to face some 10,000 Herero rebels .23
Thousands of volunteers were offering their services in Germany to be
shipped to Southwest Africa to fight for the Fatherland. The Kaiser almost
immediately took the command of the war from the Colonial Department and
placed it directly into the hands of the High Command, whose chief was
General Graf von Schlieffen. Schlieffen appointed General Lothar von Trotha,
who had served the Reich in the Boxer Rebellion, as commander of expedition
to clear the colony from all resistance. Trotha was to take over all military
operations, thus replacing Leutwein, who on April 13 fumbled his counter
offensive at Oviumbo. Three thousand Herero surrounded Leutwein’s force
there forcing to the Governor to withdraw, barely escaping annihilation. Despite
his replacement as commander-in-chief it was clear that for now Leutwein was
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to remain Governor. Leutwein still hoped that once the German forces defeated
the Herero in a few battles they could arrange a conditional surrender, because,
as the Governor well knew, the colony needed the labor of the Herero (with
Southwest Africa already requiring a nine million mark per annum subsidy from
B e r lin ) .24

After the battle at Oviumbo, the Governor acknowledged that “the

Herero apparently believe that they can expect no quarter and are therefore
fanatically determined . . . fighting will therefore come to an end only when the
enemy has fired his last

s h o t .”25

Leutwein even sent Berlin a critical comment

on their unconditional surrender demands: “The insurgents must know that
there is an alternative to death-otherwise, we will only drive them to despair,
bringing on an endless

w a r . ”26

He wrote:

I do not concur with those fanatics who want to see the Her
ero destroyed altogether. Apart from the fact that a people of 60,000
or 70,000 [his estimate was somewhat low] is not so easy to annihi
late, I would consider such a move a grave mistake from an econom
ic point of view. . . . It will be quite sufficient if they are politically dead
. . . . denied any form of tribal government and confined to reserves. . . .
[with those] found guilty of having looted farms or murdering innocent
people, be[ing] sentenced to death. . . . The only favour I beg of you
is to give me a free hand concerning the diplomatic methods to be
used to bring the negotiations to a c io s e .2 7
At one point the Governor balked, stating that “it is meaningless to talk of
encirclement, for in order to encircle [the entire Herero] people we would have
to bring together more men than this water-poor and resourceless land could
sustain .”28 The High Command ignored Leutwein in its zeal. As for Leutwein’s
forces, he had divided them in March into three groups. However, heavy
casualties quickly reduced the eastern most detachment, which by April 3 was
nearly nonexistent. Leutwein dissolved it on May 6. By the time of his dismissal
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as commander, Governor Leutwein regrouped the western detachment with the
main force for its own protection. However, most of the battles at this point were
relatively small in terms of numbers involved. From the opening battles of
January 12-20 to the battle of Oviumbo on April 13 the Herero had lost only 250
while the Germans had lost only 210 soldiers.

Yet by May, General Trotha was

already steaming for Swakopmund with more reinforcements, so Leutwein took
the defensive and remained at the fortified points to wait. From May to June,
2,126 soldiers, 169 officers, and 2,126 horses left Hamburg for Southwest
Africa. 29
Trotha himself landed with his men on June 11, 1904. He gathered the
German force and moved into the open field. With no offers of giving quarter,
Trotha quickly had Samuel Maherero’s Herero force cornered at Waterberg
between his forces and the expanse of the Omaheke wasteland or sandveld,
which was several hundred miles wide and simply a northern extension of the
Kalahari that separated Hereroland from Lake Ngami in

B e c h u a n a la n d .3 0

Trotha brought the encircling grip of his six detachments around Waterberg
fighting an inconclusive battle from August 11-12, with the Germans impressed
with the Herero resistance. However, Trotha left one link open for the Herero to
find, a hole leading out into the wasteland. Despite objections made by
Governor Leutwein and some of Trotha’s own officers, the General continued to
squeeze the Herero through the hole. By August 20 the Herero retreated past
the eastern edge of the Waterberg plateau and entered the Omaheke. Trotha
immediately had the last waterhole closed off with a line of fence and
guardposts extending over 150 miles to keep the Herero in the sandveld
8,000 Herero rebels with an auxiliary of women and children of twice that

Over
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number, made their exodus into the Omaheke with whatever cattle they had
left.31 On October 2, 1904, Trotha made his Vernichtungsbefehl or
“extermination order”:
I, the Great General of the German soldiers, address this letter
to the Herero people. The Herero are no longer considered German
subjects. They have murdered, stolen, cut off ears and other parts
from wounded soldiers, and now refuse to fight on, out of cowardice.
I have this to say to them . . . the Herero people will have to leave the
country. Otherwise I shall force them to do so by means of guns.
Within the German boundaries, every Herero, whether found armed
or unarmed, with or without cattle, will be shot. I shall not accept any
more women or children. I shall drive them back to their peopleotherwise I shall order shots to be fired at them. These are my words
to the Herero people.32
General Trotha had offered 1,000 marks to any settler who captured a Herero
subchief and 5,000 marks to anyone who supplied the General with Samuel
Maherero himself. He later added that German soldiers were also eligible to
obtain any reward, though he amended that “the firing of shots at women and
children means firing over their heads to drive them away” which he thought two
shots would suffice. As for Herero men he stated: “ I am in no doubt that as a
result of this order no more male prisoners will be taken, but neither will it give
rise to atrocities committed on women and

c h ild r e n .”33

Despite this the greatest

atrocity was the maintenance of the 150-mile fortified border keeping the Herero
in the Omaheke wasteland. Afterwards even the High Command admitted that
the fence destroyed the Herero more than any German weapons could have.
Most of the Herero died a slow death. Though some 1,000 Herero, including
Samuel Maherero, made it across the sandveld to the Okavango region which
had water, they were in turn mistreated as refugees by Sechome, the
paramount chief of the Tswana in Bechuanaland. Samuel Maherero’s power
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was now extinguished. Some 200 Herero made it westward to Walvis Bay
where the British quickly sent them to Cape Town, while an unknown number of
Herero made it safely into Ovamboland. Yet the bulk of survivors who did not
flee into the Omaheke or were not at the Waterberg battle, simply ran back to
their homeland in Hereroland where the German army hunted them down and
herded the survivors into concentration camps. By 1905, there were 5,000
Herero refugees in Bechuanaland or in the Cape Colony while nearly twice that
number remained in the labor camps of Southwest

A fric a .3 4

By now even the chief of the High Command, Schlieffen, was
questioning General Trotha’s methods. He believed Trotha had complicated
matters by keeping the conflict going, because the German forces could not
reach the remnant of the Herero and the Herero could not surrender because of
the Vernichtungbefehl (extermination order).35 Also, when the Colonial
Department of the Foreign Ministry informed Chancellor Bulow what Trotha was
doing, he was outraged. He immediately requested the Kaiser to lift the
extermination order since it was uncivilized, impractical, and worked against the
economy of Southwest Africa-in other words, everything Governor Leutwein
had argued. Bulow bluntly told Wilhelm that this genocide was “demeaning to
our standing among the civilized nations of the world.” After five days of
delaying, the Kaiser consented to have Trotha “show mercy,” and only after
eight more days did Bulow get the Kaiser to cancel the Vernichtungbefehl
entirely.36 Bulow tried to compromise with the General by allowing him to
create concentration camps if need be “where the rest of the Herero people
would be placed and kept for the time being.”37 However Trotha delayed
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complying with the new cancellation orders as long as possible. Berlin had
even insulted Trotha by demanding that he use the Rhenish Missionary Society
(RMS) to make contact with the Herero. The General blamed the missionaries
for the whole mess with the natives and wanted nothing to do with them. He
reported that trie RMS wanted a letter sent to Herero leaders “to persuade their
people to lay down their arms and to return to their old hunting grounds under
the guiding hand of the Church.” The General threw this aside and announced
his own plan to the missionaries: “Those of the Herero who are ready to lay
down their arms will be transported back to areas far removed from the front
line-there they . . . will be put in irons and employed as

ia b o u r .”3s

General

Trotha and Governor Leutwein bitterly fought over Trotha’s continued massacre
despite Chancellor Bulow and the Kaiser’s orders. Trotha even wrote to
Leutwein: “The eastern border of the colony will remain sealed off and terrorism
will be employed against any Hererc showing up. That nation must vanish from
the face of the earth. Having failed to destroy them with guns, I will have to
achieve my end in that

w a y . ”39

Trotha even denied that the Governor had any

say in the military operations. After the High Command supported Trotha’s
position, Leutwein’s future as governor was in jeopardy.
Shockingly, on October 3, 1904, the day after Trotha issued his
extermination order, Hendrik Witbooi as leader of the most powerful Nama
finally “put on ihe white feather of rebellion, thus bringing the Nama and all of
the coiony s south into the revolt.^ Unfortunately because the Germans had
exterminated Herero power the Reich could now focus its efforts entirely on the
Nama. Also, whereas Maherero acted when the German strategic position was
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at its weakest, Hendrik Witbooi waited until thousands of German soldiers were
in the colony for his rebellion. Troopships had dumped battalion after battalion
into Swakopmund to make the trek across the Namib from the Skeleton Coast.
By October 1904 there were over 10,000 German troops in Southwest Africa,
with Witbooi only having 900 rebels to begin his assault. However, the Nama
chief was more of a guerrilla leader than Maherero, and the Nama simply could
no longer contain their rage after seeing the Herero nearly “wiped off the face of
the earth.” Quickly enough half of the Nama tribes responded to Hendrick
Witbooi’s call to arms, and admittedly there were only 500 German soldiers in
Namaland when the revolt began.41 Sensing the increased hostility among the
Nama, Leutwein had sent two companies and one artillery battery to
Luderitzbucht (Angra Pequena) and further reinforcements into Namaland just
in case, so as not to be caught as unprepared as he was with the Herero. The
Germans quickly outnumbered these new rebels as Trotha sent waves of
reinforcements southward, with the Nama Chief having to run for his life on
certain occasions and even driven into the Kalahari for a time. However, the
guerrilla tactics paid off with the interruption of supply lines. Furthermore,
Trotha was frustrated by two more rebel groups. The first was another Nama
tribe led by a chief named Cornelius who rebelled after Witbooi led most of the
other Nama into rebellion. The second group was led by a cattle thief from the
Cape Colony, named Morenga, who after frustrating Cape officials crossed into
Southwest Africa. Actually General Trotha tried negotiating with Cornelius early
by sending his own son, a young lieutenant, to the Nama camp. But a German
patrol, ignorant of what was going on, fired into the camp and thus Cornelius
had the General’s son killed. Against the three rebel groups Trotha’s army, now
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15,000 strong, seemed stalemated. The Germans wanted an open battle which
these rebels never gave them after observing what happened to the Herero.
The guerrillas only raided upon the Germans or attacked them in small groups
at night, which actually proved far more successful.41
Morenga had been operating in the region even before Hendrik Witbooi
donned his white feather of war. At one point the cattle raider captured the
horses of an entire German company, with the Germans having to walk back to
Keetmanshoop. Morenga, himself half Herero and Nama, succeeded in
bringing both Nama and Herero into his group, the first truly Namibian force.
Morenga gave the German’s many small defeats, but he had to be “put on the
back burner” by the German command when the Nama Revolt broke out. The
Cape would actually help put Morenga out of Germany’s misery when the
cattle-raider later crossed back into British territory.42
Hendrik Witbooi had only the loyalty of half the tribes in the revolt, and yet
the entire Nama people equaled only one fourth the size of the Herero who had
already been defeated. More discouraging was the fact that Witbooi was being
met by a German force almost equal to the entire Nama population in
Southwest Africa. To offset these odds the Nama guerrilla leader put his faith in
God. Hendrik Witbooi was a Christian fanatic, almost having his own daughter
executed for premarital sex, and envisioned an African church free from the
western missionaries. However, even more reinforcements arrived from
Germany and despite Hendrik Witbooi’s religious visions the Nama cause
looked hopeless.43
The critical blow which ended the stalemate between the German army
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and the Nama came on October 29, 1905, when the Germans fatally wounded
the Nama rebel leader. His last words were reported thus: “It is enough with
me, it is all over-the children should now have rest.” Trotha called it “a beautiful
message” and soon Samuel Witbooi, the Nama leader’s son and successor,
surrendered.44 The Germans spared the Witbooi Nama and promised to allow

them to remain near their old capital of Gibeon. Likewise, Cornelius’ Bethanie
Nama (the same tribe who two decades earlier sold Angra Pequena to Luderitz)
were also allowed to remain near Bethanie once they surrendered. Most
surviving Nama rebels surrendered during 1905-06, but some who were
outraged by Samuel Witbooi’s early capitulation did not surrender until 1907.45
When the High Command sided with General Trotha on many military
issues, though he was now forced to take prisoners due to the Foreign Ministry,
Berlin granted Governor Leutwein home leave which he apparently requested.
This was just a dignified but forced resignation. Yet just as Berlin was frustrated
by Leutwein’s leniency and unproductivity in the rebellions, German officials
were themselves aghast by Trotha’s cruelty and overproductivity. The General
had ignored certain orders and assumed powers not given to him. Berlin felt he
was uncontrollable and therefore had him recalled. In November 1905 Trotha
was on his way back to Germany. These two were replaced with a new team to
run the post-rebellion colony--Friedrich von Lindequist (the former German
Consul in Cape Town, who tried to encourage Leutwein to annihilate the Nama)
as civilian governor, and General Dame as the new commander of Southwest
Africa.46

In November 1905, the Germans, breaking their promise, actually sent
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over one hundred Witbooi Nama (the late Hendrik Witbooi’s own tribe) to the
German colony of Togo in West Africa. However, after the Togo officials
shipped them back when they found them quickly dying due to illness there.
Also, after General Trotha was gone, another 6,000 returning Herero and 2,000
of the rebelling Nama were willing to surrender-almost all going to concentra
tion (labor) camps. In 1907, by Germany’s own admission, over half of the
2.000 Nama and now 15,000 Herero prisoners died in those camps. The worst
camp was on Shark Island, that rock in Angra Pequena Bay (now Luderitzbucht
in memorial to the founder) which had been long fought for between De Pass
and the Bremen merchant. Witbooi and Bethanie Nama rebels were sent there,
in violation of the surrender agreements made with them. Some 1,000 of the
1,700 sent to Shark Island died within seven months. Cornelius himself
perished in the cold winds of this Skeleton Coast prison. By 1911, further
testifying to the total extinguishment of indigenous power (save of course the
Ovambo), only an estimated 9,800 of the 20,000 Nama and 15,000 of the
80.000 Herero survived the wars-though reports vary. Perhaps if the Nama
had donned their white feather of war when Samuel Maherero gave his plea to
“let us die fighting” events and results might have been different. But this was
the first German war for this Kaiser and one of the few since 1871 for the
German Army (though some German forces did participate in the international
force during the Boxer Rebellion, as did General Trotha himself). Since the
resulting enthusiasm caused by this rare call to arms sent waves of German
volunteers to Southwest Africa, the end result would have been much the same.
Though perhaps if the Nama had rebelled with the Herero the German victory
might have been delayed and there would have probably been a longer
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German casualty list (2,000 Germans were actually killed in both revolts).
However the fact remains that the Nama did not fight with the Herero and
therefore the Germans had the luxury of dealing with them in succession. In this
war at least, the Second Reich rivaled the Third Reich in atrocity and genocide.
Though admittedly on a smaller numeric scale, this war was much greater in its
per capita impact and created ghost villages and regions. Yet upon returning
home, the Kaiser gave General Trotha the Order of Merit for his accomplish
ments. The Treaty of Ukamas officially ended all rebellion in Southwest Africa
in 1907, though it also at least ended the ability for settlers or soldiers to hunt
down remaining Herero.47
With the revolts ended, the Germans and Boers took complete economic
control over the region. The “Imperial Decree of 26 December 1905 Pertaining
to the Sequestration of Natives” issued by the Kaiser’s government, and
endorsed by him personally, ensured the economic fate of the Herero. Though
it included confiscating land from the Nama, Governor Lindequist, possibly
because the raider Morenga was still at large, told the Colonial Department that
it was “premature to take action against the Nama tribes at the present stage.”48
However, once news finally arrived in Windhoek of Morenga’s death in the
Cape nearly all of Namaland fell to the same fate as all of Hereroland. German
colonists quickly built their homesteads on the former native soil. Despite there
being only around a thousand white farmers, of whom over nine hundred were
German, by 1913 they owned over 13.4 million hectares of land, or almost onesixth of Southwest Africa’s entire area. Also by this time, whites owned 183,000
of the 205,000 head of cattle, with the Basters, who had allied themselves to the
Germans in both revolts, owning half of the remainder. This severe action
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against the indigenous population did not escape criticism from several
elements in Berlin. Even the Reichstag opposed the Kaiser’s action. One
deputy from the moderate Center Party called it “nothing else but robbery on a
large scale” and that the “Decree marks the entry of modern slavery into
Southwest Africa.”49 August Bebel, a deputy for the Social Democrats in the
Reichstag and critic of German imperialism, said that the Decree merely used
the rebellions as an excuse to gain what the colonists always wanted, to “wrest
the land from the natives and transfer it to the settlers.”so The Social Democratic
and Center parties passed a resolution through the Reichstag on May 30, 1906,
demanding that the Kaiser’s government return at least a portion of the
confiscated lands back to the Herero and Nama. However, because of its weak
parliamentary powers in the German government, the Kaiser and Governor
Lindequist basically ignored the Reichstag.
The economics of the colony remained discouraging, despite the some
companies and enterprise making huge profits during the confiscation of Herero
and Nama property. At the turn of the century there had been only 3,387 whites
in Southwest Africa, but by 1913 there were 14,830. This number was actually
a lot, since it now nearly equaled the post-revolt population of the Herero, who
despite the genocide were still the second largest tribe in this sparsely
populated colony. Only the Ovambo remained in their own category, and
autonomous, with well over a hundred thousand people. With the sharp rise in
settlers came a large increase in imports, which created a larger trade deficit.
Governor Lindequist tried to develop the infrastructure of the colony by building
new railways, wells, dams, and schools. However, only the discovery of
diamonds redeemed Southwest Africa, yet this occurred only at the very end of
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this colony’s life within the German Reich. In 1908, the first year after settlers
discovered diamonds near Luderitzbucht, 39,000 carats of diamonds were
exported with the largest single diamond measuring 34 carats. Already by the
next year that export figure was 483,000 carats. In 1910 the export quantity
doubled, and by 1913 Southwest Africa exported over one and a half million
carats from Swakopmund in the north and Luderitzbucht in the south. The latter
of these ports, the former Angra Pequena, shipped over 36 million marks worth
of diamond and copper in 1912 alone, the same year in which exports finally
exceeded imports. However, Swakopmund was a difficult port with ships
having to anchor offshore with smaller boats needed to load and unload cargo
through the rough surf until a stable and very lengthy pier was constructed. Yet
Swakopmund remained the gateway to Windhoek from the coast since Walvis
Bay remained in British and then South African hands. In addition to diamonds,
gold and silver mines likewise began producing huge profits. Luderitz’s dream,
and that of many others, had finally come true on this return for all the
investment. Tsumeb in the north became the largest lead mine in all of Africa
while also yielding sixteen other metals which the new Tsumeb-Swakopmund
railway transported to the coast. Bismark’s “little sandpot” which even the
Kaiser wanted to give away was finally a shinning, profitable colony for the
Reich paying off the millions of marks invested into its roads, harbors, railways,
and defense. De Pass had given up too easily, Luderitz’s survivors could say.
De Pass settled with the bird dung of the coast rather than continuing to dig for
Namibia’s buried wealth. The German colonial government and organizations
built permanent offices, hospitals, and churches replacing temporary ones.
The Germans even erected a radio transmitter that could communicate directly
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with Berlin. The British Consul in the German colony reported that a new, more
elaborate period of public construction was to begin in 1914. However, all of
this belated economic progress came too late for German Southwest Africa, as
a shot fired in Sarejevo determined its fate.51
There were only seven short years between the last of the revolts and the
first world war, and an even shorter period of economic success. When the war
began in 1914, Britain relied on the first prime minister of the Union of South
Africa, General Louis Botha, to defend the Union and to seize the now profitable
German colony. Yet South Africa’s forces included many Boers and English
who were disenchanted by the Boer War and who called this conflict “Britain’s
War” wanting no part in it. When the South African Parliament decided to go
ahead with invasion plans for Southwest Africa, many Boers openly

r e b e lle d .52

As early as August 4, Botha informed the British command that South
African (Union) troops could take over the responsibilities of the British imperial
troops stationed there, so that England could use the latter in the European war.
London quickly accepted the

o ffe r.5 3

From the new seat of power at Pretoria,

the Acting Governor General, De Villiers, wasted little time and instructed his
ministers:
If your Ministers at the same time desire and feel themselves
able to seize such part of German South-West Africa as will give
them the command of Swakopmund, Luderitzbucht, and the wireless
stations there or in the interior, we should feel this was a great and
Imperial service. You will, however, realise that any territory now oc
cupied must be at the disposal of the Imperial Government for pur
poses of an ultimate settlement at the conclusion of the war. Other
Dominions are acting in similar way on the same understanding.54
With South Africans understanding that they refrain from making claims to any
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German territory that they might occupy, London approved invasion plans on
August 9, 1914, and called it “an urgent necessity” to take the two German
harbors via “a joint naval and military expedition up the coast.” The British
command also suggested that the “capture o f . . . Wind[hoek], which is of great
importance, might follow another expedition [up the coast] . . . or be carried out
independently from [the] interior.”55 Regarding the invasion, Botha wrote that
“the naval part [is] to be undertaken by the Imperial authorities and the military
operations [are] to be undertaken by the Union Government.”56 However,
before Botha could load South African troops on to British ships or could mass a
land force on the border with Southwest Africa, growing resistance from Boer
(Afrikaner) commanders and troops brought South Africa to the brink of civil
war.
Hopes of an independent Afrikaner republic began as soon as the war
commenced in Europe. These hopes were completely anchored on Germany’s
early successes on the western front in Belgium and France. Another basis for
the Afrikaner revolt had to do with the mystical visions of a man simply known as
Van Rensburg, who prophesied a bloodless end to the Union in which the
resurrection of the Boer Republics would not even require one shot fired. Those
planning rebellion attempted early to enlist General De la Rey, the commander
of western Transvaal. However, De la Rey instead calmed down the Afrikaners
on August 15, inhibiting the revolt, though this only delayed the inevitable. Yet
due to the General’s popularity, the conspirators still wanted to enlist him.57
Lt. Colonel Solomon Maritz, later a rebel general, was another key
individual in the uprising. Maritz had fought in the western districts of the Cape

near Southwest Africa during the Boer War against the British, and left South
Africa after the peace of 1902. He resided in Madagascar briefly before he went
to Southwest Africa where he helped the Germans in the Herero Revolt. Maritz
subsequently returned to South Africa and enlisted in the Union Police.
However, after the new Union created a Defense Force he was actually offered
a commission and in January 1913 given the command of the twelfth military
district, the northwestern region of the Cape where South Africa bordered
German territory. Amazingly Maritz was in control of the same region in which
he had fought the British in the Boer War; now he was suppose to defend British
and Cape interests there. This remarkable, and unlikely, appointment was
achieved through the efforts of General C. F. Beyers, even with the reluctance of
the Union defense minister. A British report on Maritz asserted that the colonel
was “in communication with the German authorities. . . . [even] before he was
appointed to the command of the north-western districts.”58 Maritz himself
reportedly confessed that he was planning for the return of an independent
Afrikaner republic as early as 1912, which he believed an inevitable AngloGerman conflict would enable. Beyond German Southwest Africa, Maritz
maintained close communication with Generals Beyers, De Wet, and Jan Kemp,
as well as keeping contact with the leaders of the Transvaal and the Orange
Free State which were now part of the Union of South Africa.59
As early as August 7, 1914, Maritz declared to Afrikaners in his military
district that “we in South Africa have no enemy unless we make one ourselves”
and exclaimed that he and his force would not be a part of any invasion of
Southwest Africa.so Furthermore, an old associate of Maritz, Piet J. Joubert,

169
who fought in the Boer War with him and commanded the Transvaal Boers, had
been residing at a farm near Keetmanshoop in German Southwest Africa.
Joubert returned to help Maritz’s efforts, and at one point South African locals
accused him of being a German spy. The actions of Maritz gave Germany a
buffer along the Orange River, at least for a while, in the early stages of World
War I and even concealed German violations, via patrols, of the South African
border. At one point, Maritz even allowed a German force to cross into South
Africa to capture the Liebenbergs, an Afrikaner family who had fled from the
German territory with their cattle and who had shot at German patrols in the
process. 61
With the rebellion delayed by De la Rey, Maritz sent Joubert to see
Generals Botha and Smuts, the leaders of Union forces, to put aside any
skepticism which might have arisen because of Joubert’s return. However the
real reason for Maritz sending his associate to Pretoria was to make contact
with Beyers and De la Rey. Beyers had made preparations for a general
Afrikaner revolt on September 15, 1914. Maritz was to keep protecting
Southwest Africa from an invasion, while also allowing German support to flood
in for the rebels. Beyers' plans were for Major J. Kemp, later a rebel general, to
work under De la Rey in the western Transvaal, unless Beyers could not
convince De la Rey to rebel; if such was the case Kemp would take over. By
mid August, Maritz had traveled to Pretoria and confirmed to Beyers that the
revolt indeed had German support. After the seer Van Rensburg revealed
further visions to the Afrikaner people in which he saw 40,000 Germans
marching through the streets of London, and with news of continued German
success in western Europe, General Beyers also announced publicly that he
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too would not participate in any invasion of Southwest

A f r ic a .62

Although rumors were circulating that the Germans were massing a force
at Nakab, a watering hole close to the Orange River border with South Africa,
Maritz covered German activity by supposedly sending out patrols that found
nothing. He tried to keep Union leaders, Botha and Smuts, in the dark as long
as possible. Also, the Nationalist Party, an Afrikaner dominated entity, by
September 9 disclosed it opposed Botha’s plans for an invasion of Southwest
Africa. Several clergy of the Dutch Reformed Church also opposed such plans
and were in early communication with Beyers offering assistance.63
In early September, Beyers continued with plans for the uprising to begin
on September 15, which would include a march on Pretoria in what he hoped to
be a bloodless coupe against the Union government. The General tried
telegraphing De la Rey to enlist him more solidly into the group, but he was
unable to contact him. Thus Beyers had only De Wet’s support and troops in
the Orange Free State, Maritz’s in the northwestern Cape territory, and Kemp’s
control over part of De la Rey’s forces in the western Transvaal. On September
11, 1914 a force led by General Duncan Mackenzie, was about ready to set sail
from Cape Town to seize Luderitzbucht (Angra Pequena). The pressure
mounted for those wanting to prevent a full invasion. By the 14th, Beyers had
written his resignation from Union forces and had his car ready for quick travel.
The next morning, Joubert met with Beyers in Pretoria “informing him that all
arrangements [by Maritz] had been made and all was

r e a d y .”64

So the General

had Joubert sent to Johannesburg in his car, since it would be safer there for
him, and had General De la Rey brought back to Pretoria. Both Kemp and
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Beyers had already made their resignations known to their men by the time De
la Rey arrived.65
With his arrival, Beyers made sure De la Rey was against the invasion of
Southwest Africa, and he confirmed that he was. However the leader of the
coup still did not reveal the true aspirations of their movements to De la Rey, but
persuaded him to speak to Kemp’s massed troops, around 1,600 in number, at
Potchefstroom Camp. He was to give the rebellion some integrity and to win
over those in the ranks who might be swaying by criticizing the Union plans of
invasion. However, as the two generals and a driver made their way from
Pretoria to Kemp’s camp via Johannesburg, they encountered a police cordon.
Unfortunately for the rebellion, the police were after a gang of three people who
had recently stolen a car. When Beyers saw the police barrier he had his driver
run it, thinking that news had leaked out about the revolt and that the police
were looking for him. The police fired and fatally shot General De la Rey, the
most respected and followed leader in the western Transvaal.66 Equally
unfortunate and frustrating for coup leaders was the fact that the mystic seer, the
“prophet,” had refused to go to any meeting and speak which might give the
rebellion credibility, only saying “it was not yet clear to him that [this] was his
p a th . ”67

The rebellion’s rough start continued as the conspirators tried to carry it
into action, though they made some progress. When news was heard of De la
Rey’s death, Kemp had raced in his car to withdraw his resignation, but it was
too late. Although there were fears that the coup would topple, Smuts and
Botha remained ignorant of it regarding the resignations as simple protests
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against the invasion. A few days later, after the Potchefstroom debacle, Kemp
exclaimed: “Thank God, we’ve still g o t. . . Maritz on the Orange

R iv e r .”68

w ith

Maritz’s continued assurances of German support, Beyers, Kemp and De Wet
met on September 20, the evening of De la Rey’s funeral, to plot another
attempt. The next day, under the the flag of the old Orange Free State, they
preached to seven or eight hundred Afrikaners against the invasion of
Southwest Africa, continuing to criticize the invasion and to draw Afrikaner
support.. However a Union force slipped by Maritz and crossed into the
German colony. This almost spoiled the rebellion when it was learned that the
South African force “was badly cut up” by the

G e r m a n s .6 9

Maritz continued to

deny that any German threat existed on the border so that Afrikaners would not
be swept up in Botha’s and Smut’s calls to arms, which would deflate the
planned rebellion. In early October, De Wet and Kemp made speeches
denouncing the Union government in the northern parts of the Orange Free
State, trying to gain support for a revolt.™
Meanwhile, Union General Smuts ordered Maritz to invade Southwest
Africa. Maritz refused, however, saying that the Germans had now 3,000 men
on the border, a force he had been denying existed. Maritz claimed the
Germans had machine guns and howitzers and were too strong for his
untrained force of volunteer Afrikaner commandos. Smuts immediately
demanded Maritz to hand over his command to Major Enslin, whom Smuts
knew was loyal to the Union, and that Maritz come to Pretoria to explain his
actions. Maritz refused, and Enslin secretly wired to Smuts that his commander
was in contact with the Germans: “Will do my best [in] most difficult position--!
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am afraid to trust any one [in] camp.”7i The few Union loyalists in Maritz’s force,
in control of the maxim gun section, trained their weapons back on the camp
just in case Maritz tried anything. Yet further orders for Maritz to step down
came from Pretoria, but Maritz replied: “It is impossible for me to come over [to
Pretoria] under circumstances and hand over command to Major Enslin, as
matters would certainly go wrong.” Trying to prevent government interference,
on October 2, 1914, Maritz wired Pretoria that he could handle the border
situation with his current force, thus contradicting his earlier report. However,
Smuts had already ordered reinforcements and a new commander to be sent to
the

s c e n e .™

That afternoon, the rebel leader broke camp and moved towards

the border of Southwest Africa. Though this is what Pretoria had originally
commanded, Enslin telegraphed:
Maritz’s movement all of the sudden not understood and
suspicious. It may be he thinks he is clearing himself from
disobedience by moving to the border. He expressed no intention
[of] proceeding] further, but have just ascertained he has taken all
ammunition with him. I warned Lieutenant Freer [in] charge [of]
machine guns [to] keep sharp lookout.™
By October 6, Maritz had made arrangements with his German contacts
across the border for continued support. Three days later he assembled his
force of five to six hundred men in such a way as to surround the Union loyalists
of the maxim gun section, which he had disarmed and had taken into custody.
Maritz then gave a lengthy speech condemning Botha, Smuts, and explained
why he refused the orders to invade German Southwest Africa. At this time he
revealed the plan to gain the independence of the Afrikaner regions from British
control. The rebel commander explained:
I can assure you that I did not put on this uniform to serve
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England-far from it. I did it solely for the goodwill of my country, and
now I am on the point to act. When General Botha insisted on my
taking command, I told him that it was a fruitless attempt to try such a
thing, but he would not listen . . . [and now] I lay down my distinction as
an English Lieutenant Colonel, for I want to be nothing more than a
common [Afrikaner] to fight for the freedom of my country, and I shall
not cease, though my blood may flo w .™
In addition Maritz had accepted the rank of general from the Germans and
handed over 60 Union loyalists, from his own force, to be held as prisoners in
Southwest Africa.
Maritz’s actions quickly pushed Beyers, De Wet, and Kemp to take their
own action which had been repeatedly delayed. They had no choice now that
Botha and Smuts had figured out what was going on. On Monday, October 12,
the Union government announced martial law and the existence of a rebellion,
having newspapers announce: “Ever since the resignation of General Beyers
. . . there have been indications that something was wrong with the forces in the
north-west of the Cape Province [under Maritz]”. The report also denounced
Kemp and De Wet as rebels. Full rebellion now became the coup leaders’ only
option. Immediately, news reached Pretoria that Maritz had German weaponry
and possibly personnel at his disposal with the rebel General reportedly
boasting “that he would overrun the whole of South Africa.”75
In the original plan for the coup attempt, in September, Beyers was to be
president of the Boer republic with De la Rey as commander-in-chief. Now,
however, when Maritz forced matters to a head, the best they could do was to
have Beyers form some sort of leadership with commandos under De Wet in
Transvaal and under Kemp in the Orange Free State. Dutch Reformed
ministers immediately helped by transporting the rebel leaders where they
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needed to go. However, Unionists immediately searched for Beyers, forcing the
rebel general to hide for a time, so that De Wet had to take temporary control
over the situation.™ De Wet addressed a crowd of Afrikaners trying to gain
further support, stating that “you shall know shortly if happiness or misery is
coming over the land. There are only a few here, but thousands are ready and
waiting for the word.”77
On October 13, Beyers and a delegation met with Botha in Pretoria and
formally announced the coup. At the same time they ordered Afrikaner troops to
“bedank dadelik" or “resign immediately” from Union commands or posts.™
Three days later Beyers was in the field with his army. Later that month Beyers
issued another call to arms: “All [Afrikaners] of the Union of South Africa from
16 to 60 years of age are commandeered with horse, saddle, and rifle and
ammunition complete (with) rations for eight days to appear on Tuesday
morning, 27th October, 1914, at 8 o’clock a. m. at Hathoschlangte.”™ Hopefully
this call would bring in larger numbers as the public finally knew the true reason
for the rebellion-their independence.
Responding after this call, Union General Botha issued a statement on
October 26: “Citizens who have been . . . guilty of disobedience . . . need not
fear any action against them . . . on the part of the Government, so long as they
remain quietly at home and abstain from acts of violence or hostility against the
authority of the Government of the

U n io n .”80

Botha and Smuts relied on the

offer of amnesty to keep Afrikaners from answering the call, but it went largely
unheeded as hundreds and then thousands took to the field in the Transvaal *
and in the Orange Free State. The next day Botha himself took to the field to do
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battle with those who had already responded to Beyers' call. Almost
immediately, General Botha dispersed Beyers' forces at Commissie Drift, south
of Rustenburg, and forced the rebel general into hiding once more. A couple of
days later, the government again offered amnesty with warnings that if the rebel
commandos did not return home the government would seize their property.
Shortly, Union forces dispersed another rebel group, some of Beyers' and some
of Kemp’s, at Treurfontein. So far victories had been made without blood spilt,
so the Union government issued yet another warning to have local
commanders “call upon [Afrikaners] to lay down their arms and go home. . . . if
not, they will be prosecuted and punished as rebels. ”81 At this point, amnesty
was also offered to rebel leaders provided no blood was spilled in the
meantime.82
Union General Smuts did not want a civil war in South Africa in the
middle of World War I, and therefore he authorized numerous attempts to open
negotiations with De Wet and Beyers in addition to the amnesty offers. One
report of such negotiations stated:
The conversation turned on the resolution by Parliament with
regard to the campaign against German South-West Africa and the
reason for General Beyers and others taking up the position in which
they stood. Beyers stated that he was taking up a position of passive
resistance . . . and as it was impossible to address the [Afrikaners] in
the ordinary way, on account of the regulations under Martial Law
being so strict they were bound to come together in the manner they
had done, to silently protest. Such restrictions, he said, were only to
be expected in Russia.83
Beyers at one point in negotiations denied ties with Maritz and even offered a
compromise in which he would stop his revolt if only volunteers were used
against Southwest Africa. However, it appears that the rebel general was just
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buying De Wet and Kemp time to build-up. The government received a report
that De Wet would continue the fight until the Union government agreed to
withdraw all troops that had already invaded the Skeleton Coast. Another
report indicated that: “De Wet announces that all troops be removed from
German South-West Africa to within Union borders. If this is not done, he will
fight for the independence of the Transvaal and the Free State. He states that
arms, etc., will be supplied him by Maritz.”84 De Wet also bluffed a readiness to
undertake negotiations in order to buy time. These Boer leaders knew full well
they were going to ride this coup to its professed e n d -a sovereign Afrikaner
republic. During one set of promised negotiation meetings, De Wet instead
used the ruse to blow up bridges and cut telegraph lines.85 On November 5, De
Wet even felt confident enough to write:
Without making any promises now already (we are not going
to divide the bear’s skin before the bear is shot), I wish it to be known
that my intention is that, if we attain our ideal, those [Afrikaners] who
support our endeavour to attain independence are to receive a re
ward. The money for this (purpose) must come out of an assessment
levied upon the [Afrikaners] who remained at home, [and] the un
faithful who fought against us.86
Beyers likewise used the bluff of diplomacy to take the advantage of surprise.
After having a face off with a Union force for hours, pending negotiations, he
actually maneuvered his forces into an offensive against the Union
commandos.87 One British report concluded that “it is self-evident that the rebel
generals were trifling with the seriously meant offers of peace made by the
Government, and were taking advantage of its anxiety to avoid bloodshed to
concentrate their forces and to complete their organization.”88 Because of the
delays in hostilities, in the efforts of finding peace, the Union government had
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given De Wet time enough to mass 5,000 troops in the Orange Free State
alone.89 On November 7, Smuts reported that “fighting had already begun at
Kroonstad in order to oppose [De W et’s] destruction of [rail]line and blowing up
of bridges.” On the same day, Smuts reported that Union forces had
successfully confronted Beyers near Hoopstad and had captured 350 of his
commandos. Regarding the issue of amnesty, Smuts the next day admitted that
the situation had totally changed now that “private property had been destroyed
and numerous lives have been lost.”9o
Also, Botha severely defeated De Wet at Mushroom Valley on November
12, in which the rebels suffered heavy losses. This prompted Botha, now as
Prime Minister of South Africa and as commander-in-chief of all Union forces in
the field, to issue his proclamation of November 21, 1914, which again offered
amnesty but only to those who immediately disarmed. Furthermore, he
withdrew the offer now from all rebel leaders. Pretoria had become more
aggressive against the rebels. Only after Mushroom Valley did De Wet finally
agreed to serious peace negotiations, but Smut perceiving that the tables were
turning against the rebels refused. However, Pretoria did extended the length
of time for the “rank and file” Boer rebels to accept amnesty, even after blood
had spilled, while also announcing that the government would confiscate the
cattle of all rebels who remained in the field. Smuts, sensing victory over the
coup, demanded the unconditional surrender of rebel officers, though he
assured that “at present no intention to apply capital punishment” was being
considered.91 Following Mushroom Valley, Union forces continued to gather
momentum against the rebels. In early December, Botha personally led further
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operations in the Orange Free State. By the 4th he had already captured seven
hundred rebels, adding two hundred more on that day alone. Within a week
several rebel leaders had unconditionally surrendered around twelve hundred
more Boers. The Union officers allowed “rank and file” rebels to return to their
homes upon reporting to their local magistrates, but held all leaders in
custody. 92
By the new year Union forces were decisively on the offensive. Praises
rang in the London Times for Generals Smuts and Botha. One article described
Smuts’ “surrounding of a rebel commando [via] horses, foot, motor-cars, and
armoured trains, all moved with the skill of chess

p la y e r s .”93

Soon it was

reported that Union forces had heavily defeated De W et’s Freikorps, or
volunteer corps of commandos, after which the rebel general fled into
Bechuanaland trying to flee to Southwest Africa. However Union motor-car
troops ran over and killed De Wet (while Beyers drowned in a river around the
same time). With both De Wet and Beyers out of the picture, Kemp and Maritz
kept the revolt alive for another month and even attempted an offensive,
although it

fa ile d .9 4

Maritz and Kemp met near Upington on January 30 and

decided to submit to the terms of the unconditional surrender. On February 3,
news from Pretoria reported that 104 of Maritz’s men had surrendered along
with 529 of Kemp’s. By the next day news came in that Kemp himself had
surrendered, with Maritz expected to in a matter of days. However, it was later
revealed that Maritz had actually crossed into German territory to collect what
men he had there and bring them back to surrender. On February 9, 1915,
news from Pretoria informed London that the Germans had shot Maritz in
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Southwest Africa upon finding out that Maritz was performing double treason by
leading German artillery into a trap near Kakamas (though later reports
indicated that he fled German territory). Before the month’s end many of the
rebel officers captured were facing trial for their treason.95 One article in
the Times read that “the whole of the Union Forces can be launched in the
desired direction [against Southwest Africa].”96
After the Afrikaner coup had been snuffed out, Botha and Smuts
concentrated their efforts on the invasion of German Southwest Africa. General
Smuts took the command of one Union column crossing the Orange River into
Namaland pushing northward. General Botha went to Luderitzbucht (Angra
Pequena) where he addressed the troops who had seized the port the previous
year and had been waiting for the end of the coup. He stated:
I know it is not your fault that you are still here. It is my fault;
but in our country I have had to deal with a rebellion, which gave
me much pain and sorrow. I have had to give much of my attention
to this. Thank God it is past. (Cheers) I am here now, and may tell
you that more men are coming along to help us achieve our object.
It has been hard for you to have to be lying apparently idle so long,
but still you have been doing very good work. Indeed, I know that
the British Empire is gra teful. . . We in South Africa have undertaken
this task, and we are going to carry it through with all possible de
termination.97
Eventually, two columns pushed inland from Walvis Bay towards Windhoek, as
Smuts pushed up from the south. The South African force of 50,000
outnumbered and outgunned the German force of 9,000 who were mostly
reservists. However, the use of chemical warfare was not limited to the
European continent as the Germans poisoned most of the few wells that aided
the crossing of the Namib Desert into the colony’s heartland. The Germans

181

used the harsh environment as their greatest weapon, though in the end they
could only fight a delaying war due to a lack of sufficient forces. The Germans
could not get their Baster allies to fight against the South Africans because of
that tribes reluctance to kill whites. Despite the minefields prepared by the
Germans, Botha crossed the Namib with his column from Swakopmund and
captured the capital of Windhoek on May 12, 1915. Then, after “double-timing”
his force over 120 miles in one week, the South African commander cut off the
German forces before they could retreat into the Caprivi Strip and escape
across the Zambezi to German East Africa. Nearly 3,400 German troops and
militia surrendered on July 9, 1915, near Tsumeb under the command of
Colonel Franke, the same officer who had raced to Windhoek’s rescue during
the Herero revolt. In this war of more maneuver and delay than actual combat,
only 113 South Africans and 311 Germans actually died in combat according to
most accounts.98 All remaining pockets of Boer resistance in South Africa
surrendered only four days before Franke’s at Tsumeb. In reality, the Boer
rebels in South Africa, which in November 1914 numbered 11,000, had
defended Southwest Africa just as effectively or more so than the German
troops. The Union of South Africa made Sir Howard Gorges the military
governor of Southwest Africa, and he ruled under martial law until the League
of Nations determined the fate of the former German colony.99 Therefore, nearly
as quickly as Germany had established itself on the Skeleton Coast, it had now
been thrown out. London and Cape Town could finally close the door they had
left open thirty-two years earlier.
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E p ilo g u e

As Britain and France quickly took over the other German colonies in
Africa, along with Australia and New Zealand occupying Germany’s
possessions in the Pacific, Southwest Africa remained under South African
control. The Treaty of Versailles of 1919 officially stripped Germany of its
colonial empire, though by this time the Second Reich had ended as well. In
1920 the League of Nations handed Southwest Africa over to the Union of
South Africa to be administered as a Mandate. This allowed South Africa to
rule its neighbor as its own. The Mandate took effect on the first day of 1921
when martial law was finally lifted in the former German colony. The forced
repatriation of thousands of Germans back to Europe reduced the German
population in Southwest Africa from 15,000 (civilian and military) to around
8,000. Yet the white population was to double by 1926 from what it had been in
1914. This was due to the encouragement from the South African government
to have thousands of Afrikaners settle in Southwest Africa. 1
Most of the indigenous population viewed the South African occupation
as a liberation bringing pre-German freedom back to the land. In the early
years of the Mandate it looked hopeful as special courts convicted whites of
their brutal treatment of blacks, and as they repealed the zuchtligungsrect (the
right of a white master to punish his black servant). The Herero and the Nama
reported horror stories of prisons and labor camps in which the Germans
tortured, starved, or executed many. However, South Africa eventually became
as severe in its occupation of Southwest Africa as Germany had been. There
was, however, a critical difference. The Germans had obliterated any
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resistance from the Herero and Nama; but unlike Germany, South Africa
attempted to eliminate the autonomy and resistance of the Ovambo. Therefore
the size of the potential resistance actually doubled. Many from nearly all of the
tribes of Southwest Africa, save possibly the rather passive bushmen, joined
SWAPO (Southwest Africa People’s Organization). Having a single enemy,
South Africa, it helped create the Namibian identity beyond the separate tribes.
This organization formed the foundation for armed resistance against South
African’s occupation. Likewise, with the League of Nations replaced by the
United Nations following World War II, much of the world came to realize the
injustice of the Mandate and gave increased pressure against South Africa to
let Southwest Africa go. Yet South Africa held on to the territory, and to protect
the white population it established a Police Zone where the government
required blacks to carry passes to travel in and out of the dwindling tribal
reserves. Namibia finally gained its independence in 1990; thus one of the last
African regions to be colonized was also the last to be free .2
Namibia which had less than a quarter of a million inhabitants in the
1920’s, now has a growing population of 1.6 million. Although only six percent
of the population is white and only three percent speak German (compared with
Afrikaans 14% and English 1% which are the official languages), the impact of
German culture on Southwest Africa was greater than any other colony Berlin
possessed. Of the 18,370 German emigrants (excluding troops) to southern
Africa during her colonial period, over 12,300 went to Southwest Africa, while
only 4,100 went to East Africa (Tanganyika) and only 1,650 went to Cameroon.
In fact, German Namibian citizens today can still live on Goering Street in
Windhoek or drive by much of the buildings in the capital, Swakopmund,
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Luderitzbucht, or the other major cities and see evidence of German culture in
its organization, architecture, or beer hails. Yet it was Germany’s religion which
had the most lasting effect. Today 51% of Namibians are Lutheran. The
Rhenish Mission has become the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Finnish
Mission the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo-Okavango Church. Also, there is the
white German Evangelical Lutheran Church. In recent years all three have
talked of merger. In addition to Lutherans, the present population is 20%
Catholic, whereas the Dutch Reformed of the Afrikaners is an extreme minority.
Another interesting comment on how well the German heritage remained in
Southwest Africa, was the number of Germans immigrating there after the
Second World War. Actually, half of the German immigrants living in Namibia
were West German citizens at one time. Also interesting, was the fact that the
Lutheran churches, at times assisted by the small Anglican Church, defied the
Dutch Reformed by aiding SWAPO in its efforts to end South African
occupation. South African officials expelled many Lutheran bishops from the
country because of this. Namibians only recently have begun to forgive their
German neighbors for the past, and are making amends with their Afrikaner
countrymen. Only in the independence of Namibia and in the recent election of
Nelson Mandela in South Africa has the region began to purge itself of the
negative attributes of European imperialism. While remembering this past,
which was at times horrible, Nambians both white and black are finally on the
same road sharing a future and destiny.3
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3Legendre, Okovango. p. 23; Mertens, Indigenous, plate 23; Reginald
H. Green etal, Nambia: The Last Colony. (New York: Longman, 1981), p. 28,
132-135; “Namibia,” MacGlobe, (Broderbund Software, Inc.), 1992.
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